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In 2005, Canongate, an Edinburgh-based publisher, launched the first 
volumes in the Canongate Myths series, a project which commissioned 
renowned authors to retell ancient mythologies for contemporary audiences. 
Securing novellas from authors including Su Tong, Philip Pullman, A.S. Byatt 
and thirteen others, the project explores what is understood by myth today 
and how mythology remains relevant for a twenty-first century audience. It 
also asked female writers to engage directly with ancient mythologies which 
have perpetuated misogynistic narratives for millennia, encouraging those 
writers to self-consciously consider representations of gender contained 
within their selected source myths.  
This thesis uses the female-authored Greco-Roman mythologies in the 
series, from Margaret Atwood, Jeanette Winterson, Ali Smith and Salley 
Vickers, as a unique corpus in which to locate arguments regarding the 
efficacy and effect of a ‘feminist’ approach to rewriting mythology. Critical 
opinion has been split regarding whether a ‘feminist rewriting’ is, in fact, 
attainable, with some detractors asserting that any revision necessarily 
replicates the language and structure of the original. Yet by looking at the 
individual retellings and at the project as a whole, this project will argue that 
when viewed as a collaborative, ongoing process, engagements with ancient 
mythologies may in time yield results which are beneficial for representations 
of femininity and may, in turn, help to destabilise the masculinised model of 
the subject. The thesis contends that mythology can act as a framework 
through which female authors can evaluate the gendered implications of the 
personal, public and meta aspects of mythmaking and storytelling more 
generally, by considering the time and context-bound production of both the 
source myths - from Homer to Ovid, Sophocles to Freud - as well as the 
revisions themselves. 
The Canongate Myths series also serves as a distinct source for considering 
the character of rewriting within a post-postmodern literary landscape. With 
all four texts indicating a preoccupation with questions of ‘truth’, ‘reality’, and 
‘authenticity’, the Myths series contributes to ongoing critical discussions 
regarding the shifting critical climate of twenty-first century literature. In 
particular, the texts selected from the series suggest an ongoing relationship 
with modernism and its engagements with mythology; the thesis helps to 
advance current discussions pertaining to contemporary literature’s 
relationship with its modernist past. These references, and each myth’s 
presentation of a distinct theoretical perspective, indicates that despite 
Lyotard’s assertions, we have not yet seen the death of all metanarratives. 
These self-consciously constructed novellas show that questions around 
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metanarratives of patriarchy and mythology are ongoing and that feminist 
































In 2005, Canongate, an Edinburgh-based publisher, launched the first 
volumes in the Canongate Myths series, a project which commissioned 
renowned authors to retell ancient mythologies for contemporary audiences. 
Securing novellas from authors including Su Tong, Philip Pullman, A.S. Byatt 
and thirteen others, the project explores what is understood by myth today 
and how mythology remains relevant for a twenty-first century audience. It 
also asked female writers to engage directly with ancient mythologies which 
have perpetuated misogynistic narratives for millennia, encouraging those 
writers to self-consciously consider representations of gender contained 
within their selected source myths.  
This thesis questions what may be understood as a feminist rewriting of 
mythology and whether or not the four female-authored, Greco-Roman 
myths included in the series (from writers Margaret Atwood, Jeanette 
Winterson, Ali Smith and Salley Vickers) are in fact feminist in their approach 
to revision. The broader implications of the process of rewriting myth are 
considered and these four novellas are also linked back to modernism, 
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We would have written together, we would have been authors together, we 
would have drawn power from each other, we would have fought shoulder to 
shoulder because what was ours was inimitably ours. The solitude of 
women’s minds is regrettable, I said to myself, it’s a waste to be separated 
from each other, without procedures, without tradition. 


















If only I understood that the globe itself, complete, perfect, unique, is a 
story. Science is a story. History is a story. These are the stories we 
tell ourselves to make ourselves come true. 
(Winterson, Weight 145) 
 
I’m interested in myth because […] they are extraordinary lies 
designed to make people unfree.  
 (Carter, “Notes from the Frontline” 38) 
 
Myth is endlessly in conflict with itself. We recognise it as a synonym for a 
lie, but when we consider ancient mythologies, we also assume that such 
stories contain some form of ‘truth’. In Jeanette Winterson’s Weight, myth is, 
alongside science and history, another story, the construction of which aids 
the generation of identity. But for Angela Carter, the untruth of myth, the 
stories that we peddle as “extraordinary lies”, far from creating possibilities of 
self, restrict and suppress us. This restriction has often been misogynistic in 
character; myth’s inherent misogyny has been broadly discussed, as I will 
detail in due course. This paradox – an untruth designed to permit access or 
speak to truth, but which in turn can serve to perpetuate further untruth – lies 
at the heart of this thesis. When considered in light of myth’s relationship to 
women and femininity, a challenging question emerges: despite the many 
efforts of women writers to revise myth in new forms, is a truly feminist 
rewriting of mythology ever possible? 
The affirmative response offered by this thesis comes with many 
considerations and caveats. It is a complex issue, one which, as we will see, 
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has prompted divisive critical response. Yet, taking heart from Diane 
Purkiss’s assurance that, despite the challenges of such an endeavour, 
“possibilities are endless” (455), and Liedeke Plate’s hopeful endorsement of 
“the emancipatory potential of rewriting” (4), this thesis posits that the 
practice of rewriting ancient mythology can offer liberating pathways for the 
female writer and provide feminist revisions. This optimism is also informed 
by a certain form of pragmatism: women are continuously engaged with the 
act of mythological revision and such narratives often prove to be popular 
with the reading public. In 2018 alone, Daisy Johnson’s retelling of the 
Oedipus myth Everything Under was shortlisted for the Man Booker Prize, 
Madeline Miller released Circe, a New York Times number 1 bestseller, and 
Kamila Shamsie’s Home Fire, a reworking of the myth of Antigone, won the 
Women’s Prize for Fiction. Given such a persistent interest in the act of 
female mythmaking, I ultimately hold that feminist engagements with myth 
can, given its power as a dominant metanarrative at a time when our literary 
culture is renegotiating our relationships to such discourses, speak to 
broader questions about contemporary literature and the woman writer’s 
place within that context.1  
 
1 Metanarratives are mentioned frequently throughout this thesis. Whilst acknowledging the 
essential definition of a story-about-a-story, the definition used herein extends this to include 
the overarching narratives which afford our beliefs and experiences some kind of structure. 
Stephens and McCallum refer to it as “a global or totalizing narrative schema which orders 
and explains knowledge and experience” (6). Lyotard identified scepticism regarding 
metanarratives as the primary feature of postmodernism; such metanarratives according to 
his estimation included enlightened emancipation and Marxism (1984). Both myth and 
patriarchy may, therefore, be seen as global narratives attempting to “order and explain 
knowledge and experience”. Their constructed nature, rooted in story, does not preclude 
them from being felt to be real and from having genuine impact upon the experience of those 
operating within or responding to such narratives. 
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 The site for these questions is a unique collection of rewritten myths. 
The Canongate Myths series, a publishing project launched by Edinburgh 
publishers Canongate in 2005, will serve as a case study for these wider 
discussions. My interest in the Canongate Myths began during my Master of 
Studies in Creative Writing at the University of Oxford (2011-13). I had, 
rather foolishly, decided that my end of first year project would be to write a 
feminist epic poem (unsurprisingly, still unfinished). In support of this creative 
project, I undertook a critical study of Margaret Atwood’s The Penelopiad 
(2005). I found it to be an unusually provocative text, quite different from 
what I might have expected from a rewriting of the Odyssey. From there, my 
interest in the broader project of the Myths series grew.2 I recognised that the 
Myths project served as a distinct corpus in which to locate debates 
regarding female engagements with mythology and potentially generate new 
contributions to this ongoing critical discussion.  
 Upon beginning this thesis, my intention was to survey all 16 of the 
constituent texts of this project.3 This ambition proved to be far too great and 
a more refined scope was identified. This study will engage with the four 
female-authored texts using Greco-Roman sources produced during the 
Canongate Myths publishing project: Margaret Atwood’s The Penelopiad 
(2005), a retelling of the Odyssey, Jeanette Winterson’s Weight (2005), the 
myth of Atlas and Heracles, Ali Smith’s Girl meets boy (2007), the myth of 
 
2 The contents of this essay differ entirely from the analysis presented in Chapter 2 of this 
thesis. 
3 All of the Canongate Myths, including the languages in which they are published, are 
included in a more detailed discussion about the publishing process, found on pp69-70.  
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Iphis and Ianthe, and Salley Vickers’ Where Three Roads Meet (2007), the 
myth of Oedipus. The selection of rewritten mythologies from the Greco-
Roman Canongate pantheon did, unfortunately, preclude the inclusion of any 
writers of colour, and this absence is noted here as a weakness within the 
project. Yet there is a justification for this narrowing in scope; given the 
Greco-Roman tradition’s prevalence within the Western canon and within 
western education, it was decided that concentrating on this particular subset 
of the Canongate Myths would allow for a more concise engagement with the 
issues at hand and the mythological trajectories in question.4  
 The four texts selected have proven to be rich as resources for 
advancing these discussions. They are, as we shall see in the unfolding of 
this project, all as provocative as Atwood’s Penelopiad, albeit in distinct 
ways. A fascinating element of this study was the way in which each text 
demanded an engagement with a different theoretical approach. This thesis 
will, in its survey of these four titles, touch upon questions of postmodernism, 
‘post-postmodernism’, metamodernism, ecofeminism and Freudian 
psychoanalysis. Ultimately, one factor which was found to underpin all four 
texts was a preoccupation with where we are now – how the female writer 
self-consciously situates herself in this time beyond postmodernism. Indeed, 
one of the most interesting findings of this thesis is that all four texts share a 
 
4 Although I regretfully acknowledge the absence of authors of colour, I have done my best 
to, wherever possible, include critics of colour. I am also pleased to note that 50% of the 
authors in this thesis are queer (Winterson and Smith); I cannot take credit for this as my 
scope was shaped by the Canongate commissioning process but it is identified here as a 




similar engagement with, albeit to varying degrees, modernist discourses 
and most particularly, modernist understandings of myth. This interrelation of 
ancient past, modernist past, uncertain present and a feminist future, has 
generated some fascinating subtexts within the four Myths in question. 
 Whilst individual texts from the series have engendered critical 
engagement, most particularly The Penelopiad, these four texts have never, 
to the best of the researcher’s knowledge, been discussed alongside each 
other as part of a broader literary project.5 The shared motivation espoused 
by the challenge of the Canongate brief connects the four texts in a unique 
way and allows us to consider how feminist mythological rewrites may 
operate in sympathy with or in opposition to each other, in keeping with an 
understanding of myth as a “palimpsest”, composed of overlapping and 
obfuscating versions (Miles 4). This identification of the four texts as a group 
has informed my critical approach to feminist rewriting of myth, ultimately 
encouraging me to conclude that all feminist rewriting must be characterised 
and undertaken as part of a broader ‘project’. 
  Before engaging directly with the texts themselves, some groundwork 
is necessary. A deeper engagement with what we understand as ‘myth’ is 
required; from there, a discussion of the debates surrounding feminist 
rewriting in general and feminist rewriting of mythology in particular will 
further serve to contextualise the body of the thesis. From there, a brief 
outline of the approach advocated by this study will be provided; a closer 
 
5 The Myths as publishing project has been the subject of a Master’s thesis, as discussed on 
p66, but has not been the subject of a sustained critical literary study.  
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consideration of the publishing and reception aspects of the Canongate 
Myths project will provide the final piece of context needed before delving 
into the stories themselves to see what ‘truths’ can be found. 
 
What is a myth? 
Myths are universal and timeless stories that reflect and shape our 
lives – they explore our desires, our fears, our longings, and provide 
narratives that remind us what it means to be human. The Myths 
series brings together some of the world’s finest writers, each of 
whom has retold a myth in a contemporary and memorable way. 
(Foreword to each text in the Canongate Myths series.) 
 
Myth, truth and lie, “universally timeless” yet time-and-context bound, 
structure of our unconscious and inspiration for acts of creation, contains 
multitudes.6 A holistic discussion of the history, philosophy and theory of 
myth would demand many volumes and as such, we must acknowledge that 
the brief survey here of different theories of myth is necessarily approximate. 
An interesting departure point might be to note that the term ‘myth’ itself was 
first used as late as 1783 by Christian Gottlob Heyne, prompting Ken 
Dowden and Niall Livingstone to warn: “Myth is therefore as much a product 
of the modern history of ideas from the end of the Enlightenment onward as 
it is an object product of [say] ancient Greece” (3).7 It should be observed, 
therefore, that the definition of myth constructed within this thesis is a 
 
6 For brevity and flow, ‘myth’ and ‘mythology’ are used interchangeably here. This is to 
accommodate the broader philosophical implications of myth within mythology’s definition as 
a collection of, or the study of, myth.  
7 Whilst “myth” was not used in this context prior to the 18th century, the root of the term 
naturally extends back to the ancient world. The word “mythos” means word or tale in 
ancient Greek – a story conceived to be read aloud (Bremmer 4). Dowden and Livingstone 
are here acknowledging that the broader intricacies and relevance of myth as narrative did 
not begin to be formally theorised until the 18th century.  
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pragmatic product of its moment of construction today in the twenty-first 
century. Indeed, this is a position supported by Laurence Coupe, who 
suggests:  
The mythographer [ought to] acknowledge that her own chosen 
emphasis is only one of many. For example, not all myths are linked 
with a ritual; not all myths are about gods, and not all myths concern a 
time outside of historical time. Exceptions to and contradictions of any 
particular paradigm are endless. (7)  
 
As Robert W. Brockway has commented: “There is little consensus. 
The field is chaos” (9). The imperfection of the paradigm supplied herein is 
thus dutifully highlighted and from here, we shall attempt to find some order 
in this chaos.  
 In Sharon Rose Wilson’s discussion of contemporary myths and fairy 
tales, she is content to use myths simply as intertexts rather than “language, 
speech or semiological system” (Wilson, Myths and Fairy Tales in 
Contemporary Women’s Fiction: From Atwood to Morrison 1). In this she is 
referring variously to theorists such as philologist F. Max Muller, 
psychotherapist Nor Hall, semiologist Roland Barthes and others. Whilst the 
impulse to consider the purely narrative elements of mythology is tempting, it 
is my feeling that the discussions herein are advanced and supported by a 
brief engagement with some of the semiological and philosophical 
implications of mythology. However, having noted the need for a closer 
engagement with theories of myth, a further observation has fed into this 
survey. There is, both in contemporary and historical terms, a preponderance 
of male theorists working on myth as an abstracted concept, philosophy or 
structure. To dismiss the history of myth theory would be a misstep, but so 
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too would an attempt to consider too closely abstracted theories of myth 
which, as we will see, do not bear any obvious relationship with women’s 
textual responses to mythological discourse. The responses themselves 
present varying kinds of theoretical engagement, suggesting a more organic 
relationship than a fully detailed survey would account for. Whilst the review 
that follows will attempt, through broad strokes, to consider some of the more 
pertinent contributions to this discussion, what this thesis characterises as a 
“myth” will be fleshed out more fully throughout an engagement with 
theoretical perspectives on feminist engagements with rewriting “myth” and 
through the responses to this process, which are themselves very telling. At 
this point, a formal acknowledgement of Susan Sellers’ exhaustive survey of 
mythography presented in Myth and Fairy Tale in Contemporary Women’s 
Fiction (2001) is necessary; her highly detailed discussion shines a great 
deal of light on a whole body of complex theories. What I present below has 
been shaped by her superior scholarship but also offers some deviation from 
her research.   
 I understand myth as a story conceived and told as a way of 
structuring or elucidating some intangible or incomprehensible aspect of 
human experience. Cupitt speaks to 
Myth-making as […] a primal or universal function of the human mind 
… Both for society at large and for the individual, this story-generating 
function seems irreplaceable. The individual finds meaning in his life 
by making of his life a story set within a larger social and cosmic story. 
(29)  
 
Myth’s oppositional relationship to truth and untruth is of crucial interest to 
many critics; Michael Bell considers myth to encompass “both a supremely 
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significant foundational story and a falsehood” (1). Myth’s capacity to 
incorporate both truth and lie is a distinguishing characteristic and one which, 
according to Susan Sellers, was even recognised during Plato’s lifetime (23). 
Sharon Rose Wilson defines “stories believed to be true and sacred, stories 
that are etiological explanations of creation and the world” (Myths and Fairy 
Tales in Contemporary Women’s Fiction 2). Thelma J. Shinn cites Eliade’s 
response to myth’s association with falsehood, claiming it also encompasses 
“the absolute truth, because it narrates a sacred history; that is, a 
transhuman revelation that took place at the dawn of the Great time, in the 
holy time of beginnings” (Shinn 23; Eliade 19). Whilst we ought to be 
somewhat sceptical towards any suggestion of “absolute truth”, Eliade’s 
description of myth suggests the truth-telling power associated with myth and 
its perceived capacity to contain a core of originary truth. Veronica L. 
Schanoes defines myth as “a sacred, unquestioned story, involving divine or 
semi-divine beings, which purports to be history and explains how the 
physical or cultural world came to take the form it has”, whilst also 
recognising there are exceptions to even this designation (10). As Coupe has 
illustrated, many myths do not contain reference to divinity and, as Miles 
states regarding myth’s palimpsestic nature, many myths have been 
questioned. Indeed, conflicting reports of its flexibility/fixity are something to 
which we will return. Schanoes does recognise these potential variants, but 
her definition serves to support an understanding of myth as a story 
tangential to but separate from history, a narrative designed to account for 
the world as we experience(d) it. David Leeming echoes myth’s expression 
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of “any given culture’s literal or metaphorical understanding of various 
aspects of reality” (xi). Sellers cites Hans Blumenberg’s argument that myth 
was a way for populations who were newly bipedal to confront the anxiety 
caused by their own evolution. Whilst she is healthily sceptical of this blanket 
approach, she “cites it […] as an illustration of the ongoing endeavour to 
connect mythology to human origins” (Sellers 3). Recognising myth as a 
repository for both truth and untruth is a vital task for the feminist 
mythographer; to accept that it merely expresses essential or primal truths 
which in turn inform narratives detailing the oppression, mistreatment or 
absence of women suggests that such treatment comes from some basic 
truth, which I forthrightly reject. Yet to dismiss them purely as story with no 
basis in experience or no access to understanding is similarly limiting. It is in 
the dialectical relationship between truth and untruth that we find myth.  
 Karen Armstrong’s A Short History of Myth was published as a 
companion volume alongside the first two texts in the Canongate Myths 
series. She raised five key points about myth, which may have in some way 
influenced the Canongate authors’ understandings of myth: 
1. Myth is almost universally preoccupied with death and the possibility 
of extinction. 
2. Myth cannot be understood separately from ritual. 
3. Myths are about extremes; “they force us to go beyond our 
experience”. 
4. Myth is not a story created for the sake of art, but contains within it 
moral direction. 
5. “All mythology speaks of another plane that exists alongside our own 
world and in some sense supports it […] It has been called ‘the 
perennial philosophy’ because it informed the mythology, ritual and 
social organisation of all societies before the advent of our scientific 
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modernity and continues to influence more traditional societies today”. 
(3–4) 
Whilst Armstrong asserts that myth is not created for art, it should be noted 
that Coupe considers myth to be inseparable from mythographic art and 
Sarah B. Pomeroy has stressed that the mythology we have received in the 
Western world has been preserved entirely by male art. Ritual may itself be 
understood as an act of creation and thus they are more inextricably bound 
than Armstrong may be suggesting here (Coupe 30; Pomeroy 10). The 
fixation upon death and interest in the possibility of extinction is interesting, 
particularly considering the prevalence of paradigms which inversely are 
preoccupied with fertility, the most prominent of these being Frazer’s The 
Golden Bough (1890), or Mircea Eliade’s interest in creation myths (1957). 
 Another similarly contradictory aspect of theorisations of myth pertains 
to its fixity. G.R. Manton has described the process of embellishment as 
myths were performed, each elaboration helping to allow that particular myth 
to achieve its optimum impact at that precise moment, something which 
Sellers ascribes to the ritualistic aspect of myth and its ability to be shaped 
by its audience (Manton 11–17; Sellers 3). Sellers’ own opinion, however, is 
that myth can be resilient and liable to withstand all but the most direct and 
violent attacks (8). Karen Armstrong has, like Manton, observed the way 
myth can change during the process of its telling, commenting on how 
Sophocles embellished the myth of Oedipus by adding him blinding himself 
(“The Truth about Myth” NP). Shinn discusses how oral myths were often 
altered during performance, but that texts detailing mythological narrative 
23 
 
can become cultural myths, asserting: “The internal tension of the cultural 
myth is between the story and its teller, between the ancient myth and the 
contemporary interpretation and expression of its meaning” (6). We can see 
here the layers of transmission involved in our approach to mythology today, 
dealing simultaneously with text(s) and surrounding cultural myths informing 
our readings of said texts. 
This tension may be part of what propels what Coupe’s Myth 
describes as the “endless self-generating power of myth” (96). He says, 
building upon the theories of Kenneth Burke and Paul Ricoeur, that “both 
making and reading myths [implies] a drive towards completion, an 
insistence of seeing things through to as near their full development as 
possible”, a propelling force he relates back to Aristotle’s theory of entelechy 
(Coupe 6–7; Burke 100–05; Ricoeur 5). Coupe does warn that the drive for 
perfection identified by Burke can lead to totalitarian myths, but endorses 
Ricoeur’s use of this movement to gain a sense of myth’s “exploratory 
significance and its contribution to understanding”, leading to possibilities. 
Thus, Coupe asserts, whilst myth may indeed be paradigmatic and may 
contain implications of social and cosmic hierarchies and the ideal of, or 
quest for, perfection, it contains within its paradigms other potential modes of 
existence, to be achieved beyond our current moment (5). This approach, 
acknowledging the structures and horizons of myth whilst simultaneously 
identifying its capacity to hint at the spaces and possibilities beyond our 
experiences to date, is one which may appeal to women writers seeking to 
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revise ancient mythologies; the future possibilities implied by an inherent 
drive for perfection will be something to which we will return. 
 Myth’s “self-generating power” could in part be attributed, if we are to 
believe Jung, to its presence within the structure of our unconscious mind. 
Freud and Jung, the father of psychoanalysis and his sometime collaborator, 
have completely altered how we perceive the function of myth. Freud’s use 
of mythology is expanded upon in greater detail in Chapter Four. It would be 
expedient to note at this juncture Freud’s engagement with Frazer’s The 
Golden Bough. Sellers observes how Freud’s consideration of Frazer’s 
fertility myths led him to “[equate] myth with the blissful ignorance of early 
infancy, religion with the developing awareness of childhood, and science 
with the fully mature adult who has come to terms with reality” (3). We can 
see that this three-tier process of gaining knowledge indicates a journey from 
mythos to logos. Yet this linear hierarchy seems to posit science at the top of 
the pyramid as pure logos, removed entirely from mythos; the pure objectivity 
and reason of science is something which has been denounced by many 
philosophers (see, for example, Haraway 1988). It is interesting, however, to 
note the association between myth and infancy (something clearly 
underpinning Freud’s psychosexual theories and further considered in due 
course). 
 Jung’s symbolist assertions about mythological archetype are worthy 
of consideration. To Jung, myth is a series of images embedded in our 
unconscious and make themselves felt, through dreams or narrative: "C.G. 
Jung’s patients, we are told, were able to reconstruct Greek myths in their 
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dreams without knowing anything of ancient Greece, for the archetypes live 
within us in a timeless continuum that knows not before or after” (Fisch 1). 
The presence of mythical images, or archetypes, within our unconscious is 
an interesting premise and may account for certain similar mythological 
narratives emerging from different cultures, not to mention humanity’s 
ongoing fascination with such tales. Jung wrote: 
I have often been asked where the archetypes or primordial images 
come from. It seems to me that their origin can only be explain by 
assuming them to be deposits of the constantly repeated experiences 
of humanity. One of the commonest and at the same time most 
impressive experiences is the apparent movement of the sun every 
day. We certainly cannot discover anything of the kind in the 
unconscious, so far as the known physical process is concerned. 
What we do find, on the other hand, is the myth of the sun-hero in all 
its countless variations. It is this myth, and not the physical process, 
that forms the sun archetype […] The archetype is a kind of readiness 
to produce over and over again the same or similar mythical ideas. 
(330) 
 
Certainly, myth has a relationship to the experience of existence and the idea 
that it might be shaped by psychological deposits of repetitious features of 
human life is an intriguing prospect. Jung believes that archetypal images 
offer the potential for huge amounts of variation and different interpretations; 
as Segal establishes: 
Because archetypes are innately unconscious, they can express 
themselves only obliquely, through symbols. Furthermore, not only 
does every myth contain multiple archetypes, but every archetype 
harbors inexhaustible meanings. (9–10)  
 
This potential to access multiple avenues of interpretation once more 
suggests possibilities, yet the idea that these archetypes exist already within 
our collective unconscious raises questions about existing, potentially 
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essentialist feminine archetypes and what might be done to alter these. The 
‘readiness to produce over and over again’ ignores elements of the time-and-
context bound nature of myth which myth critics such as Yorke endorse.8 
However, Jung’s identification of myth’s presence within the unconscious 
and its connection to experience is a worthwhile addition to our 
understanding of the mythological paradigm.  
Roland Barthes’s seminal Mythologies has been a useful resource for 
this study. He expertly dissects the way in which humans carry out the 
mythmaking process beyond the telling of ancient stories, positing (and 
proving, through discussions of the cover of Paris-Match and “Steak and 
Chips”) that anything can become a myth. Barthes, placing myth on the right 
side of the political spectrum, shows how despite its ‘ancient’ provenance, 
myth has a historical foundation. Unlike Frazer or Eliade, it is his contention 
that myth cannot possibly have come from the ‘nature’ of things and is thus 
itself a construct. It is, he claims, a type of speech – “a system of 
communication” and a “mode of signification” (Barthes, Mythologies 
110;109). It is more than speech, however, it is also a stolen language which 
“transform(s) a meaning into form” (131). Barthes ascribes the construction 
of a myth to the dialectical relationship between form and concept, leading 
to:  
The tri-dimensional pattern…the signifier, the signified and the sign. 
But myth is a peculiar system, in that it is constructed from a 
semiological chain which existed before it: it is a second-order 
semiological system. That which is a sign (namely the associative 
 
8 See p56 of this introductory chapter 
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total of a concept and an image) in the first system, becomes a mere 
signifier in the second. (114)  
 
This suggests, however, that there is potential for altering the relationship 
between signifier, signified and sign, through what he terms the “halo of 
virtualities”, a term used later in this introduction to characterise the approach 
to feminist rewriting advocated herein (132). Barthes discusses how 
accepting myth can define all of literature; he defined “writing as the signifier 
of literary myth, that is, as a form which is already filled with meaning and 
which receives from the concept of Literature a new signification” (134). He 
has described the difficulty in trying to resist this process and suggests that 
“the best weapon against myth is to perhaps mythify in its turn and to 
produce an artificial myth: and this reconstituted myth will in fact be a 
mythology” (134). Whilst perhaps not an entire disruption of the second-order 
system of signification, the Canongate Myths does offer a form of ‘artificial 
myth’ and, indeed, a mythification of the process of mythmaking. The 
acceptance of the separation of myth from nature helps also to remove some 
of the more essentialising aspects of myth and draw attention to the 
processes by which myths are constructed. He highlights that  
Myth does not deny things, on the contrary, its function is to talk about 
them; simply, it purifies them, it makes them innocent, it gives them a 
natural and eternal justification, it gives them a clarity which is not that 
of an explanation but of a statement of fact. (141)  
 
An approach to myth which exploits Barthes ‘halo of virtualities’ to use 
the space around myth to further sever it from nature and thus undermine its 




Lévi-Strauss shared the belief that myth is language; his structuralist 
outlook encouraged him to view myth as a yearning for order, a desire to 
fight back against perceived chaos (Myth and Meaning 12–13). He believes 
that history has almost supplanted myth and serves the same organising 
function (43). His breaking down of myth, into fixed parts called mythemes, 
distinct from units of language, moved beyond the symbolist inquiries of Jung 
and suggested that the relationship between those mythemes was where 
meaning might be found (Structural Anthropology 211). Whilst I deny the 
purely structural approach, a consideration of the relationships between 
myths has informed my position, as has Lévi-Strauss’s assertion that “we 
define the myth as consisting of all its versions”, hinting towards future 
versions (“The Structural Study of Myth” 435). This process continues until 
the intellectual work of the myth has been achieved and thus the stories we 
continue to re-tell may, in time, result in larger bundles of relations containing 
contemporary pertinence and including new and varying versions.   
 One avenue to definition many theorists choose to pursue is by 
judging myth in opposition to fairy tale; this method has often been used in 
an effort to advance fairy tales as an undervalued discourse, with Fairy Tale 
as Myth/Myth as Fairy Tale offering a fully considered evaluation of this 
relationship and suggesting that fairy tale has become, in a Barthesian 
sense, myth (Zipes). Myth and fairy tale are often studied side-by-side; 
Susan Seller’s Myth and Fairy Tales in Contemporary Women’s Fiction 
(2001), Sharon Rose Wilson’s Myths and Fairy Tales in Contemporary 
Women's Fiction: From Atwood to Morrison (2008) and Veronica L. 
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Schanoes’ Fairy Tales, Myth and Psychoanalytic Theory: Feminism and 
Retelling the Tale (2014) offer three examples from the past 10 years where 
myth and fairy tale are used together within the same study to elicit similar 
discussions, albeit with acknowledged differences. Schanoes notes the 
sacred aspect of myth as distinguishing it from fairy tale, but in an 
increasingly secular world the myths we write today are often removed from 
that distinguishing sanctity. Susan Sellers writes: 
I draw no distinction between myth and fairy tale as the terms seem 
currently synonymous, even though I recognise important differences 
in their historical evolution and I continue to see a happy ending as 
the peculiar province of fairy tale. I am also aware of the ongoing 
tendency to ‘gender’ the two, and the hierarchy which the equation of 
myth with masculinity and fairy tale with femininity produces. (16) 
 
Whilst I acknowledge the impulse to conflate the two, Sellers’s amendments 
to this equation seem to me to be too weighty to ignore. Certainly there is 
merit in identifying that despite the traditional perception of their provenance 
as children’s tales, fairy tales share many of the organising principles and 
structural values of myth. Yet offering a direct equivalence, despite the 
ongoing association of fairy tale with femininity, may lead to an erosion of 
distinct discussions pertaining to why and how that association has been 
constructed. One of the authors in the Canongate Myths series interpreted 
their brief in such a way as to include fairy tale; Dubravka Ugrešić’s Baba 
Yaga Laid an Egg (2007) is a revision of the classic story from Slavic 
folklore. I believe that a conflation of myth and fairy tale could serve to 
obfuscate the distinct ‘historical evolution’ Sellers identifies; it also could 
lead, inadvertently, to a continued lack of female theorists working purely on 
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myth, choosing instead to consider both together. Given the comparative 
lack in the literature, and those who work on myth’s dependence on 
centuries of male-driven theories, this may continue to entrench 
masculine/feminine, myth/fairy tale divisions, rather than elide them. That 
being said, as a direct result of that lack, there will be moments herein when 
fairy tale criticism is deployed to highlight a particular point; there is, after all, 
a consanguinity between these two cousins and there are times where fairy 
tale criticism will best support a particular perspective. 
 Myth is thus a product of endlessly oppositional values. Ivan Strenski 
has called it “everything and nothing at the same time. It is the true story or a 
false one, revelation or deception, sacred or vulgar, real or fictional, symbol 
or tool, archetype or stereotype” (1–2). Ultimately, the primary characteristic 
of myth must be understood as story; to Brockway this is the only common 
denominator in all myths, ancient and contemporary (10). Given the noted 
chaos of the theoretical field, the most expedient approach at this juncture 
would be to take a sideways step to look more particularly at discussions of 
feminist rewritings of mythology. This thesis’s defining work has not yet been 
completed; understandings of what constitutes a myth will continue to be 
generated throughout, but it is hoped that this brief survey provides a basic 
underpinning for what will follow. 
 
Feminism, Myth and Feminist Rewriting 
Re-vision – the act of looking back, of seeing with fresh eyes, of 
entering an old text from a new critical direction – is for us more than a 
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chapter in cultural history: it is an act of survival. Until we can 
understand the assumptions in which we are drenched we cannot 
know ourselves […] A radical critique of literature, feminist in its 
impulse, would take the work first of all as a clue to how we live, how 
we have been living, how we have been led to imagine ourselves, how 
our language has trapped as well as liberated us […] We need to 
know the writing of the past, and know it differently than we have ever 
known it; not to pass on a tradition but to break its hold over us. 
(Rich 18–19) 
 
These words, written in 1972 by poet and feminist Adrienne Rich, still ring in 
the ears of anyone working on feminist revision in the twenty-first century. 
Her call to arms, her inciting challenge for women to use their creative 
capacities to revise and thus reconsider their situatedness in both literature 
and in the world, still holds true. Change is only possible through self-
knowledge and revision is one way in which to interrogate “the assumptions 
in which we”, as subjects of patriarchy, “are drenched”. A note here on the 
terms revision and rewriting: they are, within the confines of this thesis, used 
interchangeably to facilitate a more lively readability, not to necessarily 
suggest that they are synonymous. Christian Moraru’s discussions on 
rewriting focus on what he considers to be “intensive rewriting – 
programmatic, thorough, and “over” (“straight”)” as opposed to what may be 
a more “coded” revision”; the Canongate Myths’ programmatic approach 
necessitates an understanding of this as an “intensive act” (xiii). Moraru’s 
additional caveat of rewriting being recognised as a text not merely 
reproducing an older narrative but providing “a notable, formal surplus and 
an ideological, revisionary difference to boot” offers a further useful 
distinction (7). Having acknowledged the difference in terms of output, it is 
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useful to note the similarities as regards process: rewriting first demands a 
form of revision. 
 However, for those female writers awoken by Rich’s compelling 
mission statement, the act of revision is fraught with difficulty. There are 
some who believe that language, a system which is imbued with and 
perpetuates patriarchal values, cannot be used to effect political change and 
thus the act of revision is not a fruitful feminist endeavour. Others suggest 
that the use of a “female language” (to quote Christiane Makward) is the 
answer to this difficulty, promoting a language system that is “open, 
nonlinear, unfinished, fluid, exploded, fragmented, polysemic, attempting to 
speak the body I.E. the unconscious, involving silence, incorporating the 
simultaneity of life as opposed to or clearly different from pre-conceived, 
oriented, masterly or didactic languages” (96). Whilst the potential for some 
of these concepts is noted, it seems uncertain as to how this “female” 
language can operate alongside, or in opposition, to a patriarchal language, 
or if women will instead end up communicating in isolation, speaking only in 
fragments.  
 Using an imperfect language which bears the weight of millennia of 
patriarchal discourses, how do we conceive of feminist writing, much less 
feminist re-writing of stories transmitted over the course of those millennia? 
The Penelopiad offers a potent metaphor for the difficulties presented by 
such acts of revision. 
The shroud itself became a story almost instantly. ‘Penelope’s web’, it 
was called; people used to say that of any task that remained 
mysteriously unfinished. I did not appreciate the term web. If the 
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shroud was a web, then I was the spider. But I had not been 
attempting to catch men like flies: on the contrary, I’d merely been 
trying to avoid the entanglement myself. (119) 
 
Atwood’s Penelope, like Homer’s before her, is using the traditionally 
feminine art of weaving as a means of self-protection. She cunningly tells the 
suitors swarming around the island of Ithaca in Odysseus’s absence that she 
will only select one of them to marry once she has finished crafting a burial 
shroud for her father-in-law Laertes. She is able to circumnavigate this 
promise by secretly unpicking the day’s work each night, the shroud never 
progressing. Weaving has often been associated with writing; Kirstin M. 
Bloomberg makes this point most particularly in her discussions of Arachne, 
the weaver-turned-spider, in Tracing Arachne’s Web: Myth and Feminist 
Fiction (2001). Indeed, a tale is also often called a ‘yarn’, strengthening the 
connection between the two different crafts. Thus we can view Penelope’s 
articulation of the process of deconstruction and reconstruction as reflective 
of the breaking down and recreating required in a rewriting project. For a 
feminist writer, the act of weaving becomes particularly precarious. The loom 
upon which she works and the threads she entwines may all be considered 
to belong to another – to a guild of male weavers who have themselves gone 
through this process for centuries. Should she make use of the same frames 
he has used, utilising his patterns to weave new works? Or are the threads 
themselves too frayed to accurately represent her truth? Is sitting at the 
same loom simply a way of keeping her entangled in an oppressive system? 
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Does feminist rewriting become another Penelope’s web, a task mysteriously 
left unfinished, leading to accidental entrapment? 
 These are challenging questions, particularly within the context of 
rewriting mythology. Diane Purkiss warns that to talk of ‘feminist rewriting of 
mythology’ suggests that women were never involved in the mythmaking 
practice and that there are many cultures in which women are the primary 
storytellers. Yet as she has acknowledged, women have been “outsiders and 
latecomers […] in classical mythography in western literature”; as noted 
above, much of what we know about classical mythology has been 
transmitted through male art and thus both the narratives themselves and the 
language they use are produced by and complicit in, perpetuating forms of 
patriarchy (441). Myth is misogynistic; Purkiss comments how “for feminists, 
the rewriting of myths denotes participation in […] the struggle to alter gender 
asymmetries agreed upon for centuries by myth’s disseminators” (441). 
Amber Jacobs calls myth the “story of the origins of patriarchy”, 
demonstrating how the matricidal myths of the Oresteia, the story of Metis 
and others all represent a denial of female capabilities in order to better 
serve the “masculine project of the colonization of knowledge and generative 
power” (62). Sellers says that it is myth’s inherent misogyny that makes it a 
strange source of inspiration for contemporary writers, providing the 
kidnapping of Helen as one example of the sexism of mythic narrative (30). 
Zajko and Leonard say that “these myths are, after all, not only the products 
of an androcentric society, they can also be seen to justify its most basic 
patriarchal assumptions” (3). They cite the Oedipus myth as an example of a 
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violent narrative which normalises ‘gender asymmetries’, and comment how 
the post-structuralist Oedipus has “come to symbolize all modes of 
patriarchal authority” (10). A brief consideration of just some of the Greco-
Roman stories inculcated within our cultural consciousness betrays their 
inherent misogyny; consider Zeus’s assault of numerous women in his 
various guises, his powerful role as king of the gods allowing him to deny the 
autonomy and even the humanity of the mortal subjects of his desire. 
Medusa, inspiring image for Hélène Cixous, was cursed to have snakes 
instead of hair and turn all who gaze on her into stone for the ‘crime’ of being 
raped by the god Poseidon in the temple of Athena. These passing 
observations speak to a broader theme: the classics of western literature 
contain within them numerous accounts of women being enslaved, 
mistreated, or simply silenced. Alicia Ostriker believes it is “thanks to myth 
we believe that woman must be either ‘angel’ or ’monster’”(71). Not only this, 
but mythic paradigms have informed patriarchal construction and are part of 
its language. Mary Daly has called patriarchy itself a mythic paradigm (190). 
 Daly and some other feminist mythographers offer alternatives to an 
understanding of mythology as purely patriarchal, however. There is a 
distinct debate in some quarters about a mythological matriarchy which 
predates and has been suppressed by the patriarchy. Sellers’ introduction 
spends a great deal of time discussing The Great Cosmic Mother, which 
argues that evidence of matriarchal cultures with a mother goddess at its 
core has been downplayed throughout history, deliberately obfuscated by 
science (Sjöö and Mor 1991). Robert Graves famously made similar 
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suggestions in The White Goddess and Jane Caputi has argued that 
patriarchy is a “historical phenomenon and ancient myth traces the existence 
of a gynocentric consciousness” (Graves 2011; Caputi 24). Yet, as Purkiss 
has commented, the deployment of a matriarchy as the shapeless and 
shadowy underside to the patriarchy has often served the purposes of men; 
she writes that for Graves, “truth-claims of myths as the hidden secret 
repressed by civilization are […] truths about femininity for men” (441). As 
Purkiss elucidates, we find that as so often with depictions of women, they 
come into being at apposite times for the construction of male identities; 
Sellers may find Sjöö and Mor’s work to be illuminating, but I query this, 
informed by Purkiss’s warnings that such an “engagement depends on 
accepting some of the terms of what they engage with, even as they lay 
claim to an originary innocence or separatist integrity” (444). Cynthia Eller 
believes the myth of the matriarchy, which she considers to be untrue, is best 
understood as an “enormous thought experiment, a play with reversals” (8). 
Whilst appealing as a thought experiment, it is my contention that it simply 
establishes yet another binaried system of recognition in which male 
discourse is recognised, understood and transmitted and female discourse is 
shapeless, the subject of debate and constructed entirely in opposition to the 
former. Too close an engagement with myths of the matriarchy certainly 
does little to dislodge patriarchal myths from our cultural consciousness and 
beyond a tongue-in-cheek engagement with Graves’s The White Goddess in 
The Penelopiad’s anthropology lecture, and a potential subversion of the 
‘Great Goddess’ in Winterson’s version of the goddess Hera, the Canongate 
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Myths speak to the female without using the ‘mother goddess’ or a repressed 
matriarchy as a significant icon or point of inspiration. Thus this thesis will 
continue on the presumption that, despite some variations visible beyond the 
Greco-Roman tradition, and the potential for there to have existed at some 
point matriarchal, mythmaking cultures which we now cannot, despite 
Caputi’s claims, reliably trace, mythology contains and generates patriarchal 
thought and language. 
 If mythology is patriarchal it is, therefore, despite Sellers’ surprise at 
their interest in its subject matter, an important point of enquiry for feminists. 
Before delving any more deeply into theoretical frameworks for feminist 
engagements with mythology or providing a methodology for rewriting myth, 
a brief discussion regarding what is understood herein as ‘feminist’ would be 
expedient. As with efforts to pin down an unequivocal definition of myth, 
feminism (often referred to as feminisms) is notoriously hard to outline in 
definitive terms (Beasley ix). For Diane Elam, this lexical slipperiness is 
simply evidence to show that feminism has  not yet completed its political 
work (4). Feminism is understood within the scope of this thesis imperfectly 
but functionally as a group of multifarious movements with one common 
purpose: the promotion of women and the establishment of political, 
economic, social and sexual equality. I ascribe to Lykke’s assertions of 
feminist epistemology as a “situated and partial knowledge”; in this I build 
upon Lykke’s citation from Haraway’s Situated Knowledges on vision. Lykke 
writes that Haraway plays on the words ‘site’ and ‘sight’ (in here I add the 
word ‘cite’, to emphasise that this is a shared, referential vision) and suggest 
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that we must “reflect on our siting and sighting thoroughly” in order to “talk 
with an authoritative voice about the partial reality that we can see” (Haraway 
581; Lykke 6). This is worthy advice for both the female writer and critic. My 
knowledge, admittedly partial, is situated within the context of this body of 
work and I here will offer an authoritative definition of my own version of 
feminism which will be sited and cited herein. The feminism I support is an 
intersectional, non-essentialist, emancipatory approach built upon 
assumptions of gender as fluid, performative and positional; the politic 
advocated within this thesis denies a feminism which recognises only sexed 
femininity or which does not actively respond to intersectional oppressions 
based on class, race, physical form or sexuality. My vision of feminism, a 
situated knowledge and a product of twenty-first century discussions of 
gender and sexuality, believes that the erosion of the patriarchal structures 
and discourses which oppress women within society can only occur within a 
broader emancipatory project. To that end, this discussion will attempt 
always to consider intersectional concerns wherever possible and/or 
appropriate.  
This socio-political basis underpinning my understanding of a feminist 
poetics takes its cue from Nancy Chodorow’s eschewal of essential 
difference, which she claims causes us to  
Ultimately rely on the defensively constructed masculine models of 
gender that are presented to us as our cultural heritage, rather than 
creating feminist understandings of gender and difference that have 
grown from our own politics, theorizing and experience.(113)  
 
In keeping with bell hooks, my feminism is  
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Defined in such a way that it calls attention to the diversity of women’s 
social and political reality, [centralizing] the experiences of all women, 
especially the women whose social conditions have been least written 
about, studied or changed by political movements (25–26).  
 
When I describe gender as positional, I am here echoing Linda Alcoff. She 
asserts that  
Gender is not a point to start from in the sense of being a given thing 
but is, instead, a posit or construct, formalizable in a nonarbitrary way 
through a matrix of habits, practices and discourses […] it seems both 
possible and desirable to construe a gendered subjectivity in relation 
to concrete habits, practices and discourses while at the same time 
recognizing the fluidity of these. (431)  
 
 She proposes:  
If we combine the concept of identity politics with a conception of the 
subject as positionality, we can conceive of the subject as 
nonessentialized and emergent from historical experience and yet 
retain our political ability to take gender as an important point of 
departure. Thus we can say at one and the same time that gender is 
not natural, biological, universal, ahistorical or essential and yet still 
claim that gender is relevant because we are taking gender as a 
position from which to act politically. (Alcoff 433) 
 
This nuanced suggestion, the pragmatic development of a foundation which 
is at once supportive and yet also capable of movement and flux, is the 
position from which I want this thesis to act politically: denying essentialism 
or any form of universal generalizing but occupying varying positions in order 
to appropriately interrogate different facets of patriarchal discourse. The 
feminist poetics at work here (a basic definition of which is given by Terry 
Threadgold as “a feminist work on and with texts”) is thus grounded in social 
and political reality as much as in literary discourse (1).  
 How, therefore, can we address these realities, attempt to erode said 
structures and dislodge patriarchal discourses through literature? Feminist 
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literary theory, the mapping of feminist movements onto the written word, 
offers some liberatory practices for feminist readers and writers. Whilst we 
could trace a history of feminism back much further, the socio-political 
movement of the 1960s and 1970s, advancing women’s liberation and 
demanding equal rights operated in symbiosis with the emergence of 
feminist literary criticism. The roots of feminist literary criticism can be 
tracked back to writings of Mary Wollstonecraft, Virginia Woolf and others, 
yet as the question of women’s place and function in society became ever 
more pressing within social dialogues in the 1960s and 1970s, questions of 
female authorship, language and literary representation became increasingly 
important. Many early feminist critics acknowledged the adverse effects a 
male-dominated canon has had upon female creativity. Elaine Showalter 
commented on the female writer’s lack of a history upon which to build, 
forcing her to “rediscover the past anew, forging again and again the 
consciousness of their sex” (12–13). Susan M. Gilbert and Sandra Gubar’s 
The Madwoman in the Attic: The Woman Writer and the Nineteenth Century 
Imagination (1979) offered the blistering pronouncement that “patriarchy and 
its texts subordinate and imprison women” (13). Judith Fetterley has written 
of the difficulty a female student of literature experiences when engaging with 
a predominantly male canon: “Intellectually male, sexually female, one is in 
effect no one, nowhere, emasculated” (xxii). The literary criticism of the 
1970s having thus identified this gap in the canon and the significant effects 
the patriarchy was having upon both women’s literature and women’s lived 
experiences, efforts were made to attempt to find “potential foremothers for 
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feminist philosophy” and indeed literature (Gardner 41). Yet critics including 
Lillian S. Robinson believe that those efforts to simply inject women into a 
pre-existing canon that has not been properly scrutinised or realigned were 
misguided (145). Could such texts even enter that canon? The uncovering of 
repressed foremothers could ultimately contribute to the formation of a 
secondary canon, necessarily less prominent than the dominant western 
patriarchal tradition which, left directly unchallenged, would continue to 
remake itself in its own image. As with venerations of myths of the matriarchy 
often serving only to support the myths of the patriarchy, the creation of a 
secondary, reversed canon cannot in and of itself be understood as an act of 
decentring or decolonising. The identification of potential foremothers is here 
understood as an understandable and necessary impulse (and indeed, there 
is some discussion about the disconnection of mother from daughter in 
Chapter One) but it is not, in isolation, an act capable of truly dislodging 
patriarchy’s hold on our literary canon. It must function as part of a broader 
process of revision.  
Robin Truth Goodman offered this summary of the history of feminist 
theory: 
The standard historicization of the movement presumes that 
feminism’s early connection to socialism fractured because its 
tendencies to universalize the experience of “women’s oppression” 
and gave way to a “difference feminism”, hyphenization model, or an 
“identity politics” that sought a broader inclusion of race, class, 
ethnicity, nationality, age, ability and sexual orientation. It finally 
moved into a “postmodern feminism” that questioned the very 
possibility of reference and representation altogether in its broad 
philosophy of difference and its espousal of the “end of master 
narratives”. “Postmodern feminism” then itself came under attack 
because its aversion limited the possibility of representational politics 
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under the name of feminism, and so feminism turned back to a post-
feminist, materialist orientation, or a “Third Wave”(6).  
 
Goodman warns that the presentation of a systematic history like this, or 
discussion of ‘waves’, establishes a false coherence, but what we can build 
upon this framework are some other historically-bound responses from 
women writers to shifts in feminist thought. The era of difference feminism 
and identity politics saw overdue attention being finally paid to voices of 
colour, queer voices and women with other intersectional identities; whilst 
some of these works have been welcomed in from the margins, it would be 
entirely unfair to suggest that literature has fully incorporated the broad 
church of human identity to date. Indeed, as acknowledged by Goodman, 
talk of identity often consigns meaning to a false relationship between our 
biological bodies and a body of knowledge, a connection which can reduce 
meaning to surface level signifiers and further enshrines the primacy of the 
sexed body (4). Postmodern disintegration of the unified self led to a break 
down in textual practises, the shape and trajectory of which will be discussed 
in Chapter One. The textual implications of a post-feminist, materialist 
feminism might be seen in the proliferation of popular literature which 
forthrightly celebrates women’s choice to behave as consumers within a 
neoliberal context, detailing characters living sexually ‘emancipated’ lives yet 
still dictated to by the patriarchal goals of heteronormative relationships, 
beauty and capitalist consumption. As Rosalind Gill has commented, the 
issue of choice in a postfeminist context is that it sees “individuals as 
entrepreneurial actors who are rational, calculating and self-regulating. The 
43 
 
neoliberal subject is required to bear full responsibility for their life biography 
no matter how severe the constraints upon their action” (436).  
In 1993, Nina Baym commented that “Today’s feminist literary theory 
makes asking an act of empirical anti-theory, and hence a heresy. It is finally 
more concerned to be theoretical than to be feminist. It speaks from the 
position of the castrata” (155). She relates the ongoing, often polarising 
debates in feminist theory to Freud, relating it to his denial of original female 
thought, which she contends is still felt in academia (162). Whether or not we 
have sympathy for her rationale, her avowal to quit practising feminist theory, 
claiming being feminist is more important than being a theorist, speaks to the 
fragmentation in theory that existed in 1990s and 2000s. Yet The 
Bloomsbury Handbook of 21st Century Feminist Theory believes there has 
been a rejuvenation in feminism since 2008; Susan Watkins observes that 
feminism never disappeared but had been absorbed “as a mantra of the 
global establishment” (Goodman 2; Watkins 5). The feminism of the past 
decade has been shaped by a growing proliferation of misogynistic ‘men’s 
rights’ activism, the issues raised by the #metoo campaign, the election of a 
number of prominent anti-female politicians to significant positions and the 
global rise of the populist right. Rejuvenated within this maelstrom, feminist 
theory, and by extension, feminist literature, still finds itself engaging with 
fraught questions of sex vs gender and of liberal vs radical politics. Many 
feminist issues remain unresolved and it often feels like the stakes are, within 
the global socio-political context, higher than ever. The texts studied within 
this thesis were written between 2005-9, but I will argue that they predict 
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and, in some instances, encourage this rejuvenation of feminist thought and 
support an ongoing feminist literary agenda, at a time where such a project 
had lost some of its cache. All four texts certainly indicate an interest in 
theoretical conceptions of femininity and seem to share a similar yearning for 
something beyond postmodern disintegration and neoliberal exploitation.  
 This rejuvenation brings us back, therefore, to revision. We are still 
are completely drenched in those patriarchal assumptions identified by Rich: 
subject to threats of the removal of sexual rights, the ongoing indignity of a 
gender pay gap, a growing awareness of the daunting prevalence of sexual 
abuse, misogynistic online trolling, genital mutilation, trafficking and slavery. 
Even in a (neo)liberal western society which attempts to peddle this lie that 
we are equal, like the UK, only 32% of its elected representatives serving in 
Westminster are female.9 Perhaps, having identified this stasis (or, if we are 
to believe Germaine Greer, this decline in female status and degradation of 
lived experience) it is time to again look backwards in order to better support 
a move forwards (Sanghani).10 Particularly in light of current theoretical 
trends towards ‘reconstruction’ and ‘theory renaissance’ (see Funk 2015; 
Leitch 2014), the tension between this co-development of potentially 
worsening lived experiences for women and the emergence of an optimistic 
and restorative critical theory is worth consideration. This nascent theoretical 
preoccupation with re-evaluation and rejuvenation will be considered 
 
9 See BBC News “Election 2017: Record number of female MPs” for a further breakdown of 
this (2017).  
10 Greer is cited here only as an example because of the media attention garnered due to 
her declaration that things getting are worse. I would not like to suggest any kind of support 
for her other recent interventions into gender debates, particularly regarding her transphobia. 
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throughout all of the texts within this study, whilst remaining mindful of 
Baym’s assertion that it is more important to be feminist (and promote 
feminist ethics) than to ascribe entirely to dogmatic theories of feminism. This 
bricolage theory of feminism will continue to be built throughout the thesis, as 
we consider what may or may not be perceived as ‘feminist’ within the 
rewriting process. 
Entering old texts from new critical directions, including the varying 
and sometimes conflicting critical thoughts generated since Rich first wrote 
those words, could offer the potential to reconsider some of the foundational 
issues of patriarchal discourse within literature. Atwood, Winterson, Smith 
and Vickers, aged 79, 59, 56 and 71 respectively, have all had to necessarily 
consider, at least unconsciously, the question posited in 1992 by Elizabeth 
Bronfen: 
How do women constitute and establish themselves as authors within 
a culture that has not yet drafted this role, except as a blank, an 
aporia, a presence under erasure? [...] Because the historically real 
woman writer cannot articulate herself entirely devoid of cultural 
fictions of femininity, writing as a woman transpires into an act of 
reading cultural texts […] critically, so as to enact the implied 
contradiction (404). 
 
In the twenty-first century, whilst the blank space has begun to be filled by 
female writers eliding that aporia, we still retain the legacy of that lack and 
authors like those within this study still bear the weight of this absence. 
Feminist writers still consider how to bring themselves into being without 
dependence upon those versions of femininity constructed within patriarchal 
narratives; Bronfen’s suggestion of a critical reading of cultural texts 
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(including myth) critically, with an awareness of their contradictory essence, 
is a useful one. Hélène Cixous wrote in The Laugh of the Medusa that  
Woman must write herself: must write about women and bring women 
to writing, from which they have been driven away as violently as from 
their bodies – for the same reasons, by the same law, with the same 
goal. Woman must put herself into the text – as into the world and into 
history – by her own movement (875). 
 
A practice of revision – a re-visioning, to again endorse both Rich and 
Haraway – which includes critical reading of cultural texts would allow 
woman to write herself, counteracting the damage caused by a patriarchal 
society which distorts her relationship with her body and negates her political 
value by providing ‘authentic’ representations of her femininity, contributing 
to broader conceptions of femininities. The act of rewriting also means she 
will write herself, by undertaking that act of revision directly and personally. 
 But, if we are agreed that a process of revision as a principle and 
rewriting as its methodology is a relevant feminist pursuit in the twenty-first 
century, why rewrite myth in particular? Partly it is because, as Sam McBean 
suggests, that a consideration of the past will inevitably lead us back to myth: 
“it seems to be bound up in considerations of what it means to turn to the 
past – it seemingly always asks us to consider the relationship between past 
and present” (30). It may also be due to all of the reasons outlined in our 
discussion above: it informs our language, it has been an integral part of a 
certain class of rarefied western education and it contains within it stories 
which continue to be told yet indicate, if not perpetuate, elements of 
misogyny. This is a brief answer to Sellers’s question of ‘why myth?’ Yet it is 
a question she is right to ask. McBean has warned against the “counter-
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transformative” trap of feminist revisions of myth – the Penelope’s web 
described earlier (30). Elizabeth Bronfen declares that rewriting walks the 
“fine line between terrorism and collaboration”(x). These are strong words 
and bestow an enormous pressure upon the female rewriter. But it is, as 
Purkiss has elaborated, a worthy warning. She offers a detailed description 
of the ways in which rewriting can serve to reaffirm myth’s power. She says 
that the most common strategy deployed by 20th century women poets was 
to give voice to previously silenced female characters from Greco-Roman 
myth. The issue is that in so doing, it does not necessarily examine the 
female writer’s position in both the myth’s creation or the status of myth in 
literature more broadly (445). She believes that the strategy of ‘images of 
women’ feminism, whereby negative female characters are revalued and 
represented as misunderstood or with new strengths simply insists that 
“’positive’ images of women are somehow timeless” and it represents a 
“refusal to recognize the literariness of literature” (442).11 Purkiss warns that 
changing the voice of a myth can serve to strengthen its power and thus we 
can see how the feminist writer may find herself charged with patriarchal 
connection. Camille Paglia does not recognise the necessity for feminist 
 
11 Purkiss continues: “Most importantly, attempts to produce positive role models and tell 
feminist stories will repeatedly founder if we assume that stories can be excised from text, 
culture and institution, that their meanings are not circumscribed by their histories”. She 
goes onto elucidate this by discussing how the revival in feminist interest in the mother 
goddess “does not come straight to us from prehistoric women, but was invented by men 
earlier this century for reasons which had nothing to do with empowering women” (442). 
Thus the ‘literariness’ of myth may be understood as how myth has been transmitted and 
shaped by its formation into text, and how those texts have been received within cultures. 
Simple replication of a ‘bad’ mythological woman with a ‘good’ version of that character does 
little to engage with that process of transmission and cultural entrenchment. It does not also, 
in and of itself, alter the original text-based myth’s place within a literary canon.  
48 
 
rewriting as she essentially endorses the nature-feminine associations 
upheld by mythology (See Sexual Personae, 1992). Rachel Blau du Plessis 
considers the fraught process in women’s rewriting of poetry: 
The poems of new myth – the myths of critique – are necessitated by 
two central realizations […] the position of the self-as-woman, and the 
position of the self-as-historical-actor in opposition to old myths. The 
new myths entail critical perceptions about the nature of the woman in 
traditional myths, and they recast long-sanctified plots […] The poems 
are so strongly reevaluative that they may appear antimythological, for 
they record the realization that old myths are invalid and crippling for 
women […] These myths of critique are so deeply self-questioning 
that the poems may appear to reject the mythic mode entirely: “No 
masks! No more mythologies!” Yet these poems are in fact 
reinventions of myth, appropriating and rediscovering the essential 
mythic experiences: journey, rebirth, transformation and centering. 
(212)  
 
The inevitability of returning to mythic paradigm is Du Plessis’s disheartening 
critique: even in self-consciously interrogative modes, she argues, myth 
eventually sustains itself even through reference. Ultimately the end goal of 
rewriting or revising myth, Du Plessis concedes, is a change in 
consciousness, a lofty aim (219). Yet I challenge the importance Du Plessis 
gives to acknowledging or approximating ‘moments of eternal recurrence’ as 
part of this conscious-changing process; to stress the need for such 
moments is to veer towards universalizing. Offering a further warning, 
Schanoes cites Joosen’s assessment of fairy-tale rewriting: “at the same 
time it criticizes and reinforces the target text; it is simultaneously negative 
and affirming, de-escalating and resacralizing, rebellious and conservative” 
(Schanoes 16).  
  Is this a thankless task, therefore? Do female writers who attempt to 
recraft ancient mythologies necessarily strengthen their sources and thus 
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implicitly endorse the misogynies therein? If, as Purkiss warns, rewriting 
becomes a playing with patterns rather than a structural overhaul, can a 
rewriting project such as the Canongate Myths ever be considered feminist? 
Can, indeed, a capitalist project orchestrated by a commercial publisher ever 
escape its own desire for consumers in order to support the kind of feminist 
ethics and poetics outlined above? Purkiss’s essay ultimately suggests that 
there are “endless possibilities” and it is this critical optimism I wish to now 
encourage.  
 Sellers’s final response to the question ‘why myth?’ is that “its 
procedures enable the expression of more individually resonant, less easily 
co-optable, multifarious truths”(32). Truth again becomes, in its imperfect 
way, the impetus for telling stories. Schanoes believes that whilst 
postmodernism has disrupted our understanding of truth and the self, we 
continue to be fascinated by the prospect of a “true self”; she, like Winterson, 
suggests that stories can be a way to access this, even through “a 
kaleidoscopic, constantly shifting set of identities that are always in the 
process of being constructed” (5). In the twenty-first century, we find 
ourselves recognising this ongoing desire for the “true self” despite its 
impossibility and find ourselves piecing together coloured fragments from a 
variety of different sources. Myth enables this, allowing us to see ourselves, 
albeit through broken panels of stained glass. Schanoes also suggests that 
mythical revision does not necessarily require the “hostile or anxious” 
relationship which Du Plessis argues, becomes mythic itself, but her work 
instead suggests a “collaborative, affectionate relationship”(8). The model 
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she draws up for this is a psychoanalytic mother-daughter framework, 
whereby the female writer revises and thus “[rebirths] the dead” and 
becomes “simultaneously one’s own mother and one’s own daughter”(59). 
Even without engaging with the complexities of that relationship, the concept 
of collaboration, kinship and affection is useful. Her assessment is that 
“revision has the potential to expose the ideological underpinnings of the 
stories that shape our lives, not in order that we surrender to them, but in 
order that we can shape them in turn”(57). Zajko and Leonard believe that 
there is a crucial interdependence between feminism and myth, using 
Cixous’s The Laugh of the Medusa as the first of many examples of how 
myth has been central to the development of feminist thought, as opposed to 
merely the subject of specific feminist revisions of individual myths (3). Lillian 
Doherty believes that gender is the central concern of all myth; if we accept 
that gender is myth’s dominant anxiety, then an application of feminist 
thought to myth is surely pertinent (“Putting the Women Back into the 
Hesiodic Catalogue of Women” 423). Myth, for all of the pitfalls and 
problematic threads it presents, threatening to entrap the female rewriter, still 
offers stories which “combine […] imaginative fluidity with an authoritative 
force” (Doherty 422).  
 The following section of this chapter will attempt to suggest ways, 
whilst mindful of the difficulties indicated above, to make use of myth’s 
positive potential as a vehicle for feminist discourse. This is not a process 
underpinned by Ricoeur’s drive for perfection; it is an exploration of the 
possibilities suggested by Purkiss. She is correct in that no strategy will ever 
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truly manage to break myth away from existing discourse; this is not reason 
enough not to try. Instead, I advocate for the “political nous” she 
recommends and present a pragmatic, cautiously optimistic methodology for 
feminist rewriting of mythology which capitalises upon these possibilities 
within the shifting theoretical and socio-political contexts of the twenty-first 
century.  
 
Disentangling Penelope’s Web: A Methodology for Feminist Rewriting 
of Mythology  
 
As we draw closer to at last analysing the constituent texts of this study, I 
offer below ten theses on what characterises a feminist rewriting of 
mythology. Given here in summarised form, I will in due course break down 
these items in order to account for their privileging within this framework. Any 
such list is necessarily imperfect and there will emerge smaller micro-
strategies not identified here. There is also a certain amount of 
interconnection and interdependence between the different theses; viewing 
mythmaking as ongoing also demands recognition of myth as time-and-
context bound. They also at times function in opposition to each other; there 
are instances where the consideration of a very personal mythology 
precludes a sustained discussion of that individual within her community (for 
example, the autobiographical sections of Winterson’s Weight do not 
necessarily allow for this). Yet the placement of that individual 
reappropriation within a broader, more communal context of rewriting allows 
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what is personally felt to retain public relevance. Theses number 2-10 all 
demand the primary deployment of thesis number 1: Feminist rewriters of 
myth are clearly seen as critical readers of myth. In summary, this is 
designed to be descriptive rather than prescriptive; this is not a checklist and 
it will not be applied to the texts in this study in an authoritarian or even linear 
way. In keeping with the spirit of this methodology, I identify these theses as 
just one iteration of an approach which is necessarily time-and-context 
bound and will hopefully see further versions and collaborations.  
1. Feminist rewriters of myth are critical readers of myth 
2. Myth engages with its personal and public significances 
Consideration is paid to both the personal and public significances of the 
rewritten myth in particular and the concept of myth in general, as pertains to 
representations of women and gender. 
3. Rewritten myths engage in ‘metamythmaking’  
In this way, they take part in the mythologizing of female authorship. 
4. Mythmaking is a collaborative process 
It is recognised as cooperative and continuous, with no definitive end nor one 
definitive voice.  
5. Individual myths are time-and-context bound  
Each myth becomes situated within the ongoing process of mythmaking 
whilst aware of its own moment.  
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6. Individual female subjectivities are presented within broader female 
communities 
Myth is used to interrogate the relationship between the individual and her 
community, with the community’s advancement of paramount importance. 
7. Myths expand their own ‘halo of virtualities’. 
Myths do not accept their earlier editions wholly, nor respond purely with 
hostility, but use the narrative and textual methods within that narrative to 
expand the ‘halo of virtualities’ around each myth. This may be through direct 
or indirect means. 
8. Myth is self-consciously literary 
The literariness of myth is apprehended through a self-conscious 
consideration of the process of its construction, its transmission and place 
within a canon. This can also be demonstrated by a discernible awareness of 
myth’s palimpsestic nature and considerations of ‘truth’ and ‘authenticity’. 
9. Myth uses both high and low culture 
This elides the boundaries between the privileged domain of the classically 
educated and popular literature, so as to better represent varying female 
experiences and languages. 
10.  Myth engages with contemporary critical discussions  
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A consideration of contemporary discourse is not only ensures that myth is 
time-and-context bound, but it allows myth to be used to promote the female 
writer within her own critical landscape. 
The ‘Significances’ of Myth 
Fundamental to the development of my own attitude towards the prospect of 
feminist rewriting was Alicia Ostriker’s essay The Thieves of Language: 
Women Poets and Revisionist Mythmaking. Ostriker characterises selected 
American female poets as thieves, plundering reserved language and 
dislodging primary meaning (71). The essay, whilst promoting a gynocritical 
approach veering upon linguistic essentialism not necessarily endorsed 
herein, acknowledges that initially, the connection between women and 
mythology seems to be irreconcilable, but that our “need for myth of some 
sort may be ineradicable” (71). Ostriker characterises myth thus: 
Whenever a poet employs a figure or story previously accepted and 
defined by a culture, the poet is using myth, and the potential is 
always present that the use will be revisionist: that is, the figure or tale 
will be appropriated for altered ends, the old vessel filled with new 
wine, initially satisfying the thirst of the individual poet but ultimately 
making cultural change possible […] Like the gods and goddess of 
classical mythology, all such material has a double power. It exists or 
appears to exist objectively, in the public sphere, and consequently 
confers on the writer the sort of authority unavailable to someone who 
writes “merely” of the private self. Myth belongs to “high” culture and is 
handed “down” through the ages by religious, literary and educational 
authority. At the same time, myth is quintessentially intimate material, 
the stuff of dream life, forbidden desire, inexplicable motivation – 
everything in the psyche that to rational consciousness is unreal, 
crazed or abominable. (72)  
Ostriker here is using the dialectical, oppositional nature of myth to define 
itself and to useful effect, highlighting the contradictions and co-ordinations of 
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myth. Myth has, therefore, a “double significance” for women. It exists in the 
public domain, is integral to and indicative of “high” culture and is an intrinsic 
part of all of our patriarchal institutions and discourses. At the same time, 
Ostriker shows that its significance is not restricted to the public domain. It 
provides the colour and texture of our unconscious minds and offers endless 
inspiration. Whilst these contradictions do not exist merely for women, they 
are of particular relevance to women, given myth’s presence in our collective 
unconscious despite its misogyny and its modes of expression for 
experience and truth, always pressing issues for female representation. Liz 
Yorke, via Freud and Jung, has talked too about the importance of personal 
memory as accessed through mythology and she asserts that revision or 
subversion may take place: 
Anywhere that experience, memory, fantasy or dream can be 
retrieved, whether in words or images, it may be revalued and re-
presented. This effort of retrieval may permit different textures, 
colours, lights and shadings to be heard, seen and felt: such feminist 
transvaluation is a continual re-processing. (23)  
 
These significances should be understood as symbiotic; the creation of 
experiences and memories does not occur in a vacuum. They are coloured 
and texturised by the cultures and institutions which structure lived 
experience. These significances cannot be discussed in isolation. 
 To this, my contention is that we need to consider a third ‘significance’ 
to female revisionist mythology, or in the context of this project, feminist 
rewriting of mythology. It is the significance of myth on a meta level. If 
Barthes is right and anything can become a myth, and the best way to 
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mitigate the pernicious power of myth is to mythify it in turn, then the process 
of women revising myth becomes itself another kind of myth, one that 
contributes to our understanding of what a female writer is and can be. It is 
this level which demands the affectionate kinship suggested by Schanoes; it 
is this level which suggests that considering mythological rewrites in isolation 
is fruitless. Angela Carter commented “most of the great male geniuses of 
Western European culture have either been depraved egomaniacs or people 
who lived most distressing lives”("Notes from the Frontline", NP). Yet despite 
the miseries of their existence or the maliciousness of their personalities, 
these great geniuses have themselves become myths: symbolic signifiers of 
towering talent and cultural value. Female rewriters may be aided by a 
similar process of mythologisation (egomania and unhappy lives not 
withstanding). This will in turn reposition woman from the passive subject of 
mythology to the active creator of mythology, in a circular process which will 
simultaneously decentre ancient myth and elevate contemporary female 
mythmakers. There are certainly elements of metamythmaking in all of the 
Canongate texts; the commissioned aspect of the rewriting project forced all 
of the writers to consider their role-as-mythmaker within the process and this 
is seen here as a real strength. Indeed, another strength of deliberate 
“metamythmaking” is that it demands that mythography cannot, or should not 
be, an individual endeavour for female writers, but a collective act involving 
writers, readers, publishers, critics and potentially (as with some of the Myths 
series not written in English) translators. All participants in the reading 
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process are contributing to a development of the source myth, through the 
construction of, as Barthes suggests, an artificial myth of mythmaking. 
 This collective act requires, however, iterations of rewriting which are 
themselves, to steal language from Yorke, “time and context bound”. They 
will be “constructed in the different light of understanding from a woman’s 
point of view”, incorporating some of the suffering experienced by women 
and allowing revision to be, as Rich promised, an act of survival (5). This 
seems to me to be key – the creation of “alternative truths that are time and 
context bound”. If we cannot remove the ultimate authority of the source 
myth, then a self-conscious awareness of its placement within a 
contemporary context can identify the elements of that source myth that are 
no longer ‘acceptable’, even as they endure as points of reference within our 
cultural conscious. This also helps us to map out our relationship to the past 
in a distinct way; no longer conceiving of myth as simply a direct route to an 
ahistorical, often nebulous past but as a configuration of our present moment 
in response to that past could allow for more liberatory narratives. Margaret 
R. Yocom would support this perspective, saying that “one way to see old 
texts anew is to highlight the process of creation instead of the product alone 
that traditional exchanges produce” (120). This can refer to the process of 
creation of the source myths, including paying attention to various versions 
or alternative traditions, or anchoring the text in the contemporary through a 
mindful awareness of the process by which rewritten myths are written. 
Purkiss believes that myth is often “caught up in contemporaneity”; by 
making a virtue of this facet of mythology, we can imbue ancient myths with 
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narratives pertinent to the struggles we experience in the here and now. 
Wickerson has observed that the way in which myth is placed within a 
contemporary setting can effect change in the way we construct temporal 
experience; from this we can conceive of a way for myths to connect to the 
past but remain distinctively of their moment of production so as to serve a 
feminist agenda, dislodging myth from its perceived universality and 
reminding us that constructions of femininity within such rewritings are both 
positional and contextual (127–28). 
 With such a self-conscious placement of myth within the here and 
now, despite myth’s insistent character as agreed upon by many of the 
detractors of rewriting mentioned above, contemporary rewritings can 
present future benefits not necessarily even discernible within the texts 
themselves. Given myth’s suggested relation to shaping our unconscious 
mind, as argued by many theories of psychoanalysis and many myth 
theorists, even when the effects of a rewriting are not felt immediately or 
register consciously, the rewritten text, its language, its remoulded symbols 
or altered structures, can feed into the unconscious mind which can, in turn, 
effect symbolic interpretations of myth in the future. Sellers comments:  
 
My own experience of reading myth is that its knack of surviving all 
but the most sustained attacks can challenge us to confront issues we 
would rather avoid, force us to examine our prejudices, or perceive 
things in a new way. Myth’s finely honed symbolism and form 
contribute to this process by lodging in the mind to emerge at 




Given this unpredictable manifestation of mythology within the mind, it seems 
important to acknowledge that reading a rewritten mythology can evoke 
responses not consciously felt but can in time feed back into conscious 
constructions of that same myth. A writerly awareness of this further 
significance of myth could see feminist rewriters seek to harness the “self-
generating power of myth” in the present moment to help support change in 
the future. If this seems like a nebulous approach, perhaps it is; there is 
certainly no empirical way to judge such a consequence of rewriting. Yet 
even the idea of conceiving of myth’s power in this way could help the 
feminist rewriter to attune their mind to the repercussions of their interpretive 
choices. 
 The ultimate conclusion we should draw from a due consideration of 
these significances – of myth as both public and private, rewriting as 
metamythmaking, the ongoing significance of myth in the unconscious mind 
– is the necessity of a view of mythological rewriting as an ongoing and 
collaborative practice. When we consider myth as ‘public’, we are not 
speaking about a singular whole but a clustering of varying subjectivities, 
institutions and narratives. Awareness of myth’s public significance demands 
placing it within that space. To an optimistic feminist, it could be considered a 
space of community, even as it is shaped by the structures of the patriarchy. 
It is certainly something that is shared, and the communality of myth is an 
aspect clearly advocated by the Myths project. When we consider myth as 
personal, we are still placing an individual subjectivity in opposition to their 
community and seeing how the two interact. When we consider how female 
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writers of mythology can become metamythmakers and thus enhance the 
mythos of the female author, as male authorship has been constructed 
throughout the millennia, we are doing this through these shared 
significances and through our responses to each other’s texts. Ultimately, 
when we acknowledge myth’s unconscious power, we also accept that we, 
as individual readers, writers or critics, cannot be the ultimate judges of a 
rewritten myth’s efficacy and thus we accept the cooperative aspect of the 
venture. 
  
The ’Halo of Virtualities’ 
 
Barthes’s Mythologies, whilst not used here directly as a guide to semiology, 
has provided numerous sensitizing concepts for this project. One such 
heartening characterisation of myth is that “there is no fixity in mythical 
concepts: they can come into being, alter, disintegrate, disappear 
completely” (A Barthes Reader 106) . One of the elements within this 
process is what he deems the ‘halo of virtualities’ in language. Barthes 
describes it thus:  
But there always remains, around the final meaning, a halo of 
virtualities where other possible meanings are floating: the meaning 
can almost always be interpreted. (A Barthes Reader 119) 
  
This ‘halo of virtualities’ in structural language also seems to chime with 
Jung’s symbolist approbation of mythical archetype as open to interpretation. 
If we consider the ‘halo of virtualities’ around each myth – the space around 
each story and in its language – then we may also be able to use that space 
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to create ‘other possible meanings’. Barthesian purists must forgive this 
language robbery (although he may himself have predicted such an act) but 
for rewriters of myth to use the ‘halo of virtualities’ as a suggestive pathway 
to consideration of the language and symbolism of their myth of choice may 
encourage rewritings which capitalise upon that potential for interpretation.  
 This leads us in turn to consider, regarding interpretive choice, my 
final three theses. Purkiss takes issue with strategies which refuse to 
“recognize the literariness of literature” (442). Certainly, direct inversions of 
positive to negative or male to female, ignore the context of production and 
the politics of transmission and reception. Thus a self-conscious awareness 
of the literary canon and efforts to disrupt the canonicity of individual myths is 
recognised as a potential means of acknowledging that literariness. 
Consideration of the palimpsestic nature of myth (its overlapping, continual 
processing again suggesting a form of collaboration) also prompts us to 
consider questions of authenticity, versions, and truth. Of course, truth is, as 
we have discussed, at the heart of why we write myth, of why we write all 
story. Yet by acknowledging the impossibility of universal truth whilst 
yearning for a positional, personal truth which does not only empower the 
individual but also inspires the collective, might help to draw attention to the 
way myth has been constructed as a fallacious avenue to truth whilst offering 
alternative possibilities. Using myth’s truth/untruth tension to our own 
advantage, what I suggest is a rewriting that is at once earnest in its 
philosophies but ironic in its practices. Further supporting this challenge to 
the literariness of myth would be a dedicated erosion of the traditional 
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boundaries of high and low culture. Stealing language from its former, 
privileged sphere and imbuing it with the symbolism of all cultures and 
subjectivities will help to create, in the future, more feminist, emancipatory 
myths. Language also plays a vital part in this; the self-conscious 
deployment of both high and low registers also serves to dislodge myth’s 
often grandiose authority. 
 Finally, I suggest that a feminist rewriting should engage with the 
contemporary literary moment of its construction in order to promote the 
female writer within that landscape. There are some fictions in which we can 
see revised mythology functioning almost like its own genre; the mythic 
register is used uncritically, the story may be altered but it is afforded the 
same zealous respect and the author seems to be making no attempt to fix 
their version of that myth in their own ‘time-and-context bound’ moment. 
These revisions are heavy and ultimately lacking in ambition. To capitalise 
on the relationship I prescribe between myth and its moment of production, a 
feminist rewriting ought to actively develop a considered relationship with the 
literary landscape in which it is operating. This may be assumed in the ‘time-
and-context bound’ instruction of thesis 5, but it merits, I believe, closer 
attention. Zajko and O’Gorman claim that the mere mention of a myth can 
act as an intertextual moment; this is not enough (3). Rewritten myths must 
operate in connection with each other and with other fictions generated at 
that point in time, taking on the socio-political concerns of their era. This is 
something we will see very distinctly in the Canongate Myths project; all four 
texts within this thesis have something direct to say about what fiction, not 
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just mythological rewriting, has to say about life and literature in the twenty-
first century. This engagement actively forces the texts produced as part of a 
mythological rewrite to participate in the ongoing, artificial but necessary, 
process of canon-building. When the Canongate authors engage with where 
we are now, in our socio-political and our literary moment, they are also 
evaluating their own position within that moment and promoting the role of 
the female author in an ongoing project of literary development. 
 Again I assert that these suggestions are not exhaustive, nor are they 
likely to be without their own problems. This methodology is used merely as 
a guide to suggest some pathways to enabling female rewriters to use 
mythology in a feminist way, avoiding some of the pitfalls of the past. I have 
sought to stress the potential encouraged by an emphasis on collaboration, 
community, and myth as both ongoing and of its moment. In time, these 
methods will be traced through the four constituent texts of this thesis. 
 One final piece of contextualising work must take place before we 
delve directly into those texts. The Canongate project itself needs some 
consideration. The section which follows will discuss its origins, its processes 
and will examine some of the critical reviews the texts generated at the point 
of their publication. This section is designed to help offer a grounded 





“Witty Desecration”: The Canongate Myths Project and its Reception 
 
The idea for a series of rewritten myths first occurred to Canongate’s 
Managing Director Jamie Byng in 1998. He had been working on The Pocket 
Canons, which had invited a series of famous writers and thinkers to introduce 
the component books of the Bible; Bono penned an introduction to Psalms 
whilst the Bishop of Edinburgh handled Luke. A number of the Pocket Canons 
introduction writers would later go on to write for the Myths series.12 Published 
by Canongate and produced by design studio Pentagram, the Pocket Canons 
were characterised as a “Radical repackaging of the Bible designed to 
reintroduce the texts to a contemporary audience”.13 Pentagram’s mission 
statement interestingly highlights the commercial and aesthetic nature of these 
texts; referring to them as a “repackaging” deploys the language of marketing, 
perhaps intended as a means of making the component parts of the Bible 
seem relevant to more people in today’s increasingly secular world. The fact 
that the project was spearheaded by a design agency points to the continuing 
aesthetic value of ancient stories. Indeed, what the mission statement further 
stressed was the “contemporary” nature of the intended audience. These texts 
may go back millennia, but they retain, according to Pentagram and 
Canongate, pertinence for a twenty-first century audience. The Bible 
possesses, one may conclude, a sustained relevance even within an 
 
12 The authors for both series are: A.S. Byatt (Ragnarok/ “Song of Solomon”); David 
Grossman (Lion’s Honey/“Exodus”) and Karen Armstrong (A Short History of Myth/ 
“Hebrews”).  
13 See https://www.pentagram.com/work/the-pocket-canons  
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increasingly atheistic society; the stories contained within each Pocket Canon 
offer interesting narratives which need only to be “repackaged”. Whilst not a 
rewriting project as such, the process of commissioning a cohort of well-known 
authors and celebrities would lay the groundwork for Byng’s later project. 
Using recognised authors as both a marketing tool and a channel through 
which to make ancient narratives that might be perceived as outdated seem 
current and important would stand Byng in good stead as he moved onto an 
even more ambitious endeavour. 
 In an interview with Solander, Byng commented that his ambitions for 
the Canongate Myths series extended “long after you or I have become food 
for worms”. He added “writers have been doing this for centuries, but as a 
publishing idea I felt it had real potential because it gives writers the broadest 
brief possible and myths provide inspiration rather than imitation” (NP). These 
remarks suggest once more the inextricable connection between the project 
as an artistic undertaking and a marketing campaign. Byng ties the project’s 
potential as a publishing scheme back to its aesthetics, positing that its 
unlimited inspiration, rather than star power and profile alone, are what could 
lead to its success. He also here emphasises the extensive tradition of 
rewriting within the Western canon; his endorsement of mythology as an 
inspiration rather than a prescription calls to mind Angela Carter’s desire to 
“extract the latent content” from her source tales when retelling fairy tales 
(“Angela Carter” 80). The process of extraction would be, Byng seems to 
suggest, liberating and his ambition for this undertaking was that it would be 
open-ended in every sense. This aspiration, for endless inspiration and 
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enduring success, seems to be reflected in the project’s definition of 
mythology: tales which are “universal and timeless”.  
 A brief consideration of the production of the Canongate Myths series 
and a closer look at its critical reception will function a means of gauging how 
mythology has been understood and approached within this context. A more 
considered analysis of how the texts were themselves publicly received will 
provide insights into public discourses pertaining to mythology and issues of 
gender. An engagement with how the project was conceived and in turn 
understood, how its commissioned writers were characterised critically and 
ultimately, how mythology is defined by at least one tranche of the literati in 
the twenty-first century, will partially reveal some of the assumptions and 
presumptions readers take with them when they open the pages of one of 
Canongate’s sixteen Myths. This approach takes a cue from Hans Robert 
Jauss’s reception aesthetics, arguing that the aesthetic value of a work is the 
product of a dialectic relationship between the readers and the work in 
question, produced incrementally over time (Toward an Aesthetic of 
Reception, 1982). Jauss discusses the “horizon of expectation” of a body of 
readers, suggesting that deviation from the norm is what is most exciting to 
readers within this dialectic; any move away from the status quo represents 
an expansion of that horizon of expectation (59). A brief survey of some of the 
critical opinions commissioned and disseminated by the media will indicate the 
threshold of that “horizon of expectation” and allow us to consider where these 
demarcations are. If feminist rewriting, as contended in the introduction to this 
thesis, necessitates a concerted effort to expand myth’s halo of virtualities, 
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establishing the horizon of expectation will help to identify places where that 
expansion may occur within the four selected texts of this project. Furthermore, 
as already identified within my critical framework, rewriting must be understood 
as an act which continues beyond the page and accommodates the time-and-
context bound production of any individual text. Thus consideration of the 
paratexts of the series and critiques of the novellas in question forms an 
important part of evaluating the ongoing process of feminist rewriting. 
 
The Largest Simultaneous Publication in History 
 
It took seven years for Byng to realise his goal; the first volumes in the Myths 
series were proudly presented in 2005. This section owes a debt to the 
research conducted by NA Perkins for her Master of Publishing thesis and 
benefits from the insights gleaned by Perkins during her time interning with 
Canongate. She notes that Canongate’s identity had originally been that of a 
Scottish publisher for Scottish audiences before Byng’s takeover and tenure 
as MD; Perkins also comments on how one of Byng’s first acts following the 
takeover was to buy independent magazine “Rebel Inc”, with its slogan “Fuck 
the Mainstream” (19). Yet by 2005 it was producing a publication project 
unmatched in scale and scope. This is indicative of what I perceive as a 
general contradiction in Canongate’s ethos – there is a fiercely independent 
streak which seeks to support rebellion and innovation, yet it also produced 
the world’s largest publishing project, built upon marketing authors we may 
consider to be mainstream.  
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Perkins summarised the financial approach of the project:  
A Myths title is commissioned to be a Myth, and the contractual 
structure that was originally envisioned supported this – the author 
might receive less money than the usual advance, in the expectation 
that the book will become an important part of a project to advance new 
and unusual voices (36).  
 
While this more co-operative approach to profit-sharing may suggest a 
potentially liberal outlook, it does not seem to have actually led to the 
advancement of any new or unusual voices. All of the female authors 
published by the series in English are white and had, prior to their Myth 
publication, experienced considerable critical and commercial success. The 
Myths project was not a testing ground for new, unheard or underrepresented 
authors.  
According to Perkins, Byng entered partnership with three other 
publishers: Morgan Entrekin (Grove Atlantic, United States), Louise Dennys 
(Knopf, Canada) and Arnulf Conradi (Berlin Verlag, Germany) (11). This group 
worked together to secure authors for the project and to convince other 
publishers to commit to taking part. It was officially launched at the Frankfurt 
Book Fair in 2005 and Perkins noted in 2009 that the ambition was for it to last 
until 2038, suggesting that Byng’s “food for worms” prediction may have been 
a dramatic flourish.14 The authors were, according to Perkins, issued identical 
 
14 Interestingly, when Perkins discusses the literary heritage of rewriting, she cites an 
extensive list of authors but includes only one female: “James Joyce, Robert Graves, Marion 
Zimmer Bradley, W.B. Yeats, Tomson Highway, Richard Wagner, Rainer Maria Rilke, Neil 
Gaiman, Ryunosuke Akutagawa” (23). She asserts that these names have been cited “at 
random”, but this curious omission of female authors is again suggestive of the way 
mythology and its reproduction has been gendered in the past. I am loath to read too much 
into this list, but cannot help but wonder that if, given Perkins’ close association with Byng 
and Canongate, if these were names cited as inspirational for the project. The first three 
Myths published were written by women, questioning whether or not this was a deliberate 
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terms and given advances that were on the lower end of the scale for British 
mid-sized publishers, intending to create a strong royalty-producing backlist 
rather than an immediate cash windfall for authors (22). The project was also 
dependent on a unique foreign rights selling approach; the money accrued by 
selling the rights was used to commission new works and the texts themselves 
were to be marketed by partner publishers all over the world, adding to the 
project’s transnational approach (24). Indeed, a sliding scale for countries 
such with smaller markets was introduced, allowing Indonesia, Romania and 
others to join the fold (25).  
 When commissioning its authors, according to Perkins, the original 
author brief was simply: “Read Chapter Twelve of James Joyce’s Ulysses” 
(16).15 The Cyclops chapter of James’s opus is a dense and intricate return to 
the Odysseus myth, the myopic giant offering insights into questions of 
mythology, nationalism and race. Thus Canongate could be said to have been, 
in those early commissions, looking for experimental and innovative prose 
designed to use mythology as a means to consider a variety of important 
sociological or linguistic concerns. Using Ulysses as the ur-Myth is noteworthy 
as it indicates the need for continued reinvention; going back to the earlier 
Odyssey is not advocated so much as extending the myth’s trajectory in a 
creative and culturally relevant way. As we consider the Myths in question 
 
act of rebalancing. This may be a tenuous connection but remains an intriguing 
consideration.  
15 Although Perkins’ referencing for this remains unclear, it is assumed that this is taken from 
the minutes of the Myths editorial meeting at Frankfurt, October 2006. These are included 
in her appendices.  
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more closely, the influence of Ulysses and other modernist engagements with 
mythology, will be seen in a marked way. 
 The first books to be published in the series were Margaret Atwood’s 
The Penelopiad, Jeanette Winterson’s Weight and Karen Armstrong’s 
companion guide, A Short History of Myth. Launched on 21st October 2005, 
the Washington Post characterised this as “the largest simultaneous 
publication in history” (The New Muses NP), with the three texts being 
released in different languages and by different partner publishers across the 
world. The three opening works were followed in due course; below is a list of 
the published titles in the Myths series to date. 
Title Author Date of Publication 
The Helmet of Horror Victor Pelevin 2nd March 200616 
Lion’s Honey David Grossman 23rd March 2006 
Dream Angus Alexander McCall 
Smith 
5th October 2006 
Anna In Grobowcach 
Swiata 
Olga Tokarczuk 2006 
Girl meets boy Ali Smith 1st November 2007 
Binu and the Great Wall Su Tong 1 November 2007 
Where Three Roads 
Meet 
Salley Vickers 1 November 2007 
 
16 Please note dates given are British publication dates; there are international variants but 
one date is given for each as a general point of reference. The exception to this is Olga 
Tokarczuk, as this text was never translated into English and was published only in Poland.  
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Baba Yaga Laid an Egg Dubravka Ugreŝić 21st May 2009 
The Fire Gospel Michel Faber 2nd July 2009 
The Hurricane Party Klas Östergren 6th August 2009 
The Good Man Jesus 
and the Scoundrel 
Christ 
Philip Pullman 22nd October 2010 
Orphans of Eldorado Milton Hatoum 18th February 2010 
Ragnarok: The End of 
the Gods 
A.S. Byatt 3rd May 2012 
The Goddess Chronicle Natsuo Kirino 3rd March 2013 
The Song of King Gesar Alai 7th November 2013 
 
With no titles having been released since 2013, 25 years earlier than Byng’s 
projected end date of 2038, it seems that as a marketing tactic, the Myths 
series was not universally successful. Perkins commented:  
While the Myths project was received well by booksellers and media 
alike, it is possible that the concept of the project is simply too 
amorphous for the marketplace to absorb, and that what is exciting as 
an idea may in actuality not have legs strong enough to carry the project 
through the next twenty-five years (44).  
She also has identified that whilst The Penelopiad was the most successful 
title in terms of sales, it has underperformed Atwood’s other texts, and indeed 
all of the high-profile authors in the series have had greater success with their 
independent titles than with their contributions to the project. 
 The Myths project as a publishing phenomenon is fascinating to 
consider and there is certainly scope for someone to build upon Perkins’s 
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thesis and produce a more up-to-date and in-depth overview of the publication 
aspects of the project. However, within the confines of this particular 
investigation, a basic understanding of the way the scheme was set up, how it 
functioned, and how successful it was in the marketplace is crucial as a means 
of assessing how myth is understood, produced and consumed, by readers 
and authors alike. Whilst Perkins suggests the media and booksellers were all 
intrigued by this unique approach to publication, and whilst the project did 
certainly receive a great deal of press attention, it would not be true to claim 
that media responses to the texts themselves were universally positive. 
Indeed, turning now to consider some of those responses will indicate how in 
various ways, the Myths project contravened certain readerly expectations and 
what this says about the limits of our horizon of expectations for mythological 
rewrites. 
 
Critical Responses to the Myths 
 
During an early stage of this doctoral research, I spent some time reading 
reviews of my chosen texts from respected magazines and newspapers. I was 
interested by the perceived failure of the project and wondered whether or not 
this could be attributed to a lukewarm critical response. Whilst many of the 
critiques of the Atwood, Winterson, Smith and Vickers were not 
overwhelmingly favourable, this means of introducing myself to the series also 
yielded some extremely useful insights. I was struck by a number of different 
qualities the reviews all seemed to share. The first of these is that many of the 
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ways in which they defined mythology were gendered. Secondly, there were 
many inherent contradictions in how each critic attempted to define mythology 
as a concept. Thirdly, many of the reviews betrayed a marked resistance to 
rewriting as a process and finally, all of the reviewers seemed to devalue the 
literary significance of the texts in question. Indeed, my own opinion of the 
merit of these texts was initially coloured by the challenging critical responses 
I was reading. Yet as we shall see, the four female-authored Greco-Roman 
myths of this series are all extremely provocative and complex inquiries, 
fascinating individually and even more so as part of a project.  
 Caroline Alexander, in her 2005 New York Times review “Myths Made 
Modern”, offers a variety of contradictions in her analysis of the three opening 
texts of the project. In the first lines of the review, she discusses the fluidity of 
myth and its potential for revision:  
The survival of these myths, some of them immemorially ancient, is 
precisely due to the fact that they have been readdressed, readjusted 
and reinterpreted through the ages. The relationship between people 
and the mythic events they celebrate in story and ritual has always been 
fluid. (NP).  
 
Yet later on, her review castigates the authors for this readjustment and 
reinterpretation, offering praise only for points where she can recognise the 
“mythical quality” of the rewrite. Take as evidence of this contradiction the 
comparative way in which she assesses The Penelopiad and Weight. Of the 
former, she writes: 
Atwood has done her research: she knows that penelopia means “duck” 
in Greek; that ribald stories about a Penelope – whether “our Penelope” 
or someone else – were circulated; and that virginity could be renewed 
by the blood of a male sacrifice. Here, amid the moon cults and palace 
women and the returned king, “spattered over with gore and battle filth”, 
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as Homer tells us, is fabulous Atwood territory. Unfortunately she does 
not grasp this thorny nettle, but chooses instead to blow feather-light 
dandelions. There are a number of witty devices, like a recurring chorus 
of maids whose saucy songs fix attention on themselves as opposed to 
the royal subjects. Atwood tells the story in determinedly irreverent 
modern argot, apparently to dislodge her tale from its epic moorings. 
 
Alexander, a Classicist who was the first woman to publish a full translation of 
The Iliad, praises the places where the classical tradition can be felt most 
keenly in Atwood’s rewrite – her duck-based puns or her invocation of the 
blood and guts of battle. She appreciates Atwood’s “research” and her 
acceptance of alternative versions – the “ribald stories about a Penelope”. Yet 
despite Atwood’s appeals to a form of classical authenticity through meticulous 
research, Alexander does not consider The Penelopiad a weighty retelling, 
denigrating it as “feather-light”. The “witty devices” Atwood deploys are 
mentioned briefly before Alexander questions Atwood’s linguistic irreverence. 
The idea that Atwood might be attempting to “dislodge her tale from its epic 
moorings” suggests that Alexander sees the source myth as some kind of 
anchored monolith and that any attempts to move the tale away from its own 
tradition results in a playful but ultimately frivolous engagement. Atwood, she 
concludes, is not capable of handling such an ancient, epic tale – “this thorny 
nettle”. 
 Yet in comparison, when evaluating Weight in the same review, 
Alexander does not accuse Winterson of such sciolism. She writes:  
The self-conscious jokiness of Atwood’s “Penelopiad”, the voice of the 
embarrassed modern in the presence of something acknowledged as 
profound, also informs Jeanette Winterson’s “Weight”…the difference 
is that this tone exactly suits the boorish Heracles, who is a slayer of 
men and a ravager of women, dripping blood and sweat and semen, a 
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force of unassailable muscle that has always grabbed what it wanted. 
It is a portrait that would have been recognized and relished by the 
ancients. 
 
 Again, Alexander’s value judgments come from how little the retellings deviate 
from the source myths, a curious perspective considering her own assertion 
that myth can only survive through “readjustment and reinterpretation”. It’s 
interesting too to consider that Heracles’s behaviour – the blood, sweat and 
semen of it all – may have been accepted to the ancients but surely should 
not be to a modern audience. Winterson’s interrogations of this behaviour, 
through hyperbole and an analysis of the toxicity of the masculinity at work in 
the Heracles myth, which we will discuss in Chapter Two, are not considered 
by Alexander. Weight, on an immediate and superficial level, tallies with 
Alexander’s expectations of what a mythological rewrite should be: something 
which could be “relished by the ancients”, rather than relevant to contemporary 
readers. She praises too Winterson’s imagery and claims it signifies her 
“embrace of the mythic landscape”, where Atwood’s modern linguistic 
playfulness is deemed inappropriate in this context, phrases like Winterson’s 
“kicking the stars like stones” are just epic enough to be acceptable. 
 Alexander’s one point of criticism for Weight is that Winterson “mars” 
the text with “brief autobiographical pieces at the beginning and the end that 
are not integrated into the story. Still, this short novel fulfils a number of the 
criteria myth is meant to embody”. Her critique of the autobiographical sections 
of the novella suggests that as with her criticism of Atwood, where the 
individual author interferes with the accepted classical tradition, through irony 
76 
 
and “witty devices” with Atwood or personal memoir with Winterson, this is an 
infringement upon the myth in question and thus seen as a weakness. Indeed, 
when she goes on to praise Weight for ticking several of the boxes necessary 
to comply with her clearly limited understanding of a myth, we see that the 
fluidity of myth she cites at the beginning of her review is simply an illusion. 
Alexander’s definition of myth is clearly more restricted than the understanding 
of either Atwood or Winterson, or indeed the vision of myth Canongate 
intended to proffer. She concludes:  
Canongate’s series is an ambitious, risky project, potentially profound 
and potentially trivial. As its first productions reveal, an essential 
element is the genuine chemistry between the author and the chosen 
subject. As editors line up more writers for this series, they should ask 
a key question: Do you really, really want to tell this particular story? 
 
This seems a rather strange commentary on the process, given that both 
Atwood and Winterson very clearly, in their respective forewords, specify their 
reasons for their myth selection. The texts themselves are full of self-conscious 
engagement with the story in question. The very refrain of Weight is “I want to 
tell the story again”. The question Alexander, as a Classicist clearly very 
invested in the source myths, should ask herself is if whether it is simply that 
these are not the stories that she wants to read.  
 As a counterpoint to this, the review penned by Simon Goldhill for the 
New Statesman offers a different perspective. Goldhill, like Alexander, is a 
Classicist and both highlighted the “risky” nature of the project, with Goldhill 
characterising it as a “primary school task” (NP). Yet unlike Alexander, he 
seems to be far more favourably inclined towards the texts and the project. His 
interpretation of myth does not seem to have as many “criteria” which need to 
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be met. Interestingly, he (like the Canongate brief) identifies Ulysses as the 
“great model…loom[ing] forbiddingly over any such venture”.  
Of Weight, Goldhill writes that Heracles is: 
[…] the archetypal he-man […] Her Hercules [sic] is a raping, raging, 
wanking, hyperactive go-getter. The vulgar humour of the portrait 
offsets the reflective passivity of Atlas, and the beautifully rhythmic 
prose in which his inward-looking life has been described…Hercules’s 
endeavours lead him relentlessly to his fated death, while Atlas’s 
recognition of his own desire to shift the burden makes his passivity 
heroic. (NP) 
 
Here, Goldhill identifies Winterson’s playing with different forms of masculine 
strength and ideas of heroism, indicating some appreciation of a move away 
from restrictive archetype. Interestingly, Goldhill considers both texts in light of 
the authors’ respective oeuvres, joking that The Penelopiad could have been 
called “The Handmaid’s Tale”, highlighting its thematic connection to the 
earlier work by Atwood, and characterising the myth of Atlas as “perfect 
Winterson territory…the past weighing down crushingly on the developing 
self”. Where Alexander considers how The Penelopiad and Weight function as 
part of an extensive, ancient classical tradition, Goldhill considers how they 
function within the individual tradition of each author. He praises them for being 
brought home “inexorably to the here and now”.  
 Peter Conrad reviewed the first three texts for The Observer (23rd 
October 2005). The review is full of curious observations. He offers a general 
overview of the series and comments: “The authors are eclectic: as well as the 
usual Anglo-American suspects, they include Chinua Achebe, Su Tong and 
Natsuo Kirino. The Greeks are about to take over the world” (NP). None of 
these authors in fact wrote Greek myths for the project (indeed, Achebe never 
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completed his Canongate Myth). The assumption that the myths in question 
must be Greek is indicative of the relative value of Greco-Roman mythology 
over mythologies from elsewhere in the world.  
Most tellingly, Conrad writes that “Myth, concerned with the fertile 
source of life, is a matriarchal affair. Canongate launches its series with small, 
beautiful books by three wise women”. This characterisation of myth as “a 
matriarchal affair” is curious. In his review, he does not, prior to this point, 
despite an extensive engagement with our history of mythological rewriting, 
mention a single woman, despite listing Freud, Jung, E.M. Forster, Wagner 
and Levi-Strauss, thus suggesting that myth is a matriarchal affair which has 
somehow been defined, propelled and maintained entirely by male artists and 
theorists. The matriarchal connections (something Mary Beard takes Atwood 
to task for in her review of The Penelopiad, claiming “most feminists I know 
think that matriarchy is itself invented by patriarchal culture”) are misleading, 
given our extensive discussions in the Introduction to this thesis regarding the 
patriarchal nature of mythological narrative and archetype.17 The connection 
between “small, beautiful” books and “three wise women” seems also to 
suggest that beauty and brevity are connected to being a wise woman. He 
characterises the rivalry between Penelope and Helen as “a tabloid catfight”, 
revelling in the narratives which pit women against each other and which in 
fact, Atwood seems to be questioning throughout the text. Finally, he suggests 
that Atwood’s rewriting is, in essence, “witty desecration”. In this way, he 
 
17 As discussed in Chapter Two, I do not believe Atwood’s engagement with the myth of the 
matriarchy is sincere, but is instead part of an ironic attempt to create a series of alternative 
‘versions’ of the myth.  
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confers a holy weight upon the original and suggests that Atwood’s re-
evaluation is sacrilege. Even in a generally positive review, Conrad betrays a 
similar thought process to Alexander, whereby the source myths are 
authoritative and the retellings are playful acts of disobedience in defiance of 
some ancient, accepted order. 
This is something we see again in Catherine Taylor’s review for The 
Independent. She discusses the “mischievous” title of The Penelopiad and 
comments upon Atwood’s “typical audacity”, in “reposition[ing] The Odyssey 
from the viewpoint of Penelope”(NP). Wit is another feature of Taylor’s review, 
discussing “Winterson’s wordplay” and claiming it is wittier than Atwood’s. 
Taylor observes that the strength of both texts is their “strong evocation of the 
abhorrent nature of war and of casual slaughter” but fails to comment on how 
this is also a feminist evocation, considering particularly the female victimhood 
of this war and casual slaughter. She concludes that “larger than life stories 
will always be ripe for inventive plundering”, once more suggesting that 
rewriting is in some way a criminal act.  
 Novelist and reviewer for the London Review of Books Thomas Jones 
raises a particular point. He claims that The Penelopiad is not a retelling of a 
myth at all, but a retelling of the Odyssey (NP). This distinction between the 
Odyssey as text and the story of Odysseus as myth is an interesting one, and 
it is worth pointing out that Atwood does not limit herself to retelling the 
Odyssey. In her foreword to The Penelopiad, Atwood comments:  
Homer’s Odyssey is not the only version of the story. Mythic material 
was originally oral, and also local – a myth would be told one way in 
one place and quite differently in another. I have drawn on material 
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other than The Odyssey…The story as told in The Odyssey doesn’t 
hold water: there are too many inconsistencies. (xx)  
 
What Atwood is in fact acknowledging is that the myth of Odysseus extends 
beyond the Odyssey and as a result of that vast and varying tradition, the tale 
has complexities with which she chooses to experiment – such as information 
about Penelope’s parentage and rumours surrounding her fidelity. Jones is 
simply incorrect in his assertions that The Penelopiad is written “very precisely 
in response to” The Odyssey; it is inevitable, perhaps, that there are strong 
connections between the two texts but Atwood labours the point once again in 
her notes, when she discusses other sources (197). The assertion that the 
Odyssey is not myth is a strange one in and of itself; as Barthes asserts, 
anything can become a myth, and surely its narrative must be accepted as 
mythological, if anything can be. 
 A further point of contention for Jones is Penelope’s commentary on 
modern life as seen from the underworld. He believes that “The narrator exists 
neither in the world she lived in nor ours, but in limbo somewhere in between 
– the ideal place from which to tell her story. The narrative moves between 
recollections of her life on earth and encounters in Hades with ghosts of the 
people she once knew”. He believes the appropriate space for a mythological 
narrator is removed from the temporal, distant and unreachable. When 
Penelope intervenes on the contemporary world, discussing humans visiting 
historical palaces and then buying souvenirs of the artefacts they have seen 
in the palace giftshop, Jones believes “These criticisms are too laboured and 
sneering to have much force. I assume they are intended to reveal the distance 
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between Penelope’s time and now. They don’t succeed in making the familiar 
strange.” The question of time is again interesting. Canongate asserts that 
myths are timeless, whilst others (including Atwood herself) note the time-
bound shape and colour of a myth. Jones seems to believe, much like Caroline 
Alexander, that attempts to release the narratives from their “epic moorings” 
are weak or sneering. The insistent preference upon a nebulous, “mythic” time 
and place in which to retell mythological narratives is curious and speaks 
perhaps to a desire to further enshrine, rather than to alter or enrich, these 
ancient tales. 
 Famed Classicist Mary Beard offers an alternative perspective on this, 
however. She observes in her Guardian review that “there is, in fact, hardly a 
modern poet, playwright or novelist who has not engaged with, or meddled in, 
Greek myth”. She details some of the discussions, from Samuel Butler and 
Dorothy Parker to Stesichorus, regarding the desires and motivations of 
Penelope and Helen, Atwood’s “witty desecration” encouraging her to reveal 
some of the conflicted discourse which has surrounded this myth for many 
years. She also discusses Winterson’s Heracles, identifying him as a “slippery 
figure in ancient myth” and acknowledging Winterson’s navigation of this. Her 
review offers an inquiry into the very nature of mythological retellings. She 
says: “Reworkings and subversions of the classic tales are one thing; but what 
if you want the stories “straight”?” She acknowledges the ease with which myth 
is adapted for a younger audience, yet rightly contends that this is much harder 
to achieve when writing for adults. She surmises:  
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Ultimately the answer lies in the nature of the myths and the very idea 
of an orthodox version. Except for dull encyclopedias and stories told 
on grandmothers’ knees, there was no such thing as a “straight” version 
of Greek myth, even in antiquity. Every literary telling we have is already 
a reworking, a prequel, a sequel or a subversion […] 
 
 She then, in contrast to Alexander’s critique of “irreverent modern argot”, 
Conrad’s “witty desecration”, or Jones’s accusation of modern reference being 
laboured, concludes:  
No wonder the rhetorical register is so hard to find, the lapses into 
footnotes or sententiousness so easy. Paradoxically, the jokes, 
cunning, replotting and smart updating by the likes of Atwood and 
Winterson are the closest we get to the original orthodoxy of Greek 
myth. 
  
Indeed, questions regarding the rhetorical register pervade these 
reviews, as do gendered assumptions. Descriptions of Penelope and Helen 
occasionally offer new archetypal qualifiers which may be updated but are just 
as limiting as the previous, epic offerings – Goldhill calls Penelope “a slightly 
dippy hausfrau” (Atwood’s Penelope is highly intelligent and caustic, ‘dippy’ is 
a strange word to use here). Conrad, linking Atwood’s Helen to Offenbach’s, 
calls her a “predatory harlot” and characterises the entire story as “the 
domestic vigil of his [Odysseus’s] long-suffering wife Penelope”. Alexander 
seems to call out Atwood’s character development, yet reveals in the process 
her own commitment to the Odyssey’s original archetypes:  
Atwood’s Penelope…is wholly unconvincing. Each Odyssean landmark 
is inverted with a broad wink. In this telling Penelope is a dutiful but 
hardly love-struck wife; the treacherous maids were in fact her loyal 
allies; the faithful nurse, Eurykelia, was a controlling bag.  
 
That Penelope is unconvincing because she is not love-struck and that the 
established characteristics of the maids and the nurse have been inverted 
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serve to advance Alexander’s negative critique of the whole novel. Again, it 
seems that we find resistance to change in some quarters and that often that 
resistance is, at least in part, gendered. Winking at each Odyssean landmark 
is, as we shall discover in Chapter One, a very useful technique for redressing 
the myth’s gender dynamics but is not recognised as such within the context 
of this review. 
 Whilst the majority of available reviews focus on Weight and most 
particularly, on The Penelopiad, Ursula K Le Guin provided an interesting 
review of Girl meets boy and Where Three Roads Meet. She defines myth as 
“stories we tell to assure ourselves of who our people are, how hard it is to 
make the right choice, and how transcendently inexplicable life remains even 
as we’re telling stories to explain it” (NP). She compliments both Vickers and 
Smith for taking on their “majestic assignment with brio and aplomb”, once 
again suggesting that a mythological rewrite is worthy but perhaps associated 
with risk. She comments that with the ending of her myth, Smith “cheats a 
bit…in the nicest possible way”, and again we find that critics have approached 
these texts with rules in mind which the authors seem wont to break. Le Guin’s 
complaint about Where Three Roads Meet is: “Maybe there are too many 
ironies in the fire?” and suggests that the novel has “not yet taken us one step 
past Sophocles”. The idea of an onward journey, a mythological journey with 
marked and very apparent steps, is interesting. Many of the other reviewers 
seem to conceive of rewriting is a process of circling back through constant 
reference. Le Guin suggests it is a linear progression, where as surely neither 
are true and as Beard says, any form of orthodoxy is misleading. 
84 
 
 Kirsty Gunn’s review in the Guardian of the Smith and Vickers’ myths 
offers further interest. It begins: 
When I first heard about the Canongate Myths project, I thought it would 
never take off. The idea of “rewriting a myth” – what kind of writer would 
be interested in that? I thought. Rewriting poetry, translating or retelling 
old stories, as many of our great poets do, is one thing. Poetry, after all, 
is in itself the basis for poetry. But a writer of prose ‘novelising’, 
familiarising, making conscious and known one of the great ancient 
tales of old? I wasn’t sure. Myths are, by their very nature, somehow 
unknowable and need to be that way – rearing out of our consciousness 
like boulders on the landscape or rocks in the sea. How do you turn that 
very unknownness into a chatty little novel by Margaret Atwood? (NP) 
 
Whilst Gunn later acknowledges that she was wrong, there are a number of 
very clear and slightly concerning misapprehensions at work her. First is the 
value judgment attached to rewriting poetry as opposed to prose, crucially 
overlooking that, for example, the Odyssey and Metamorphoses were 
themselves once narrative poems occupying that liminal space between 
poetry and prose and thus open to exploration through either genre. More than 
that, however, the idea that myth is only an ancient tale is again given voice 
here, and the denigration of The Penelopiad as a “chatty little novel”, as 
opposed to an unknowable rock just below the waterline, gives us insight again 
into some expectations of the register of myth. She does acknowledge her 
mistaken assumptions and asserts that myths have an ongoing presence in 
our lives, but it is a telling prejudice for a reader to bring to the table.  
 Of Girl meets boy, she says that “Smith is a gravely moral writer – and 
that is partly why her contribution to the world of myth is so powerful. There is 
nothing detached or ironic here”. We find yet again an aversion to irony in the 
context of myth, yet it is surely misleading to suggest that there is nothing ironic 
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about a novel in which there is an entire imagined ending featuring the Loch 
Ness monster which ultimately gives way to the “real”, pared-back conclusion. 
The connection Gunn makes between Smith’s professed ethics and the impact 
of her rewrite indicates that mythology contains, for many readers, an 
expectation of morality. She closes her review with an observation: “With the 
bookshops stuffed with footballers’ autobiographies and the dieting secrets of 
their wives, and with book-buying habits dominated by trend and fashion, 
surely we need to have myths about us more than ever”. This statement is 
curious, seemingly avoiding the fact that the Myths project which produced the 
texts she now venerates was, in its way, a fashionable scheme which has in 
turn prompted a new trend in publishing projects. There is surely a classist 
element here in the discussions of “footballers’ autobiographies” as opposed 
to “the importance of storytelling”, which suggests that the line between “great 
ancient tales” and “chatty little novels” has not, for Gunn, completely 
disappeared. She is making another value judgment, one which places 
mythology in a rarefied space removed from fashion or superficiality, as 
opposed to its true roots as the original pop culture. She does not value the 
storytelling of footballer autobiographies and appeals instead to myth as a 
means of making book-buying in the twenty-first century a more considered, 
worthy process. 
 This very brief survey of some of the reviews of the Myths selected for 
this thesis has identified a number of key expectations which readers, or at 
least, the readers selected by major publications to review these texts, bring 
to a mythological rewriting. What is most striking is the repeated suggestion 
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that rewriting is in some way an illegitimate act. We have read of it being 
described as “desecration”, “irreverence”, “plundering”, “meddling” and 
“audacious”. The risk associated with such an endeavour has been repeatedly 
raised. There are a number of gendered assumptions too – that myth ought to 
be considered feminine, despite its intrinsically patriarchal values and that its 
characters must continue to be understood through their archetypal qualifiers. 
Many of the reviewers, particularly Caroline Alexander, offer praise only when 
they feel that Canongate’s offerings are in keeping with the epic register of the 
source myth; irony and joviality are particularly questioned throughout these 
reviews. Yet as Mary Beard has observed, “the jokes, cunning, replotting and 
smart updating” are in fact an intrinsic part of the mythmaking tradition, even 
if today we tend to regard it as fixed and worthy – rocks in the water.  
 These reviews, mixed in the main, are responding directly to the hype 
surrounding the project and are the product of a media interested more in the 
“story” of a rewriting project than the text themselves. The hype, which may 
have helped to drive sales initially, may also have been a means of devaluing 
the literary value of each individual novella. As Gunn says, book-buying has 
become driven by trend and thus a literary project which becomes fashionable 
or well-marketed might be denigrated for containing “chatty little novels”, held 
akin to footballer autobiographies. Whether the disappointing sales of these 
texts are a reaction to this hype and are indicative of a readership put off by 
lacklustre critical responses, or suggest that broader audiences share the 




 What this thesis aims to prove, however, is that all of these responses 
are relevant to what may be understood as a feminist rewriting, helping to form 
the context of production of these texts. Furthermore, later chapters will show 
that this resistance to rewriting from some quarters has obfuscated the 
genuinely innovative and significant ways in which all four authors responded 
to their Canongate prompt. The repeated insistence that these texts are risky, 
witty acts of desecration further advances a narrative whereby the patriarchal 
values of the originals ought to be allowed to continue unchallenged. The 
collective nature of the project led to reviews which focus on the “bigger 
picture” of rewriting mythology as a concept; often these newspaper accounts 
have been commissioned from people with a vested interest in maintaining the 
status of mythology. The bigger picture is important and as discussed in the 
introduction, all of these printed opinions contribute to the significant meta-
level of mythmaking. Yet it is to be hoped that through extensive analysis with 
the four chosen novellas, it will be seen that these acts of defiance yield 
fascinating results. Indeed, what is particularly remarkable about the Myths of 
Atwood, Winterson, Smith and Vickers is that they are not merely responses 
to the classical tradition. They are also vivid engagements with the modernist 
literary canon and valuable contributions to ongoing discussions about the 
generation of meaning in twenty-first century literature, nuanced points which 
the reviews detailed above failed to accommodate adequately.  
 




We turn now to the texts themselves, to find out to what extent the assertions 
made above hold true and to map out elements of feminist rewriting within 
the novellas produced by the Canongate scheme. The first volume, The 
Penelopiad, a rewrite of the myth of Odysseus and Penelope by Canadian 
author Margaret Atwood, shows the tension which can occur when the 
individual is separated from her community. Her version of the Odyssey 
problematizes truth and the idea of a single version, whilst also indicating 
some of the difficulties a female author may encounter when engaging with 
postmodernism. 
 Chapter Two looks at Jeanette Winterson’s Weight, the myth of Atlas 
and Heracles. Here I build on my argument that the Canongate Myths are all 
engaged in some way with the shifting theoretical ground of twenty-first 
century literature; Winterson’s myth suggests an awareness of and 
involvement in ‘post-postmodern’ yearning for authenticity, even whilst 
acknowledging its impossibility. Weight also indicates the power of myth’s 
personal significances; this chapter discusses how the myth of Atlas and 
Heracles enabled Weight to act as a bridging text between two different 
versions of Winterson’s ‘autobiography’: Oranges are Not the Only Fruit and 
Why Be Happy When You Could Be Normal? 
 Chapter Three discusses Ali Smith’s Girl meets boy, an uplifting 
update of the myth of Iphis and Ianthe from Metamorphoses. Smith’s love 
story, at once encompassing all genders and none, uses ecofeminist ethics 
to examine the source myth in order to explore what is understood as 
‘natural’. I also argue that Smith is at moments indicating a metamodernist 
89 
 
approach, riffing against modernist literature in order to make sense of her 
twenty-first century context. 
 The final chapter will discuss Salley Vickers’s Where Three Roads 
Meet. In this complex novella, Tiresias comes to Sigmund Freud in the final 
days of his life to tell the story of Oedipus. The text is an interrogation of 
Freudian psychoanalysis and a consideration of how Freud as mythmaker 
and Freudian psychoanalysis as myth did not always appropriately consider 
femininity in its paradigms. Again we find a preoccupation with modernist 
literature, prompting the final question: is twenty-first century literature 
enacting its own ‘mythic method’, to quote T.S. Eliot? 
 These texts all, to varying degrees, enact some of the theses 
identified above. They all also indicate an awareness of the tension currently 
traceable through twenty-first century literary theory. How do we talk about 
rejuvenation, restoration or a renaissance when the world is in flux? How can 
we use the past to inform the future? How does a feminist agenda operate 
within that programme and does all engagement with myth eventually lead 
us back to modernism? Within each chapter, we will find more layers of 
theory, more colourful parts to add to the bricolage already created within 
this introduction. These are not easy texts; they are certainly not the heavy, 
overly respectful mythological rewrites I cautioned against. Nor are they 
hostile. They suggest instead that feeling of kinship mentioned earlier. This 
affection perhaps comes as a result of the process of their commissioning; 
the self-consciousness of these works is no doubt due to the brief presented 
by Canongate as a publisher. Yet they all work in sympathy to help build a 
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version of myth that is at once fluid, contemporary and a vision of feminism 
that is simultaneously idealistic but grounded in the practical, political 


































“No mouth through which I can speak”: The 
Penelopiad and the Problem of the Postmodern 
 
Now that I’m dead I know everything. This is what I wished would 
happen, but like so many of my wishes it failed to come true. I know 
only a few factoids that I didn’t know before. Death is much too high a 
price for the satisfaction of curiosity, needless to say. 
Since being dead – since achieving this state of bonelessness, 
liplessness, breastlessness – I’ve learned some things I would rather 
not know, as one does when listening at windows or opening other 
people’s letters. You think you’d like to read minds? Think again. 
 (Atwood, The Penelopiad 1).  
 When, in The Penelopiad, we first meet Margaret Atwood’s Penelope, 
she tells us she has always been “of a determined nature” (4). A pun on her 
archetypal literary genealogy and her famed forbearance, this Penelope’s 
lonely waiting occurs within the underworld. From Homer to Joyce and in 
Atwood’s own poetry, Penelope and her weaving have loomed large, 
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refracted through her archetypal qualifiers. Atwood’s epigraphs cite Homer’s 
descriptions of Odysseus’s wife:  
How faithful was your flawless Penelope, Icarius’s daughter! [...]The 
glory of her virtue will not fade with the years, but the deathless gods 
themselves will make a beautiful song for mortal ears in honour of the 
constant Penelope. (xiii)  
 
Her merit is here merely acknowledged in how it reflects upon her relations – 
her father and Odysseus are both elevated by their association with 
Penelope’s constant fidelity. Yet this twenty-first century Penelope is not 
exclusively marked by her determined nature, and is in fact, a producer of, as 
much as a product of, multiple forms of indeterminacy. 
 In the underworld, death has not given her access to all the 
knowledge she hoped to attain. She instead has been able to pick up on a 
few scant nuggets of information. The things she has learned have all been 
gleaned through behaviour associated with deceit, likened to eavesdropping 
or snooping. Such a role, where she can only learn things she should not 
know, like “listening at windows” or “opening other people’s letters”, make 
her an observer of rather than a real participant in the generation of “truth” or 
understanding. She has been reduced beyond her own body – feminised 
even in its breastlessness – but even this breaking down into constituent 
parts has not permitted her to achieve a full understanding of her own life, let 
alone significant or absolute insights into the universe as a whole. Body and 
mind have become separated and the body has become isolated even from 
itself; the result of this disintegration is, for Penelope, further dissatisfaction 
following on from a life of disappointment. 
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 Penelope describes how everyone in the underworld arrives with a 
sack containing words. These sacks host the words you have said and all 
that has been spoken about you by others (1). Even without the bones and 
musculature necessary to hold these sacks, everyone in the underworld 
must carry with them these repositories, of stories, lies, speech and song. 
Penelope, when faced with this sack, realises “how they were jeering, 
making jokes about me, jokes both clean and dirty; how they were turning 
me into several stories, though not the kind of stories I’d prefer to hear about 
myself” (3). She acknowledges in this moment how a person’s “determined” 
nature is the sum of the stories which have been told about them. Yet, 
despite being required to bear the weight of these narratives which 
misrepresent, mock or demean her, Penelope does not have the physical 
capabilities to respond or justify herself: 
The difficulty is that I have no mouth through which I can speak. I can’t 
make myself understood, not in your world, the world of bodies, of 
tongues, and fingers; and most of the time I have no listeners, not on 
your side of the river. Those of you who may catch the odd whisper, 
the odd squeak, so easily mistake my words for breezes rustling the 
dry reeds, for bats and twilight, for bad dreams. (4) 
 
Penelope associates being understood with the world “of bodies, of tongues, 
of fingers”, and there is a connection being formed here between 
comprehension and embodiment. Thus her disintegration, her bodily lack, 
becomes an impediment to accessing knowledge or any form of ‘truth’. 
Penelope becomes felt only through fragments of nature – squeaks, reeds 
and bats – or through the unconscious content of ‘bad dreams’.  
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 This chapter contends that throughout The Penelopiad, Atwood’s use 
of myth serves to problematize postmodernism’s prioritisation of 
ambivalence, disintegration and lack. Atwood, an author repeatedly lauded 
as postmodern, deploys numerous literary techniques associated with the 
literary context, yet seems also to be suggesting that efforts to break down 
the self can lead to further isolation and misunderstanding.18 Her exploration 
of the feminine voices silenced or sidelined in her source myth, Odysseus’s 
wife Penelope and her twelve murdered maids, also provides an 
interrogation of how female voices can operate individually and in community 
with each other, to varying effects. Penelope, twisting her tales and 
redressing the “scandalous” rumours circulated about her, is established as a 
female entirely in isolation within a patriarchal society which separates her 
from other women. Conversely, her maids, speaking as a chorus which 
contains diverse voices yet also frequently comes together to speak as one, 
are better equipped to seek the textual justice Penelope cannot find. 
 In this, I will suggest that whilst The Penelopiad owes a great deal to 
the postmodern tradition in terms of form, tone and in its cynicism regarding 
totalising narratives, it also marks a step away from postmodern scepticism 
and suggests that in the twenty-first century, the “bonelessness, liplessness, 
breastlessness” of disintegrating postmodernism may not always be an 
avenue to understanding. Its distancing of the female self from her politicised 
body is one of the many ways in which postmodernism has been held to be 
 
18 Atwood’s postmodern credentials are discussed later in this chapter, on p101.  
95 
 
problematic for feminism; the first part of this chapter will consider how the 
dominant literary discourse of the end of the twentieth century has been held 
by some commentators to be incompatible with feminism. It will then move 
on to discuss how The Penelopiad interacts with these critical discussions 
and how it represents femininity through rewriting within this context. From 
this we will see how the practice of rewriting myth, within a project like the 
Canongate Myths, can interrogate broader literary debates whilst 
investigating particular stories and traditions. 
“A boy’s game of irony and wordplay”: Postmodernism and Feminism 
 
At first glance, feminism and postmodernism, identified as two of the most 
significant bodies of thought to emerge from the twentieth century, may seem 
to be a perfect pairing (Nicholson 9). Indeed, Richard Rorty suggests that 
they spring from a similar impulse, as feminism serves as evidence that the 
philosophical tradition of the West has failed in its supposed quest to 
represent human thought and experience.19 However, despite what may be 
considered in essence as a similar repudiation of Enlightenment thought, the 
relationship between these cultural theories has not been entirely 
harmonious.20  
 
19 See Rorty (1979). Rorty breaks down what he believes are the central tenets of 
Enlightenment thought and asserts that nature cannot act as a mirror, nor is there a truth for 
us to discover. The flawed mirror of Enlightenment philosophy is what prevents us from 
being represented accurately. In this regard, his critique shares a perspective with some 
feminist theories which claim the Enlightenment has misrepresented women.  
20 It should be noted that this is not universally accepted; Nicholson, Theresa Man Ling Lee 
and others question this. Fraser and Nicholson (1990) suggests that scepticism of the 
Enlightenment is only partially shared by feminism and postmodernism (5); after all, an anti-
Enlightenment impulse is not necessarily a feminist one (Lee Ling 35).  
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 In his landmark treatise The Postmodern Condition, Jean-Francois 
Lyotard defined the predominant feature of postmodernism as “an incredulity 
towards metanarratives” (xiii–iv; 5). Nicholson has expanded upon this, 
emphasising that postmodernists are looking for ways to proffer social 
criticism that is not built upon traditional, essentialist philosophies (100). Ten 
years after Lyotard highlighted this scepticism, Jennifer Wicke and Margaret 
Ferguson indicated that there was such a commitment to this prevailing 
mode of thought that, as of 1994, it should be understood as “the way we live 
now”(1). Later chapters will discuss postmodernism’s waning influence in the 
twenty-first century and how this shift manifests itself within other texts within 
the series, but this discussion will serve to establish how postmodernism 
developed and has been understood by feminist theorists. 
 The broadly accepted textual methodologies that arise from this 
supposedly ingrained incredulity have been identified as “pastiche, double 
coding, open-endedness, bricolage, fragmentation and so on” (Felski 4). The 
deployment of these techniques in fiction has been read as a means of 
collapsing (or at least, dislodging) totalising metanarratives and displacing 
truth and subjectivity as singular entities.  
 Aspects of this incredulity, both to metanarratives and to Western 
philosophy more generally, have been appealing to feminist and postcolonial 
critics, who have noted that the fragmentation of, or at least scepticism 
towards, overarching narratives has allowed figures previously marginalised 
to occupy alternative, more central spaces within the text. In Postmodern 
Literature and Race, Len Platt and Sara Upstone commend “postmodern 
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texts which challenge the grand narratives on which conventional racial 
ideologies rely”(1). It is unsurprising, therefore, that this method of 
challenging ideologies is appealing to some feminist literary theorists, 
considering the historic exclusion of women from both public life and the 
canon. In turn, a variety of female writers have themselves made use of 
postmodernism’s recognised textual aesthetics as a means of renegotiating 
their place within the text and the canon. Fraser and Nicholson have 
encouraged the development of a “postmodern-feminist theory” of identity 
which allows the replacement of male/female binaries through the 
acceptance of constructions of gender which are complex and multitudinous 
(34). Teresa L. Ebert has written regarding what she considers to be the 
necessity of “postmodern feminist theory” for social change, citing 
postmodernism’s “significant political, cultural and historical development” 
(886). Patricia Waugh has observed how both postmodernism and women’s 
liberation have rejected the “elitist and purely formalist celebration of 
modernism” and has stressed that both have celebrated the liminal and de-
emphasised boundaries: “the traditional markets of ‘difference’ ”(Feminine 
Fictions: Revisiting the Postmodern 3). This relationship to modernism, this 
elitism and prioritisation of form, is something to which we shall return in later 
chapters. 
 Yet despite these evident similarities, upon closer scrutiny it becomes 
apparent that these movements are not in total sympathy with one another. 
As Nancy Hartsock has pertinently asked:  
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Why is it that just at the moment when so many of us who have been 
silenced begin to demand the right to name ourselves, to act as 
subjects rather than history, that just then the concept of subjecthood 
becomes problematic? (164)  
 
It is not merely the moment of conception which is questionable, but also the 
way in which this has been theorised. We must also question why it is that 
despite the key male postmodern theorists saying “next to nothing about 
feminism”, feminists still feel obliged to sincerely engage with this discourse 
(Lee Ling 41). Waugh supports this, adding that there is a vacuum within 
postmodern theory pertaining to questions of gender (4). Felski has also 
queried the relationship, calling postmodernism “baggy and bloated […] 
embracing a huge and disparate arrays of texts, theories and cultural 
phenomena […] there is not much common ground in this scholarship” (4). 
This leads her to question: “Is the postmodern novel a boy’s game of irony 
and wordplay, remote from the concerns of most women? Or is women’s 
writing at the very heart of the postmodern?” (Felski 4–5). 
 Patricia Waugh has expanded upon this conflict at length, first in 
Feminine Fictions: Revisiting the Postmodern (1989) and again in Practising 
Postmodernism/Reading Modernism (1992). She accepts that feminism and 
postmodernism have a number of shared concerns: derailing the established 
boundaries between “‘art’ and ‘life’, masculine and feminine, high and 
popular culture, the dominant and the marginal” (6). She emphasises their 
engagement with the decline of a “consensus aesthetics” and “the absence 
of a strong sense of stable subjectivity. Each expresses concern about the 
extension of technological and scientific modes of knowledge which cannot 
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be contained within traditional moral paradigms” (Feminine Fictions: 
Revisiting the Postmodern 6). Despite these shared preoccupations, she 
also eloquently raises a key point: it is not possible for women to have the 
same relationship with postmodernism as men. 
 This is due to a number of reasons. The first, and I would argue 
primary, of these is that the fragmentation postmodernism has theorised into 
both philosophy and artistic practice necessarily affects women differently. 
Waugh attributes postmodernism’s destructive impulses to a recognition that 
the autonomous ideal of the Enlightenment cannot be achieved. It is this 
collective loss, she argues, that informs the “schizophrenic experience” of 
postmodernism which Frederic Jameson has described (26). However, as 
Waugh states, this is problematic for feminists as: 
They are unlikely to bear this sort of relationship to history or to the 
ideal autonomous self central to the discourses of modernity. Those 
who have been systematically excluded from the constitution of that 
so-called universal subject – whether for reasons of gender, class, 
race, sexuality – are unlikely either to long nostalgically for what they 
have never experienced or possessed (even as an illusion) or to revel 
angrily or in celebratory fashion in the ‘jouissance’ of its own 
disintegration. To recognise the limitations of an ideal which was 
never one’s own is to bear a very different relationship to its perceived 
loss. (Practising Postmodernism/Reading Modernism 125) 
 
This conflicted connection is something which has been echoed by Felski, 
pointing out that feminist scholars are unlikely to consider earlier stages of 
our history with nostalgia (145). It is, therefore, not a loss of subjecthood that 
women face, but a gap where subjectivity has never lived. This vital 
difference in experience leads to a disconnect between femininity (and by 
extension, feminism) and postmodernism. It could also, I suggest, lead to 
100 
 
further feelings of isolation for the female subject, encouraged to participate 
in the destruction of that which has never been experienced or understood 
by her. 
 Waugh suggests another reason for the fraught interplay between 
these ideologies. If we, as Lyotard and other postmodernists do, accept 
postmodernism as the end to all metanarratives, we must not forget that 
patriarchy itself is a metanarrative (Practising Postmodernism/Reading 
Modernism 127). It becomes, therefore, problematic for a feminist to accept 
that the patriarchy has been subverted through postmodernism and leaves 
feminism, as an active movement with ongoing struggles, in a difficult 
position. The feminist writer, therefore, finds herself in a precarious position: 
should she ignore the prevailing contemporary literary style and risk being 
excluded from the canon? But if she does choose to adopt the recognised 
techniques of postmodernism – playfulness, pastiche, plurality and so on – is 
she engaging in a discourse which does not adequately represent her 
relationship to both herself and the world around her, or denies her and other 
women an avenue for political action, given that it would have us believe that 
the very structures which oppress her do not exist? After all, denying the 
patriarchy’s existence does not remove its power.  
 Some critics have disregarded this paradox. Sharon Rose Wilson 
claims that women or other writers excluded from the canon may have, in 
fact, invented postmodernism, casually disregarding that its theorisation has 
been predominantly conducted by men (Myths and Fairy Tales in 
Contemporary Women’s Fiction: From Atwood to Morrison 3). She maintains 
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that techniques are not intrinsically “male” or “female” or belonging to any of 
the other designations of power and to believe so is essentialist, maintaining 
an adherence to realism. This ignores the fact that techniques may still be 
received and codified in gendered ways. It also ignores that realism, whilst 
flawed in its suggestion of total or unified realities, can be useful for exploring 
through the text social realities in need of interrogation. As this thesis shall 
prove throughout, a partial, flexible form of realism has its uses in the twenty-
first century, and postmodernism did not manage to completely quell a desire 
for a return to the ‘real’. Suggesting that those who question the influence of 
postmodernism on revisions of myth and fairy tale as “still operating within 
dualistic binary oppositions” becomes itself ironically essentialising. Wilson 
does highlight a number of postmodern techniques which may be understood 
as useful for the deconstruction of myth and fairy tale, including gender 
reversal, the displacement of truth and the deployment of an unreliable 
narrator; this displacement of truth is one of my recommendations for a 
feminist rewriting and it is certainly true that these techniques are all at play 
within The Penelopiad. 
 Ultimately, if postmodernism is a response to the loss of the ideal of 
the single, unitary self – the kind of subjectivity that women have historically 
been denied – then how can the female writer engage with it as a 
movement? The simple answer for some critics is that she must. Nicholson 
writes that: 
Postmodern-feminist theory would be pragmatic and fallibilistic. It 
would tailor its methods and categories to the specific task at hand, 
using multiple categories when appropriate and forswearing the 
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metaphysical comfort of a single feminist method or epistemology. In 
short, this theory would look more like a tapestry of many different 
hues than one woven in single colour. (114) 
 
After all, she continues, if we are to talk of feminisms, as is the current trend, 
it is already an implicitly postmodern theory (115). 
 This chapter will assess the postmodern elements of The Penelopiad, 
as previously discussed by a number of critics, but will expand upon this to 
suggest that with her rewritten mythology, Atwood is indicating alternative 
forms of critique beyond deconstruction alone. Whilst The Penelopiad is 
decidedly not a realist text, Atwood’s fleshing out of the lived experience of 
Penelope speaks to broader experiences of women within patriarchy. 
Penelope’s isolation – from herself, from other women and from the 
knowledge she wishes she could possess – serves to highlight how 
postmodern disintegration can lead to dislocated subjectivities who cannot 
connect. The choral voice of the Maids, conversely, acts as a counterpoint, 
showing that where communities are formed, questions may be asked and 
textual justice may be sought. The Penelopiad, written in 2005, incorporates 
postmodern techniques and scepticism, whilst also suggesting a twenty-first 
century desire for something to satisfy our enduring desire for justice and 
truth.  
 





Atwood’s credentials, as both postmodernist and feminist, have been 
repeatedly and variously asserted by a number of critics. Fiona Tolan’s 
Margaret Atwood: Feminism and Fiction has traced feminist theory 
throughout many of her major works (2007). Coral Ann Howells has agreed 
with this characterisation of Atwood as feminist (18). The interplay between 
her female protagonists and the patriarchies represented within her novels is 
a key characteristic of her work; The Handmaid’s Tale (1986) serving as the 
best representative of this. Charlotte Beyer has deftly mapped out feminist 
revisionist mythology in Atwood’s poetry and cites Surfacing (1972) and 
Cat’s Eye (1988) as examples of a similar impulse in her fiction, 
incorporating revised mythologies into her work, “sometimes in an ironic or 
grotesque mode” (278). Yet despite the enthusiasm with which feminist 
critics engage with Atwood, she herself has resisted the feminist label. 
Indeed, in recent years, she has courted some controversy for this very issue 
and has most recently been the subject of a public backlash from feminists 
regarding her interventions into #metoo-inspired proceedings against a 
member of the University of British Columbia’s Creative Writing faculty.21 
Following the release of The Edible Woman, she said: 
 
21 In 2018 Atwood wrote in The Globe and Mail: “It seems that I am a "Bad Feminist." I can 
add that to the other things I've been accused of since 1972, such as climbing to fame up a 
pyramid of decapitated men's heads (a leftie journal), of being a dominatrix bent on the 
subjugation of men (a rightie one, complete with an illustration of me in leather boots and a 
whip) and of being an awful person who can annihilate – with her magic White Witch powers 
– anyone critical of her at Toronto dinner tables. I'm so scary! And now, it seems, I am 
conducting a War on Women, like the misogynistic, rape-enabling Bad Feminist that I am.” 
Her tongue-in-cheek, if somewhat tone-deaf, words here are the introduction to a detailed 
defence of her position regarding the dismissal of Steve Galloway. The article speaks to the 
backlash against her, as well as her own perspective on this fraught topic. Delving into this 
issue too deeply would lead to tangential discussions but suffice it to say that Atwood is not 
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I don’t consider it feminism; I just consider it social realism. That part 
of it is simply social reporting. It was written in 1965 and that’s what 
things were like in 1965 (Quoted in Kaminski 21).  
 
This curious eschewal of a label which persistently seeks to attach itself to 
Atwood is significant. To suggest that social reporting does not serve a 
feminist function is misleading; for women to better understand the world in 
which they are operating and the experiences of other women, this kind of 
“social realism” can be extremely useful. This reference to realism is 
interesting too; despite her identity as a postmodern author, therefore, she 
maintains that at heart her books are driven by realist impulses – to portray 
the world as it is or as it should be understood. Also of note is the context 
bound nature of her assessment – The Edible Woman was written in 1965 
and that is how things were, yet with the very recent announcement of a 
forthcoming sequel to The Handmaid’s Tale, we can see that perhaps the 
issues at play within Atwood’s novel do not simply speak to their moment of 
production and the gender issues at play have a life beyond their year of 
publication. Fiona Tolan counters this by saying that the feminism at work in 
Atwood’s novel is not the same as we will find in feminist theory and we 
should understand that “the novelist has generated a new and original 
contribution to feminist discourse” (3). She also points out that beyond being 
herself influenced, the author also has the power to, in turn, influence others; 
the persistent use of Atwood’s work to elucidate women’s issues and 
 
an unproblematic or simple feminist figure, although some critics would like to co-opt her as 
such (Atwood, “Am I a Bad Feminist?”). 
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advance feminist discussion points to her capacity as a feminist ‘influencer’ 
(4). Tolan also notes that her work “demonstrably anticipates future 
movements within feminism”, a point which supports this chapter’s argument 
that Atwood is, through The Penelopiad, indicating a shift away from the 
predominant discourse of the late twentieth century (4). 
 Her postmodernism has similarly been discussed. In fact, Kathleen 
Gregory Klein believes that while Atwood’s analysis of femininity and the 
patriarchy may be feminist in impulse, this “urge to challenge is itself 
postmodern in nature” (27). This observation insinuates that it can only be 
postmodernism that prompts a writer to challenge “overly rigid categories of 
classification”, which is surely a key enterprise of third-wave feminism. This 
speaks again to the conflict between these two movements. Atwood has 
regularly been characterised as a postmodern writer, given her use of 
typically postmodern tropes such as unreliable and self-conscious narration, 
intertextuality, pastiche and the ontological enquiries that Brian McHale has 
attributed to the movement (10). The Penelopiad has also been specifically 
referred to as postmodern; “The Penelopiad: A Postmodern Fiction” 
advanced this argument in 2013 (Khalid and Tabassum). Rûta Slapkauskaitë 
writes that “Atwood is characteristically described as a postmodern female 
writer, who constantly experiments with different genres […] Her writings are 
also acutely aware of the relations of power that construct our social roles 
and organise the discourses through which we imagine ourselves and 
others” (2). Yet Slapkauskaitë has questioned The Penelopiad’s 
postmodernism, stating that “the myth of Odysseus and Penelope seems to 
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be less of a grand narrative today than an interpretation of James Joyce’s 
Ulysses” (142). A recent article on the MaddAddam Trilogy suggests that 
twenty-first century postmodernism is different to the dominant form of the 
postmodern experienced in the 1980s and 1990s (Raschke).22 Seyla 
Benhabib discusses “strong” and “weak” versions of postmodernism; the 
strong version of the “Death of the Subject” and other theses of 
postmodernism are held to be “not compatible with the goals of feminism” but 
moderations of this are possible; whilst Benhabib’s argument is convincing, it 
seems to me that postmodernism is itself too exhausted as a theory to allow 
‘weak’ moderations of broadly understood theses to serve as supporting 
philosophies for feminism (215). When Slapkauskaitë suggests that The 
Penelopiad is seeking to go “beyond – beyond the present and the past, 
beyond the real and the imaginary”, we see how critics have begun to map a 
move away from the disintegration of ‘pure’ postmodernism (145). 
Slapkauskaitë does suggest that “Atwood remains loyal to her postmodern 
experiments and her ideological views” (145), yet I contend that despite 
marked elements of postmodern experimentation, The Penelopiad does 
highlight a shift in the construction of feminine voices in twenty-first century 
literature.  
 
22 Interestingly, Debrah Raschke believes that the “postmodernism of the 1980s is not the 
postmodernism of the twenty-first century. The trilogy, in effect, dramatizes the postmodern 
condition gone amuck’ (NP). Thus we see how Atwood has traditionally been understood as 
a postmodern author but her twenty-first century texts mark a shift from this, as this chapter 
similarly contends. Sharon Rose Wilson links Atwood’s rewritings, from The Robber Bride 
(1993) to Oryx and Crake (2003) to postmodernism (“Margaret Atwood and the Fairy Tale: 
Postmodern Revisioning in Recent Texts”, 2008)     
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 In her rewriting for the Canongate series, Atwood’s foreword states 
that “two questions […] must pose themselves after any close reading of the 
Odyssey: what led to the hanging of the maids, and what was Penelope 
really up to?” (The Penelopiad 1). Those seeking determinacy will be left 
disappointed, but the foregrounding of these questions points to a desire to 
destabilise the primary authority of her source. This is further served by her 
choice to remove power from Homer’s omniscient narrator, giving voice 
instead to Odysseus’s wife Penelope and her twelve maids, hanged by 
Telemachus in the climax of the Odyssey. This is an immediate and obvious 
deviance from the epic form of the original. Offering narrative authority to a 
previously marginalised character has been repeatedly designated as a 
postmodern technique; Wilson includes this method in her list of postmodern 
methodologies for myth and fairy tale (Myths and Fairy Tales in 
Contemporary Women’s Fiction). Purkiss has also recognised this as a 
methodology deployed by some feminist rewriters, in addition to general 
reversal and moral inversion – where what was negative is framed positively 
and vice versa (441–42).23 Not only does Atwood serve a redundancy notice 
to Homer’s narrator, but she also weaves into the subtext of The Penelopiad 
doubts about the veracity of the epic original. The question of what Penelope 
was “really up to”, whilst remaining unanswered, establishes from the outset 
the existence of truths that the original source myth does not allow the reader 
 
23 Purkiss does note, however, that this approach is not without difficulty (as discussed in the 
introduction to this thesis).  
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to easily access, or may in fact, not be understood by the characters 
themselves. 
 Homer’s Penelope, wise and intelligent, has been received throughout 
the ages as refracted through her limited archetypal qualifiers. Indeed, 
Penelope had become synonymous with wifely forbearance, something that 
Atwood’s Penelope comments upon wryly: 
Hadn’t I been faithful? Hadn’t I waited, and waited, and waited, 
despite the temptation – almost the compulsion – to do otherwise? 
And what did I amount to, once the official version gained ground? An 
edifying legend. A stick used to beat other women with. Why couldn’t 
they be as considerate, as trustworthy, as all-suffering as I had been? 
(2) 
 
Here Atwood is drawing attention to the damage that feminine archetypes 
may cause, the idealised Penelope being used as an impossible standard 
against whom other women will be inevitably judged. Potential inaccuracies 
in the Homeric original are highlighted; the suggestion of an “official version” 
gives The Odyssey an established weight, but it also tantalisingly offers the 
possibility of alternative versions – versions in which Penelope may not be 
the flawless feminine figurehead that we have inherited through our literary 
tradition. She may not even be the inversion of this ideal, which Molly Bloom, 
the Penelope of Ulysses, may be said to represent. She is instead, a version 
of this ‘Penelope’ which casts questions of official, definitive ‘versions’ into 
question. 
 This interrogation is expanded later in the novella, when Penelope’s 
own authenticity as a narrator is repeatedly called into question. In the 
chapter “Slanderous Gossip” she emphatically – rather too emphatically – 
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asserts that she was never physically intimate with any of the swarming 
suitors who assembled on Ithaca in Odysseus’s absence (143). Indeed, by 
addressing this supposed gossip, the “various items […] that have been 
going the rounds for the past two or three thousand years”, she is not only 
destabilising Penelope’s symbolic faithfulness, but is keying into critical 
debates pertaining to Homer’s original and suggesting alternative narratives 
that have been marginalised throughout the history of this particular text. 
Atwood’s rewrite is not merely an engagement with the textual source myth 
as we receive it today, but a response to a survey of oral traditions that have 
contributed to the Odysseus myth, thus undermining the grand narrative of 
the classical text in a classically postmodern way. 
 Atwood’s chorus of maids further serve this destabilisation in their 
framing interludes. Their fate preoccupied Atwood and they are provided with 
a form of vengeance: helping to slay Homer’s textual authority. The 
complimentary and contrasting voices of the Maids and Penelope, each 
casting each other into a liminal space of doubt, thus question the feasibility 
of authorial certainty. Yet there also occurs, due to this layering of 
oppositional voices, a questioning of how women’s voices interact with each 
other. Penelope, in isolation, finds, despite her new position of authority, 
speech to be difficult: when she tries to scream, she sounds like an owl (2). 
Yet the Maids, performing a multi-genre chorus, are able to pursue a far 
more coherent and assertive line of narrative inquiry. This is a point to which 
we will return later. 
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 The Penelopiad’s engagement with time is also consistent with the 
postmodern aesthetic. Khalid & Tabassum have detailed the text’s use of 
historiographic metafiction, using Linda Hutcheon’s definition: “[it] installs and 
blurs the line between fiction and history and there is simultaneous and overt 
assertion and crossing of boundaries in a way which is intensely self-
conscious” (A Poetics of Postmodernism: History Theory, Fiction 112). Rita 
Felski, in Doing Time: Feminist Theory and Postmodern Culture, states:  
History presumes a confident knowledge of what really happened in 
the past and an imperious urge to organize the chaotic flux of time into 
a single streamlined story. Postmodern thought shatters this 
apparently stable ground and radically alters our way of thinking about 
time (2).  
 
Indeed, one is forcibly reminded of Penelope wandering through the 
asphodel when we read Felski’s assessment of contemporary concepts of 
time: “We are no longer propelled into the future by the purposeful forward 
march of events. Instead, we find ourselves adrift, floating aimlessly in a sea 
of temporal fragments and random moments” (2). Atwood indicates an 
appreciation of the lost arrow of postmodern time – in life, Penelope 
observes the sun rising and setting and the moon “[doing] the same, 
changing from phase to phase” but in Atwood’s imagined underworld, she 
notes “it’s hard to keep track of time here, because we don’t have any of it as 
such” (18). The text is not ahistoric – Penelope comments on how things 
have changed throughout history, even if she is unable to quantify it in terms 
of time – but the non-linear narrative is supported by an implied 




In the invention of the light bulb, for instance, and in the matter-into-
energy theories of the twentieth century. More recently, some of us 
have been able to infiltrate the new ethereal-wave system that now 
encircles the globe, and to travel around that way […] Perhaps how 
the gods were able to come and go as they did back then – they must 
have had something like that at their disposal. (19)  
 
Here Penelope is showing an awareness of how technology has developed 
in a linear history but also subverts this with the suggestion that this 
technology must have been available to ancient deities. Atwood is therefore 
simultaneously constructing history as linear and as part of what Felski 
defines as “a posthistorical consciousness” (2). Alterations of time within the 
text, and Penelope’s ability to see beyond her time, are two further methods 
of disruption and progenitors of ambiguity within the text.  
 Atwood has thus been shown to use a variety of techniques 
recognised as postmodern as a method of disturbing the certainties of her 
Homeric source. To this end, Atwood may be understood as a ‘resisting 
reader’ of myth, to quote Fetterley’s epithet – she foregrounds uncertainties 
in previous versions of the myth and leaves open spaces within her own. Yet 
what I contend is that within this multi-layered retelling, where characters 
place each other on trial and call into question established behaviours, 
Penelope remains, to a certain extent, “determined”. The postmodern 
retelling is limited by its setting within patriarchy. While methods of 
storytelling may be adopted to inject resistance into the narrative, there 
remain unchallenged, fixed points of gender asymmetry which, Atwood 
seems to be suggesting, cannot be dismantled by irony or pastiche alone. 
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 Wilson champions The Penelopiad as a feminist antimyth (Myths and 
Fairy Tales in Contemporary Women’s Fiction: From Atwood to Morrison 3). 
She unpacks this: 
Focussing on her personal odyssey in The Penelopiad, Penelope 
appropriates patriarchal myth and establishes her own identity as a 
wise Crone creator. Characteristically, Atwood re-visions old stories, 
in this case, Homer’s canonical story, in a postmodern manner, 
emphasizing how history, myth and reality – yet other stories – are all 
constructions. Like Scheherazade without a mouth, Penelope is an 
archetypal woman writer: She creates, changes and perpetuates a 
world and herself for as long as she speaks. (59) 
 
In her analysis of the text, Wilson argues that Atwood both parodies and 
symbolises the Great Goddess figure and tells the tale from her ‘Crone’ 
phase (55). Wilson is correct that she is both creation and creator – engaging 
in the “low art” of stories and her traditional artisanal weaving enterprises 
alike (1). Her characterisation of Penelope as Crone may also be accepted, 
though it seems to me that this role is far more convincingly occupied by 
Odysseus’s aged nurse Eurycleia, whose particular brand of wisdom leads to 
the selection of which maids to hang, with Penelope occupying the ‘Mother’ 
branch of the trinity and the maids as a unified ‘maiden’ figure. What is 
curious is, however, that Wilson characterises Penelope within a different 
archetypal role, when Atwood has done so much to try and destabilise 
archetype within her rewrite. Does the female writer indeed “create, change 
and perpetuate a world and herself for as long as she speaks”? What if her 
speech is, as Luce Irigaray has extensively discussed, imbued with the 
masculine?24 How, without a mouth, where she sounds like an owl, can 
 
24 See, for example, To Speak is Never Neutral (Irigaray 2017)).  
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Penelope truly speak herself into being? As Penelope comments: “What can 
a woman do when scandalous gossip travels the world? If she defends 
herself she sounds guilty” (3). The burden of speech is something Penelope 
feels keenly, and is quite literally something she has to carry around in a 
sack whilst in the underworld. 
 Ultimately, Penelope is deliberately restricted by the constraints of her 
patriarchal society; the irony with which the source myth is destabilised does 
in fact, ironically identify the structures and narratives which cannot be 
dislodged through word play, generic experimentation or parody. As 
Penelope says, “So much whispering goes on, in the dark caverns, in the 
meadows, that sometimes it’s hard to know whether the whispering is 
coming from others or from the inside” (8-9). When voices are so dislocated, 
it is hard to discern their origin and harder still to identify when they have 
become internalised. 
 Penelope is in fact herself a generator of patriarchal myth. She offers 
an abundance of pronouncements on how woman do or ought to behave, 
recommending crafts as a means of avoiding having to deal with 
inappropriate remarks and talking about how “goody-goody girls” are always 
secretly attracted to the criminal classes (8-9). Penelope cannot understand 
herself beyond her archetypal signifiers: 
As for me…well, people told me I was beautiful, they had to tell me 
that because I was a princess […] I was smart though: considering the 
times, very smart. That seems to be what I was known for: being 
smart. That, and my weaving, and my devotion to my husband, and 




Penelope recognises that other people’s opinions may not be accurate and 
are shaped by position or expectation, yet she continues to extol the same 
virtues as we were given by Homer. She seems to find it difficult to conceive 
of herself beyond what others say about her, or else, how she is constructed 
in opposition to her loathed cousin, Helen.  
 It is no wonder that Penelope finds herself limited in this way, when 
her society is revealed to be brutally misogynistic in its structuring. She 
comments:  
Marriages were for having children, and children were not toys or 
pets. Children were vehicles for passing things along. If you had 
daughters instead of sons, you needed to get them bred as soon as 
possible so you could have grandsons. (25) 
 
The relative value of male versus female is expanded upon by the Maids. In 
the ‘Lament of the Maids’, they declare “We too were children […] we were 
told we were fatherless. We were told we were dirty […] we were the dirty 
girls” (13). Whereas Penelope speaks of the misogynistic reception of 
childbirth in ancient Greece in abstract terms: “if you had daughters instead 
of sons”, the Maids as a group speak of their own experiences with a “we”. 
The removal of the figure of a father as a standard by which a woman might 
be judged before having a husband renders the girls “dirty”. This is later 
expanded in their Idyll, where they compare their births to that of 
Telemachus: 
 His mother presented a princeling. Our various mothers 
 Spawned merely, lambed, farrowed, littered, 
Foaled, whelped and kittened, brooded, 
Hatched out their clutch […] 
He was fathered; we simply appeared, 
 Like the crocus, the rose, the sparrows 
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 Engendered in mud. (67) 
“He” is presented whilst they, in animal terminology “spawned merely”, their 
lack of an identifiable father leaving them without an anchor in the world and 
also bodiless, excluded from a patrilineal society. This also furthers the long-
established patriarchal motif of femininity’s association with nature, 
particularly flowers and birds. Thus whilst Penelope recognises some of 
these features in her society, she does not engage with this directly. There is 
certainly a class element at work and Penelope’s status as a princess 
protects her from many of the indignities experienced by the maids. Yet 
Penelope is also a woman whose father attempted to drown her at birth (7); 
she never learns precisely why, but she believes it is out of fear that she 
would weave his shroud. Female children, whether rich or poor, are thus of a 
lesser value and subject to male control.   
 The violence and toxicity of Atwood’s Ancient Greek patriarchy is 
emphasised repeatedly. The marriage between Odysseus and Penelope is 
described as her being “handed over to Odysseus, like a package of meat. A 
package of meat in a wrapping of gold, mind you. A sort of gilded blood 
pudding” (39). Whilst she contextualises this, establishing that meat was 
highly valued at a time, the transactional nature of the relationship, trading 
flesh, is highlighted. Penelope seems to internalise this consumerist attitude 
towards interpersonal relationships, commenting that Helen viewed 
Odysseus as a “less than delicious sausage” that she has rejected (34). 
Odysseus and Penelope, after their wedding ceremony, are forced to take 
part in a charade where she pretends to have been stolen:  
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The gatekeeper had been posted to keep the bride from rushing out in 
horror, and to stop her friends from breaking down the door and 
rescuing her when they heard her scream. All of this was play-acting: 
the fiction was that the bride had been stolen, and the consummation 
of a marriage was supposed to be a sanctioned rape. It was supposed 
to be a conquest, a trampling of a foe, a mock killing. There was 
supposed to be blood. (44)  
 
Whilst Penelope and Odysseus circumvent this with pretend screams, the 
elaborately staged expectation of brutality as part of a marriage 
consummation speaks to the patriarchal context within which the Odyssey 
was situated. Even if this is an outdated game played by the wealthy, it is a 
game which still speaks to the relative power of man and wife within their 
new marital relationship.  
 One interesting point where the narrative remains moored to 
patriarchal assumption is with the famed bow contest. Marilyn A. Katz has 
provided, in Penelope’s Renown: Meaning and Indeterminacy in The 
Odyssey, an extensive study of the static understanding of Homer’s 
Penelope betrayed by many Classicists. As she writes:  
Traditionally […] including in the ancient tradition, the understanding 
of Penelope’s kleos [glory or renown] is characteristically restricted to 
what we might call the simple or denotative meaning, to the level, at 
which it is identical with her capacity with her endurance and her 
faithfulness to Odysseus. (6) 
 
She then lists a number of ancient commentators who emphasise her 
“discretion” and “chastity” (6). Thus, the incident of the bow contest, where 
Penelope tells the suitors she will marry whoever can string Odysseus’s bow 
and fire it through twelve axe heads, has become a major source of 
contention for those critics, ancient and contemporary, who only appreciate 
Penelope’s worth according to this framework. F.M. Combellack comments: 
117 
 
“Penelope, the model of cautious, shrewd intelligence, acts on this one 
occasion like a rash, precipitate fool. It is quite understandable that Homer’s 
readers have often wondered why” (11). The bow contest is seen as a threat 
to this unified image of Penelope as faithful and constant, as it invites the 
possibility of her remarriage, though many (including Atwood) have claimed 
that Penelope did this fully aware of its impossibility as a task for anyone 
other than Odysseus.  
 What the perennial question of the bow contest indicates, however, is 
what Richard Heitman calls “the assumption that Penelope is to be 
understood in terms of her sexual fidelity to Odysseus” (111). Indeed, F.I. 
Zeitlin has called it the principal narrative anxiety of the entire epic (122). 
Heitman has also raised the incongruous doubting of all of Penelope’s 
statements and behaviour – “Every time Odysseus lies, the epic audience 
knows that he is lying”, but, he contends, Penelope is accorded no such faith 
in classical scholarship (111). Lilian Eileen Doherty says that the bow 
episode and Penelope’s (or the narrator’s) failure to offer any motive 
provides an opening in a text she understands to be primarily closed, though 
the diverging groups of Homeric scholars seem to suggest that the text 
cannot be as closed as she would presume (Siren Songs: Gender, 
Audiences and Narrators in The Odyssey 32). However, the assumption that 
Penelope must account for her motives in order to maintain her chaste 
reputation is itself a misogynistic expectation. 
 Thus when Atwood engages with these ambiguities pertaining to 
Penelope’s fidelity, she is also contributing to nearly three millennia of critical 
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investigations and appraisals of her sexual virtue. In fact, Atwood ‘closes’ the 
opening of the bow episode by definitively confirming that Penelope 
recognised Odysseus: 
The songs claim that the arrival of Odysseus and my decision to set 
the test of the bow and axes coincided by accident – or by divine plan 
[…] Now you’ve heard the plain truth. I knew that only Odysseus 
would be able to perform this archery trick. I knew that the beggar was 
Odysseus. There was no coincidence. I set the whole thing up on 
purpose. (139) 
 
It is a complicated response to the bow question. On one hand, it gives 
Penelope an agency denied her in the source myth – she is definitively 
aware and acts autonomously to set the climax of the plot into action. Yet on 
the other hand, it leaves the primary uncertainty of the text as being 
Penelope’s chastity. Was the “Scandalous Gossip” correct? Atwood is, on 
one hand, closing an ambiguity within the text by confirming Penelope’s 
awareness of Odysseus and, on the other, reinforcing the ancient ambiguity 
regarding Penelope’s fidelity. Atwood has shifted the lens of the tale to focus 
upon the hanging of the Maids but does not alter Zeitlin’s “narrative anxiety”: 
Penelope’s sexual indeterminacy. In a novel full of play, mixing registers, and 
inventions, the points at which Atwood chooses to remain fixed to the original 
are particularly significant. 
 Atwood’s imagination, never in doubt, chooses also not the fill in the 
time Penelope spends on Ithaca waiting for Odysseus in any great detail.  
What can I tell you about the next ten years? Odysseus sailed away to 
Troy. I stayed in Ithaca. The sun rose, travelled across the sky, set. 
Only sometimes did I think of it as the flaming chariot of Helios. The 
moon did the same, changing from phase to phase. Only sometimes 




Where Odysseus’s adventures are the subject of discussion and debate, 
departure and invention, Penelope has little to tell us. She describes being 
told that Odysseus and his men had put wax in his ears to avoid the sirens, 
while being told by someone else that “it was a high-class Sicilian knocking 
shop – the courtesans there were known for their musical talents and their 
fancy feathered outfits” (91). Thus while his exploits are open to 
interpretation or re-evaluation, the gap in Homer’s narrative pertaining to 
Penelope’s lonely occupation is left unfilled. Penelope simply does not have 
the language to articulate a life beyond her relationship to Odysseus and 
only sometimes can she view the world as anything other than literal, as the 
“flaming chariot of Helios”. She wonders: “When would he come back and 
relieve me of my boredom?”, her life defined by their interactions with each 
other (81).  
 Yet the primary example of what we may characterise as Penelope’s 
internalised misogyny is her relationship with her cousin Helen. Rivalry 
between women is a repeated theme in Atwood’s work, as highlighted by 
Earl G. Ingersoll, who comments: 
As in her other work, Atwood offers here a portrait of a woman who 
seems unable to resist allowing another woman to dominate her. 
Indeed traditional feminists have had their difficulties with Atwood on 
this very point: much as she demonstrates that men dominate and 
abuse other women, she will not discount the fact that women are 
occasionally even worse in their abuse of each other […] consciously 
or not, Atwood appears to be reminding her readers that women can 
be not only “sisters” but each other’s worst enemies. (119)  
 
Ingersoll derides this rivalry in the context of The Penelopiad, suggesting that 
it becomes something like “Penelope’s Complaint”, thereby turning tragedy 
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into what a less sensitive generation might have called a “cat fight” (117).25 
His derision of the “soap opera” elements seems to ignore that within the 
patriarchal context Atwood has built for Penelope, engagement with other 
women becomes very difficult. 
 Helen, the face who launched the thousand ships, is Penelope’s 
cousin and the main antagonist of her narrative. One chapter title succinctly 
summarises her judgment of Helen: “Helen Ruins My Life” (71). The pair 
have numerous meetings, both in life and in the underworld, and whilst Helen 
does make one unpleasant remark about Penelope and Odysseus both 
having short legs, it seems that Penelope can only interpret their interactions 
as antipathetic and that in fact, Helen’s speech does not necessarily provoke 
such a strong reaction at all times.  
‘Never mind, little cousin,’ she said to me, patting me on the arm. 
‘They say he’s very clever. And you’re very clever too, they tell me. So 
you’ll be able to understand what he says. I certainly never could!’ 
(34-5)  
Penelope describes this as being accompanied by a patronizing smirk, but 
certainly it could be read as a genuine compliment and hope for a success in 
the match. It could be understood as Helen’s acknowledgement of 
Penelope’s superior intellect. In the underworld, she even extends kindness 
to an isolated Penelope, inviting her to come and bathe, but Penelope is 
unable to appreciate this as anything other than spite (153). She holds Helen 
responsible for “ruining her life”, by running off with Paris and thus instigating 
the Trojan War. During the marriage contest for Helen’s hand, Odysseus 
 
25 Interestingly the very term used by Peter Conrad (see p78 of this thesis).  
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suggested to Helen’s father Tyndaerus that to prevent any conflict after she 
had made her choice, they all would make an oath to defend Helen and 
whoever she married (36). Penelope thus believes Helen’s contravening this 
oath through her infidelity resulted in Odysseus’s departure and their 
separation. It ought to be noted, however, that the pact was made as a result 
of Helen’s suitors being unable to behave themselves and as a means of 
stemming conflict between her masculine admirers. Some critics have 
questioned the role Helen played as ancient Greek Eve; other versions of the 
myth have suggested Helen was abducted or never really existed.26 Yet 
here, Penelope establishes her as the root of her misery, describing “Paris 
and wicked Helen”, ascribing blame entirely to her cousin (78). 
 She describes how in the underworld, she is not as interesting to the 
mystics and clairvoyants seeking commune with the dead as Helen is: 
For some reason they didn’t want to see me, whereas my cousin 
Helen was much in demand. It didn’t seem fair – I wasn’t known for 
doing anything notorious, especially of a sexual nature, and she was 
nothing if not infamous. Of course she was very beautiful. It was 
claimed she’d come out of an egg, being the daughter of Zeus who’d 
raped her mother in the form of a swan. She was quite stuck-up about 
it, was Helen. I wonder how many of us really believed that swan-rape 
concoction? There were a lot of stories of that kind going around then 
– the gods couldn’t seem to keep their hands or paws or beaks off 
mortal women, they were always raping someone or other. (20) 
 
This diatribe reveals a number of interesting points. The first of these is that 
Helen is the product of rape, the result of Leda’s violation by Zeus in the 
 
26 Euripides, Stesichorus, and Herodotus all stated they did not believe Helen ever went 
to Troy, but stayed in Egypt. See Edmunds (2015) for full details of the varying versions 
of the Helen myth; Edmunds cites Euripides play Helen of Troy, in which Helen declares 
“I did not go to Troy; it was an image” (173). This is something expanded upon in 
Cassandra (Wolf 2013). 
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guise of a swan. Later in the novel she also mentions how Helen had been 
kidnapped as a 12 year old by Theseus. She is then sold to Menelaus and 
potentially abducted by Paris. Helen is, despite her fame and beauty, clearly 
a victim of the patriarchy and male violence. Penelope is not able to see this 
from her limited perspective, however. Penelope as an individual (“I wonder”) 
is querying the collective opinion of that story (“how many of us really 
believed”). There is a tacit acknowledgement of the weight and impact of 
group think, but also an indication of the fact that sexual behaviour is open to 
discussion and evaluation by others. Penelope later perpetuates the “story” 
herself perhaps inadvertently, describing her “sailing up, like the long-necked 
swan she fancied herself to be” (33). What is also key in this railing against 
Helen’s fame is that Penelope finds herself in an impossible position. She 
wants to be of interest and import, yet believes it is notorious behaviour 
which secures that status. Which version of Penelope is real and which is the 
version she wants us to be believe? The Penelope who did secretly conduct 
affairs with the suitors behind her husband’s back, as the narrative 
occasionally suggests, or the version whose chastity remained ever intact? 
Penelope doesn’t wish to be judged as inferior within this underworld value 
system which prizes notoriety and beauty, and in this she is transposing the 
competitive, transactional character of relationships from the world of the 
living to the land of the dead. Helen, when conjured, also feels the weight of 
these expectations and in fact, dresses specifically to meet the tastes of 
whoever has summoned her:  
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She liked to appear in one of her Trojan outfits, over-decorated to my 
taste […] Or she’d take on the form in which she displayed herself to 
her outraged husband, Menelaus, when Troy was burning and he was 
about to plunge his vengeful sword into her. All she had to do was 
bare one of her peerless breasts, and he was down on his knees, and 
drooling and begging to take her back. (20)  
 
The male-driven violence of Helen’s experience, rendered acutely phallic by 
the “vengeful sword” about to be “plunged into her”, means that her only 
possible response to his rage is sexual manipulation. Yet her breasts are 
“peerless”, unmatched in beauty but also isolating Helen from any other form 
of community. When her life has been lived adhering to the expectations or 
demands of men, no wonder she performs accordingly, leaving herself 
without a peer. Both Penelope and Helen are on opposing ends of the 
Whore-Madonna dichotomy, something Penelope emphasises: “If you were 
magician […] would you want to conjure up a plain but smart wife who’d 
been good at weaving and had never transgressed, instead of a woman 
who’d driven hundreds of men mad with lust?” (21-2). Yet they are both 
similarly defined by their relationships with men and their isolation from 
others. When Penelope comments on Helen’s lack of punishment, she 
closes the subject by saying “I had other things in my life to occupy my 
attention. Which brings me to my marriage” (22). This juxtaposition shows 
that these two things which have occupied Penelope’s attention – her rivalry 
with Helen and her marriage to Odysseus – have both been produced by 
patriarchal structures, are both detrimental to her happiness, and crucially, 
are both to a greater or lesser extent faithful to our expectations from the 
source myth. It is also worth noting that Anticleia and Eurycleia, the other two 
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women whose identities are most clearly anchored to Odysseus, do not 
change a great deal from the source myth and are themselves antagonistic 
towards other women.  
 The establishment of these fixed points, this ‘determined nature’ 
amidst many new ambiguities, serves to emphasise that Penelope as an 
individual woman cannot, within the context of a purely postmodern novella 
filled with play and irony, actually move beyond patriarchal structures and 
archetypes. She can dislodge the authority of her source and call some of its 
essential premises into question, but there are barriers to complete 
disintegration. However, conversely, the female characters operating in 
commune, the choral collective of the Maids, are in fact given more liberty in 
terms of generic innovation and in the quest for textual justice.  
 
“The Maids all curtsy”: Performed Femininity and the Case for 
Community 
 
Unfortunately one of them betrayed the secret of my interminable 
weaving. I’m sure it was an accident: the young are careless, and she 
must have slip a hint or a word. I still don’t know which one: down 
here among the shadows they all go about in a group, and when I 
approach them they run away. They shun me as if I had done them a 
terrible injury. But I never would have hurt them, not of my own 
accord. (115) 
 
Atwood’s Penelope involves the Maids in her plot with the suitors, 
encouraging them to flirt with and manipulate them to better obfuscate her 
shroud trick. When the secret is discovered, she holds one of them 
accountable, though not knowing precisely who it was who told them of her 
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plans. The single figure in Penelope’s imagination, the careless maid guilty of 
‘betraying’ her, contrasts with the ever-united group of maids in the 
underworld, sticking together after life and refusing to approach Penelope as 
she wanders alone through the asphodel. Penelope’s knowledge of and 
complicity in the Maids’ execution by Telemachus is explored in many of the 
Maids’ framing interludes. In Penelope’s own words, she offers a qualified 
plea of innocence: she would not have hurt them if left to her own devices. 
Their murder, it is suggested, is the inevitable result of a patriarchal system 
wherein an individual female cannot act “on her own accord”, leading to 
“terrible injury”. This section will examine the performative aspects of 
femininity within the text, with the Maids’ outright ‘dramatic’ performances in 
idylls, plays, sea shanties and videotaped court trials, juxtaposed with 
Penelope’s individual performance of ‘feminine’ tropes. From this, an 
argument for the community of women’s voices, as opposed to the isolation 
of disintegrating individual female subjectivities, will be presented. 
 Penelope repeatedly and ironically enacts behaviours which are 
suggested to be disingenuous, in keeping with the expectations of those 
around her. As a result, the inherent misogyny of the source myth is 
highlighted through Atwood’s construction of femininity as a performed act, in 
keeping with a feminist understanding of gender as not biological but socially 
constituted.27 These behaviours are also in-line with some of the repeated 
 
27 See, for example, the works of Judith Butler. Butler writes: “Because there is neither an 
‘essence’ that gender expresses or externalizes nor an objective ideal to which gender 
aspires; because gender is not a fact, the various acts of gender create the idea of gender, 
and without those acts, there would be no gender at all. Gender is, thus, a construction that 
regularly conceals its genesis. The tacit collective agreement to perform, produce, and 
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archetypes associated with Homer’s Penelope. The primary of these is her 
crying. In the Odyssey, Penelope’s son Telemachus comments: “I am going 
to town now to show myself to my mother; I am sure she won’t stop her 
dismal weeping and lamenting until she sees me in the flesh”, indicating that 
the maternal influence in his life has been left to cry whilst he, her son, has 
been free to go out and seek adventure (17, 5-9). His expectation is that she 
will remain in the domestic sphere and give into what is a predominantly 
feminine pursuit, weeping. This is later confirmed when he returns: “Mother,” 
the thoughtful Telemachus replied, “do not bring me to tears or stir my 
emotions when I have just escaped from a violent death. But go upstairs with 
your ladies” (Homer 17, 45–47). Telemachus has to resist the impulse to cry 
and forbids his mother to evoke this emotion in conjunction with his more 
masculine adventures. She then does as she is told and continues upstairs 
to weep, with her ladies. The implication is, therefore, that one of most 
Penelope’s obvious actions in the Odyssey, her weeping, is not only passive 
but restricted to the female sex and avoided by men. It may be done with 
companionship from other women, but it should occur somewhere away from 
the male members of the family or community.  
 Atwood’s Penelope cries continuously, but her weeping serves to 
ironically highlight the strictures of her classical archetype. On the day of her 
marriage to Odysseus, Atwood’s Penelope starts to cry, “as I would do so 
often in the future” and later “did some more weeping, and was comforted in 
 
sustain discrete and polar genders as cultural fictions is obscured by the credibility of its own 
production. The authors of gender become entranced by their own fictions whereby the 
construction compels one’s belief in its necessity and naturalness”(1988, 522).  
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ways that were suitable for a wedding night” (48). The passive verb and the 
subsequent intimacy between man and wife as a result of this behaviour is 
indicative of Penelope’s desire to be seen as traditionally feminine and is in 
keeping with her repetitive crying in the Odyssey. Yet Atwood’s insistence on 
the performative “did crying”, repeated also on page 7, highlights that her 
supposedly feminine weeping is a performed behaviour rather than a natural 
emotional impulse. Another interaction between Odysseus and Penelope 
shows her emulating the behaviours expected of the wife of a hero, though in 
this circumstance they are more genuine than her tears: 
If word got around about his post, said Odysseus in a mock-sinister 
manner, he would know I’d been sleeping with some other man, and 
then – he said, frowning at me in what was supposed to be a playful 
way – he would be very cross indeed, and he would have to chop me 
into little pieces with his sword or hang me from the roof beam. 
I pretended to be frightened, and said I would never, never 
think of betraying his big post. 
  Actually, I really was frightened. (74) 
 
The interplay between Penelope’s performed fear, to please Odysseus and 
gratify his simultaneously enacted (“supposed to be in a playful way”) 
masculinity, and her genuine fear of his potential violence towards her in this 
unsettling scene, draws attention to both Penelope’s pragmatic performance 
of feminine tropes of behaviour and her intrinsic fear of her husband’s 
capacity for violence. Later she imagines Odysseus’s return and “me – with 
womanly modesty – revealing to him how well I had done” (89). Penelope’s 
repeated and ironic need to perform as a ‘feminine’ wife in order to meet the 
expectations of both her husband, and the society in which they are 
operating, as evidenced by the wedding night incident detailed earlier, draws 
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attention to how constructions of femininity occur within societies which 
demand a certain pattern of behaviour.  
These performed behaviours are reiterated throughout the text, with 
“crying” appearing in the text 8 times, “tears” 13 times and “weep” 12 times; 
they are ultimately established as part of Penelope’s broader ‘performance’ 
as a dutiful wife. When Odysseus returns from his travels, Penelope informs 
the reader that “it is said” that he did not reveal himself as he distrusted her 
and wanted to test her faithfulness. Penelope counters this perceived 
explanation by saying “But the real reason was that he was afraid I would cry 
tears of joy and thus give him away” (145). Odysseus has, as far as 
Penelope can tell, accepted this as part of her behaviour and it is this 
performance which prevents him from being honest with her. Yet the tears 
are ultimately dishonest, which Penelope reveals, commenting: “But he knew 
me well - my tender heart, my habit of dissolving in tears and falling down on 
thresholds. He simply didn’t want to expose me to dangers and disagreeable 
sights. Surely that is the obvious explanation for his behaviour” (145). Her 
vague “surely” allows the reader to identify her uncertainty about this – a 
logical explanation to detract from the rumours circulating about Penelope’s 
fidelity. Upon his return, Penelope shed a “satisfactory number of tears” to 
convince Odysseus that she had not betrayed him (171) and later, after they 
have spent some time alone together, she tells him “how very many tears I’d 
shed while waiting twenty years for his return, and how tediously faithful I’d 
been” (173). She then asserts that they were both known liars and “it was a 
wonder either one of us believed a word the other said” (173). Tears are thus 
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the signifying behaviour she uses to indicate her wifely status, to assure her 
fidelity and to gratify Odysseus’s expectation. Yet they are similarly here 
established as insincere and markers of that expectation rather than of a true 
emotional outpouring.  
We find this reasserted on further occasions. Penelope comments: 
“When things get too dismal, and after I’ve done as much weeping as 
possible without turning myself into a pond, I have always – fortunately – 
been able to go to sleep” (123). Crying as much as possible and yet still 
being able to easily fall into slumber suggests once again a level of design in 
these outpourings. It is something Penelope does when no other recourse is 
open to her or whenever she feels the need to reassert her position as a 
female wife and princess: “What could I do but burst into tears?” (128) There 
are, for Penelope, no other pathways to agency. Indeed, there are even 
more oblique references to this conscious production of emotion later: “No 
sooner had I performed the familiar ritual and shed the familiar tears than 
Odysseus himself had shambled into the courtyard” (135). Penelope’s crying 
is so regularly performed that it becomes ritualistic, performed to and for 
others.  
Penelope’s performance as a self-consciously constructed individual 
living according to patriarchal expectation leads her to feel isolated from the 
other women in the novella. We have discussed at length her conflict with 
Helen, a similarly isolated figure performing according to archetype, although 
in her case it is as the eternal seductress. Penelope is also separated from 
her Maids, not merely by class and status, but by their very language and 
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means of communication. The Maids do not cry, indeed, they comment: “It 
did us no good to weep. It did us no good to say we were in pain” (9). The 
method of performance which works for Penelope, in her position of relative 
power, has no utility for the lowly Maids. But what they are able to access 
instead is community with each other. Their comfort comes not from weeping 
but: “We laughed together in our attics, in our nights” (15). This reference to 
the famed Madwoman in the Attic, echoing at once Rochester’s wife Bertha 
Mason and the seminal feminist re-evaluation of Victorian women’s literature 
The Madwoman in the Attic suggests that the Maids, like Bertha in Jane 
Eyre, have been oppressed and othered within the Odysseus myth. Yet 
these “madwomen” are not, like Bertha, alone in the attic: they instead laugh 
together despite their oppression, free to communicate with one another 
instead of succumbing to insanity alone. In the subsequent chapter, 
Penelope’s loneliness in the Underworld is highlighted and she even often 
admits that she avoids speaking to others (15).  
Penelope’s early characterisations of her Maids indicate that they 
have an access to knowledge that she will never have due to her position 
and the restrictive social mores which kept her ignorant. She states:  
A couple of the maids were with me – they never left me unattended, I 
was a risk until I was safely married, because who knew what upstart 
fortune hunter might try to seduce me or seize me and run away with 
me? The maids were my sources of information. They were the ever-
flowing fountains of trivial gossip: they could come and go freely in the 
palace, they could study the men from all angles, they could listen in 
on their conversations, they could laugh and joke with them as much 
as they pleased: no one cared who might worm his way in between 




For Penelope, the value of this liberty is primarily sexual freedom; their purity 
is not valued given their inferior status and the fact that this leaves them 
vulnerable to “worming between their legs” does not concern her. But she 
also identifies that their status permits them to gain knowledge and 
communicate in ways which she cannot, for her socially-ascribed purity 
constantly restricts and silences her, separating her from the conversations 
of others. Indeed, her position, both as an individual woman and as a 
princess, leaves her unable to understand or respond to the lewd jokes the 
maids make, leaving her “mortified [...] I had no way of making them stop” 
(32). When Penelope encourages the Maids to pretend to fall in love with the 
suitors, the deception ultimately results in their massacre. This pretence, 
these performed behaviours designed for to appease male desire, are thus 
characterised within the text as dangerous for women. 
 A further point at which the reader can recognise the disconnect 
between Penelope and her Maids comes when we consider the text’s 
disruption of feminine lineage and interrelation. Beyer discusses how some 
of the feminist success in, for example, Atwood’s poem “Metempsychosis”, 
comes through the forging of an “intergenerational connection between 
women” (284). In a second poem by Atwood, “Half-hanged Mary”, Beyer 
contends that she reflects “the need […] for women writers generally to 
connect to a powerful female predecessor, who acquires a significance to 
her on the level of personal mythology” (287). We cannot trace a similar 
intergenerational connection through Penelope’s interaction with other 
women. Her mother, a Naiad, “was elusive. When I was little I often tried to 
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throw my arms around her, but she had a habit of sliding away” (11). Her 
mother had “a short attention span and rapidly changing emotions” (11). This 
particular intimation is followed immediately by “The Chorus Line: Kiddie 
Mourn, A Lament” (13). In this, the Maids assert “We too were children. We 
too were born to the wrong parents […] We were told we were motherless” 
(13). This lack of a mother is then used as an excuse for their misuse by the 
sons of visiting noblemen, but the Maids do not see the same lack of 
parentage. Indeed, they claim their “various mothers” in a later interlude (67). 
Penelope’s fate is to flow in isolation; the Maids and their mothers traverse 
those seas together, united in body. Penelope, the ignored daughter of an 
“oblique” mother, struggles to identify the kind of relationship she ought to 
have with the maids (43). She behaves in a maternal way towards the 
younger maids, buying them as small children, bringing them up to play with 
her son, and training them to serve her (113). When the maids are raped, 
despite the part she plays in this turn of events, she comforts them (118). Yet 
the strongest kinship she can claim, despite this adoption of a maternal 
position within their lives, is that “we were almost like sisters” (114, emphasis 
own). Indeed, in Odysseus’s “trial” interlude, Penelope curiously states: “I’d 
brought some of them up, you could say. They were like the daughters I 
never had” (181, emphasis own). Penelope’s inability to unequivocally claim 
the Maids as either sisters or daughters speaks again to her distance from 
other women; you could say that they were like her daughters, but there is no 
true maternal connection there.  
133 
 
We could extrapolate a broader point from this – that when there is no 
intergenerational connection, actively constructed rather than necessarily 
organically occurring, the result is marked isolation and potentially, even 
tragedy. If we accept that postmodernism has called into question our literary 
genealogy through a disavowal of linear time, a scepticism towards the 
metanarratives of history and patriarchy, and a preponderance for 
fragmentation, paranoia and irony, this may result in the positive effects of 
increased consideration of intertextuality may becoming undone. This could 
be seen to engender a new form of Gilbert and Gubar’s “anxiety of 
authorship” – where memory loss, uncertainty, sickness and death are once 
again made vitally present within the text.28 Indeed, the response of the 
Maids to the denial of their mothers is to “laugh together in their attics” (14). 
Taking a closer look now at the narrative of the Maids, we can see 
how the pragmatic, temporary unification of feminine subjectivities within one 
critical voice can interrogate dominant discourses and ultimately serve to 
destabilise existing preconceptions surrounding mythology. In their 
performance as a choral band, containing separate and distinct voices but 
singing the same songs, they are able to use the performative elements of 
their interludes to interrogate the very patriarchal values Penelope attempts 
to indulge. In “The Chorus Line: If I Was a Princess, A Popular Tune”, this 
disparity in power is explored, “accompanied” by instruments generally seen 
to be lower class: “a Fiddle, an Accordion and a Penny Whistle”. The first 
 
28 See “Infection in the Sentence: The Woman Writer and the Anxiety of Authorship” in 
Gilbert and Gubar (2010).  
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Maid offers her assumption about the privileged life of a princess: “If I were a 
princess, with silver and gold /And loved by a hero, I’d never grow old (51). 
Penelope the princess, with her silver and gold, is loved by a hero and at 
least, within the confines of this text, we do not see her grow old. Yet the 
Chorus intervenes to contradict the naïve wish of the first maid: 
 The water below is as dark as the grave 
 And maybe you’ll sink in your little blue boat 
 It’s hope, and hope only, that keeps us afloat. (51) 
 
The “boat” metaphor is identified in other Chorus Line interludes as the self. 
The princess, and the Maid wishing to occupy a similar position, is alone in 
her boat. The chorus, speaking together as an “us”, are together, kept afloat 
by the hope provided by a shared experience. In “The Chorus Line: The Birth 
of Telemachus, an Idyll”, they discuss how “Of troubling dreams he 
[Telemachus] sailed/ In his frail dark boat, the boat of himself” (65). 
Conversely, the  
twelve who were to die by his hand […] 
sailed as well, in the dark boats of ourselves 
Through the turbulent seas of our swollen 
and sore-footed mothers. (66) 
 
Telemachus is alone in his solitary boat, as the Maid who wishes to be a 
Princess is alone in hers. Yet the Maids are bound in the “boats of ourselves” 
and come to realise that it is this solitude which is dangerous. They realise 
that had they acted as or been perceived as a community, they may have 
been able to challenge the authority of Telemachus’s status: “Twelve against 
one, he wouldn’t have stood a chance” (69). 
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 At the end of the “Popular Tune”, the “audience” is spoken to directly 
by “Melantho of the Pretty Cheeks, passing the hat: Thank you, sir. Thank 
you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you” (52). This concluding note suggests 
a monetised performance with an audience which is at least, in part, 
identifiably male: “Thank you, sir”. Within the performance, the Maid 
performing her solo speaks of her desire for riches, wealth and fame. The 
other Maids function as a counterpoint to this fantasy, warning of the threat 
to the self which occurs when power and privilege isolate a person from 
others: “maybe you’ll sink in your little blue boat” (51). There is hope in the 
“us”, keeping afloat despite the threatening waters underneath. 
 In “The Perils of Penelope: A Drama”, the Maids add an extra layer to 
their performance, playing the roles of Penelope and Eurycleia respectively. 
The Maid-as-Penelope uses the dramatic form to directly explore the gossip 
surrounding Penelope’s famed fidelity, indicating both the extent to which 
Penelope’s sexual conduct has been a matter for public debate and also 
expanding possibilities regarding her behaviour.  
 PENELOPE 
 While he was pleasuring every nymph and beauty, 
 Did he think I’d do nothing but my duty? 
 While every girl and goddess he was praising 
 Did he assume I’d dry up like a raisin? 
 
 EURYCLEIA 
 While you your famous loom claimed to be threading, 
 In fact you were at work within the bedding! 
(148-9) 
 
Penelope’s shroud for Laertes becomes, in this dramatic re-enactment, a 
decoy to distract from Penelope’s lustful interactions. The performed nature 
136 
 
of identity is reiterated, with the Maids dressed as Penelope recreating her 
story and speech according to their own interpretations of her character. The 
dialogue addresses the hypocrisy of Ithacan society’s sexual strictures – why 
should Penelope not allow herself to engage in such pleasures, given 
Odysseus’s own sexual adventures? The multitude at voices within these 
interludes cast each other into a liminal space of doubt, thus questioning the 
feasibility of a singular narrative authority. When the Maids as 
Penelope/Eurycleia plot to pin the suitors’ destruction on the maids, they use 
a variety of different words to describe them: “jades”, “slaves”, “knaves” and 
sluts” (151-2). These varying terms are interesting considered in light of the 
points Emily Wilson, classicist and the first female translator of the Odyssey, 
made in a viral Channel 4 interview in May 2018. She discusses how 
translators of the ancient Greek text repeatedly made choices about the kind 
of language they used and that their translations frequently made space for 
“visible misogynies”. Her cited example for this is the description of the 
Maids, sometimes called “sluts” despite the fact, as Wilson asserts, that 
there is no term of abuse included in the Greek text and they are simply 
described as the women who had sex with the suitors.29 Placing into the 
Maids’ own mouths the words used by others to denigrate them make these 
misogynies all the more visible; by using Penelope and Eurycleia to amplify 
such terms, they are identifying the complicity other women can have in the 
 
29 The video is available on Channel 4’s Twitter account: @Channel4News. ““A translator 
always makes choices.” Classicist Dr Emily Wilson is the first woman to translate The 
Odyssey into English - and she found that many men before her added sexist or misogynist 




processes of female oppression. They thus become fractured voices, 
simultaneously denying a unitary narrative truth whilst highlighting a social 
reality.  
Despite this moment of polyphony, the Maids still function as one at 
key moments, and thus as a group of twelve are able to the access 
recognition and textual justice Atwood clearly feels has been denied them. 
During their Anthropology lecture (164), they indicate that it was no 
coincidence at all that there were twelve of them, discussing the symbolic 
relevance of the number 12 in legal proceedings and in Robert Graves’s 
discussions of matriarchal cults (164). In the lecture, the Maids highlight how 
their number has abstracted them, removing them from the individual 
subjectivities with whom it is easier to empathise: “You don’t have to think of 
us as real girls, real flesh and blood, real pain, real injustice […] Consider us 
symbol. We’re no more real than money” (168). Yet in “The Trial of 
Odysseus”, their number is felt as a weight, increasing the number of 
charges against their former master. Odysseus is in fact on trial for 
murdering the suitors and the Maids are not even included in the 
proceedings. The entire section could be read as a fictionalisation of the 
words of early feminist Poulain de Barre, as quoted by Simone de Beauvoir 
in The Second Sex: “All that has been written about women by men should 
be suspect, for the men are at once judge and party to the lawsuit” (10–11). 
The suitors themselves are quantified repeatedly as “give or take a dozen” 
(175, 176). Yet when the maids take their stand, they are unequivocal in 
number: “He hanged us in cold blood! Twelve of us! Twelve young girls! For 
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nothing!” (177). These young girls have now become far more real than 
money, their number no longer voluminous enough to lead to the kind of 
abstraction previously witnessed.  
The trial contains numerous observations on the access to justice for 
women. The judge takes the Odyssey as “the main authority on the subject” 
and acknowledges, despite the Attorney for the Defence’s attempts to 
demonise the maids, that the book itself clearly states that “The suitors raped 
them. Nobody stopped them” (180). He also identifies that Odysseus knew 
this, having said so himself. Yet when Penelope is brought in as a witness, 
she says: “I was asleep, Your Honour. I was often asleep” (181). Indeed, she 
claims “I felt so sorry for them! But most maids got raped, sooner or later; a 
deplorable but common feature of palace life. It wasn’t the fact of their being 
raped that told against them, in the mind of Odysseus. It’s that they were 
raped without permission” (181). Penelope’s testimony undermines the text 
and the judge, fearful of being “guilty of an anachronism”, dismisses the 
case. Using language feminists are all too familiar with due to its deployment 
in sexual assault defences, the Judge claims: “Standards of behaviour were 
different then. It would be unfortunate if this regrettable but minor incident 
were allowed to stand as a blot on an otherwise exceedingly distinguished 
career” (182). Penelope’s amplification of misogynistic values and defence of 
her murderous loved ones result in a denial of justice within the confines of 
the videotaped trial. Another channel for retribution appears, with the twelve 
Erinyes (Furies) “turn[ing] towards Odysseus. Their red eyes flash” (184). 
Vengeance appears likely and yet, the twelve Maids, supported by the twelve 
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Furies, are instead again undermined by the appearance of a powerful 
individual: this time the goddess Pallas Athene, Odysseus’s greatest 
supporter, who whisks him away in a puff of smoke. Throughout the entire 
trial, we see how one woman in a relative position of power can contribute to 
the oppression of an entire body of women. Denied justice in the trial of 
Odysseus, the text itself offers a different form of justice. It demonstrates the 
isolation and degradation which occurs when women are separated from 
each other and how such individualism can lead to increased internalisation 
of a patriarchal agenda. Yet the final word comes from the Maids, who are 
given a broader jury in the form of a new readership, who ultimately call out: 
 
Yoo hoo, Mr Thoughtfulness, Mr Goodness, Mr Godlike, Mr Judge! 
Look over your shoulder! Here we are, walking behind you, close, 
close by, close as a kiss, close as your own skin […] We’re the 
serving girls, we’re here to serve you. We’re here to serve you right. 
We’ll never leave you, we’ll stick to your shadow, soft and relentless 
as glue. Pretty maids, all in a row. (193) 
 
These male figures of power – the godlike, the judge – cannot ultimately 
escape the presence of the vengeful maids who together, “all in a row”, 
haunt them. They play together with language, suggesting a trajectory from 
victim to avenger: “We’re here to serve you. We’re here to serve you right”. 
The repeated “we”, the closeness of the grouped female bodies in a row, 
establishes this Maids’ chorus as a communal quest for some form of justice, 
for some interrogation of the act within the source myth that Atwood 
considered to be so cruel and unusual. Zina Giannopolou contends that the 
text ends with “female oppressors and a male victim”; yet we also have seen 
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how men can escape efforts to punish them, their crimes ignored for 
centuries or whisked away from courtrooms as if by magic (114). 
 Whilst the Maids are not, at last, afforded the justice they seek, their 
functioning together as a group within a variety of different genres, provides 
the reader with fresh insight into them as mythological figures; the generic 
playfulness of the choral interludes allows the videotaped trial to move 
beyond mere metaphor as a quest for justice. Ingersoll believes that  
The Penelopiad reads like a very early Greek tragedy in which the 
dramatist has just invented the form by allowing a single named and 
therefore individualized member of the Chorus to speak away from the 
group to tell a story, while the Chorus continues its function of 
speaking choric odes, often in counterpoint to the voice of the tragic 
figure but without the sense that the chorus and the tragic figure are 
necessarily “communicating” with each other. (113)  
 
Yet the very lack of communication between the chorus of Maids and the 
individual Penelope is making a precise and important point. Where female 
power is centred on one privileged individual, other women will in time 
become its victims. Penelope becomes like Woolf’s Angel in the House in 
purgatory: “Be sympathetic; be tender; flatter; deceive; use all the arts and 
wiles of our sex. Never let anybody guess you have a mind of your own. 
Above all, be pure” (Professions for Women 140).  Penelope, trapped in an 
outdated mode of femininity, and the Maids, whose collectivity and class 
allow them to be more honest, may not directly communicate with each 
other, but they are in communication with the reader, the source myth, and a 
longer history of mythological rewriting which has served to present 
unquestioningly a tale in which twelve innocent girls, victims of sexual 
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assault, can be raped by a man who we are supposed to still consider to be 
heroic. 
  
“Now you can’t get rid of us”: The Legacy of The Penelopiad 
 
In the penultimate chorus, the Maids tell Odysseus: “Now you can’t get rid of 
us, wherever you go: in your life or your afterlife or any of your other lives” 
(192). This is in part a reference to Odysseus’s choice to drink the Waters of 
Forgetfulness from the river Lethe, which are supposed to wipe away past 
lives from a person’s memories so that they might return to earth and live a 
new life. Odysseus and Telemachus both repeatedly choose to drink these 
waters and live out new lives, usually in positions of power and “it always 
ends badly, with a suicide or an accident or a death in battle or an 
assassination” (189-90). Yet Penelope and the Maids do not do the same, 
staying instead in the Underworld and retaining those same memories. This 
may be understood on a comment on male access to a kind of postmodern 
disintegration; one can indulge in living different lives, creating different 
endings, if one can be guaranteed returning to a life of masculine privilege. 
Yet, as Penelope establishes, this breaking down is ultimately an illusion: 
drinking from the Lethe “is only a theory. The Waters of Forgetfulness don’t 
always work the way they’re supposed to. Lots of people remember 
everything” (186-7). Indeed, despite the disparity of lives lived, for Odysseus, 
it “always ends badly”.  Much as Odysseus and Telemachus may try to 
forget, choosing time and time again to live new lives, or much as 
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postmodernism would urge us to deconstruct and dismantle, Odysseus does 
remember, his individual male subjectivity never completely fragmented. The 
Maids and Penelope, all bearing the weight of their experience, may now be 
disembodied but remain fully cognizant of the past and are armed with an 
ongoing responsibility: to preserve their memories, either to wallow in them 
like Penelope, or to seek justice, for the Maids. 
 When the Maids speak of “any of [Odysseus’s] other lives”, they are 
not merely speaking of the extra lives he chooses through drinking those 
forgetful waters. They are also indicating a shift in how Odysseus’s life may 
be perceived by readership in the future. Now that their experience has been 
more fully represented through Atwood’s rewrite, it will be impossible for 
Odysseus’s future lives, through further rewritings or engagements with the 
source myth itself, to be free of the haunting presence of the Maids. Thus 
whilst perhaps Atwood’s conclusion, “that it always ends badly”, and that 
“people always remember everything”, may be considered to be a damning 
indictment of the limited potential of rewriting, the rejuvenated presence of 
the Maids will now haunt the myth, marking a true expansion of the halo of 
virtualities surrounding the Odyssey.  
 Atwood may never have fully answered the questions which were 
posed by the Odyssey. The Judge in trial of Odysseus comments, 
bewildered: 
What’s going on? Order! Order! This is a twenty-first-century court of 
justice! [...] What’s this cloud doing in here? Where are the police? 




Attempts to bring Odysseus to justice in the twenty-first century may result in 
more questions and further appeals to “order”. Yet Atwood’s process of 
foregrounding these questions expanded the text, helping to reveal fixed 
points within the source whilst using a collective body of feminine voices to 
seek textual justice and redress for that ancient, literary crime. In so doing, 
The Penelopiad comes to represent many of the ongoing concerns which will 
be raised repeatedly throughout this thesis. In the next chapter, we see how 
an individual woman may use myth as a positive framework, whilst still 
contributing to a broader corpus of feminine mythmaking. We can also see, 
as The Penelopiad highlights some of the limitations of postmodernism for 
feminism, how other authors in the series have chosen to engage with the 
shifting literary context of the twenty-first century, and the implications this 
moving ground has upon the process of rewriting mythology. While Penelope 
likes to “see things through to the end” (4), the novella does not end with 




















“I can lift my own weight”: Atlas Complexities, 
Autobiography and Authenticity in Jeanette 
Winterson’s Weight 
 
 “I want to tell the story again.” 
What is it that you contain? The dead. Time. Light patterns of 
millennia opening in your gut. Every minute, in each of you, a few 
million potassium atoms succumb to radioactive decay. The energy 
that powers these tiny atomic events has been locked inside 
potassium atoms ever since a star-sized bomb exploded nothing into 
being. Potassium, like uranium and radium, is a long-lived radioactive 
nuclear waste of the supernova bang that accounts for you. 
  Your first parent was a star.  
 (Winterson. Weight. 4–5) 
Jeanette Winterson’s contribution to the Myths series, Weight, depicts a 
breaking down of the body into its smallest, infinitesimal parts. Whether her 
‘you’ is self-referential or refers to the reader, this desire to consider the 
atomic roots of the body and valorise them over the merely human, physical 
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whole is reminiscent of Atwood’s Penelope disintegrating into “bonelessness, 
liplessness, breastlessness”. Yet where Atwood presents the negative where 
the body once lived, Winterson is instead interested in the particles that 
create that body and how they are constantly reformed. Winterson’s rewriting 
of myth does not revel in ambiguity the way that The Penelopiad does. Her 
origin story for ‘you’, birthed by a star, is presented in terms that are once 
mythical and scientific. Indeed, as Freud commented in a letter addressed to 
Einstein, “Does not every science come in the end to a kind of mythology?” 
(Standard Edition 21, 211). In Weight, history and physics combine to create 
the self; mythology provides both an allegory for that process and a language 
with which to express it.   
Weight contains the dead, time and the light patterns of millennia as it 
depicts the myth of Atlas and Heracles from a new angle. The Titan Atlas 
was obliged to carry the world upon his shoulders in punishment for his role 
in the Titanomachy. Heracles came into contact with him when, as part of his 
famed Labours, he was obliged to fetch golden apples from Hera’s garden, 
protected by Atlas’s daughters the Hesperides. Atlas attempted to trick 
Heracles into taking his terrible burden but it was ultimately never truly 
relieved. Winterson’s version is not just a mythological rewrite – as her 
authorial persona intimates in the novella’s foreword, her revision “has a 
personal story broken against the bigger story of the myth we know and the 
myth I have re-told” (xviii-xix). Atwood and Winterson are both engaged in 
the disintegration of their source myths and, as we shall see, Winterson also 
successfully uses gender performativity as a method of achieving this. But 
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where Atwood allows her disintegration to lead to a deliberate interrogation 
of the implications or limitations of postmodern ambiguity, Winterson’s tale 
indicates a move beyond this towards a desire for definitive conclusions, 
even though they remain ultimately unattainable. Penelope in the underworld 
finds herself severed from her mythological status and in a space where she 
has, paradoxically, become a contemporary character by becoming 
atemporal. Conversely, Weight is directly appealing to the extended history 
of myth – its roots may be in the big bang but its atoms remain inside both 
reader and writer. Winterson’s impulse with myth is to appeal to its enormity 
and supposed universality as she considers what it is she contains as she 
rewrites her personal story; her nuanced vision of that shared story 
deconstructs both myth and the self to an atomic level before rebuilding that 
myth and that selfhood in a new format. 
“I want to tell the story again” is the framing refrain of the novella; the 
authorial persona refers to it as its “recurring language motif” (xviii). Weight’s 
immediate, self-conscious proclamation of its own status as a rewrite 
(“Rewritten.” xvii) serves to emphasise the text’s preoccupation with choice, 
desire and inspiration. When the reader is informed of Weight’s 
autobiographical dimension in the foreword, they are encouraged to question 
this urge to tell the story again (xvii-xix). From whence is her desire to retell 
the story of Atlas and Heracles derived? And what is it about the process of 
rewriting mythology that has encouraged or enabled Winterson to revisit her 
own story, first strongly hinted at in Oranges Are Not the Only Fruit (1985), 
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and then, after the publication of Weight, more frankly presented in Why Be 
Normal When You Can Be Happy? (2011)? 
In Weight’s mission statement, Winterson declares: 
Autobiography is not important. Authenticity is important. The writer 
must fire herself through the text, be the molten stuff that welds 
together disparate elements. I believe there is always exposure, 
vulnerability in the writing process, which is not to say it is either 
confessional or memoir. Simply, it is real. (xix) 
 
The eschewal of autobiography, as a form or drive, in favour of authenticity, 
an abstract concept, is an interesting one. Winterson’s authorial position is 
not taken here completely seriously; it is apparent that from the outset, 
Winterson is mythologising herself as a writer – an authorial Hephaestus 
acting as both the ‘molten stuff’ of the text and the smith capable of shaping 
that stuff. Yet the interplay between autobiography and authenticity, here 
postured into polarised positions, is indicative. In her appeal to authenticity 
and to that which is real – or, crucially, felt to be real – Winterson is hinting at 
a shift in her approach to representation. Coming at what has been called a 
“representational crossroads” in Winterson’s work and as part of her self-
defined “second cycle” of work, Weight betrays a repeated yearning for 
authenticity and reality, which is not present in her most postmodern works, 
such as Written on the Body (Keulks 147). Where Written on the Body 
courted ambiguity with its love story told by a degendered narrator, from its 
very beginnings, Weight suggests that there may be some level of 
authenticity possible within a text. More particularly, she suggests that 
authenticity is possible within a mythological rewrite. The effects of this 
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movement towards, or aspiration for, authenticity has implications for modes 
of gender construction. At times, Winterson’s satirical approach to 
mythological masculinities may be seen to be dependent upon a binaried 
process of othering and opposition.   
 Weight’s engagement with gender is, as we shall see, complex. Plate 
has discussed how Winterson, like Atwood, has had a fractious relationship 
with feminist theory, but as posited in the previous chapter, this does not 
preclude her works from being feminist or having something to say about 
women’s writing (168). Plate curiously questions why Winterson, upon 
responding to the Canongate call to arms, chose a “male, even masculine 
myth”, as opposed to the “female myth[s]” told by Atwood and Smith (173). 
This seems a strange observation; perhaps Plate means a rewriting with a 
female character at its heart but to characterise myth in this way seems not 
only essentialist but somewhat misguided, given that in the many (if not the 
majority) of their iterations the myths of Penelope and Iphis have been 
constructed by male authors as canvases upon which to project male 
expectations. Lest we forget, in the original myth of Iphis, Iphis actually 
became a man – hardly a “female” myth, if we can categorise myth with such 
certainty at all. Winterson’s engagement with forms of mythological 
masculinity does not prevent this text from having something considerable to 
contribute to this project’s ongoing interest in feminine rewriting. There are 
moments of complexity regarding its engagement with gender which at 
times, are suggestive of a potential return to the gender binary, but ultimately 
Weight is an indictment of our desire for forms of authenticity, even as we 
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remain mindful of the idiosyncrasies and paradoxes that render true 
authenticity impossible. Its interest in reconstruction is of note, not only to the 
practice of rewriting, but to contemporary theoretical discussions regarding 
the nature of literary representation. 
Weight also provides a potent example of how mythology can be 
liberating as a discourse for the female writer. Winterson’s “personal story”, 
despite – or perhaps because of – its function as a secondary frame 
narrative, is in many ways more frank than her earlier foray into 
autobiography. Whilst Winterson’s claimed desire for authenticity may come 
at the risk of reconstructing previously dismissed categories of identity, this 
post-postmodern urge does compel her to reconsider her own story once 
more. Weight, I argue, is a bridge between the ‘fictional’ semi-autobiography 
of Oranges and what she has called its “dark twin”, Why Be Happy. In this 
way, Weight is aware of the many layers of significance of mythology. 
Winterson’s act of rewriting the myth of Atlas and Heracles should, therefore, 
be understood as a ritual with implications for both reader and writer. 
 
“Cover versions”: The Importance of Autobiography 
 
Autobiography has long held considerable interest for feminist theorists. The 
form privileges a space for the amplification of female thought and lived 
experience. Cosslett et al. have remarked upon this fascination:  
There has always been a strong feminist interest in the 
autobiographical, beginning with the attempt to connect the ‘personal 
with the ‘political’, and the concomitant emphasis on women’s 
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experience as a vital resource in the creation of women’s knowledge. 
(2)  
 
Yet the significant relationship between feminism and autobiography is not 
without tension. Despite autobiography’s capacity for fostering 
intersubjectivity between women in disparate communities, Christy Rishoi 
has noted how dominant forms of feminism have failed to incorporate the 
autobiographical narratives of working class women or women of colour, thus 
allowing only one female demographic to document their experiences, 
although she does suggest that this is slowly changing (25). Furthermore, 
given autobiography’s dependence upon memory, it is vulnerable to 
influence by memories that have been created, maintained, re-accessed, 
and indeed corrupted, within a patriarchal context. Sidonie Smith’s A Poetics 
of Women’s Autobiography refers to memory within autobiography as a 
necessary fiction; as with all fiction, memory is therefore a product of our 
unequal socio-political environments (45). Liz Stanley asserts that a more 
accurate term would be ‘auto/biography’, which problematises the idea that 
there is a generic separation between autobiography and biography; she 
believes that whilst there are significant differences between an individual 
writing about another individual and an individual penning their own story, 
these dissimilarities do not lead to function differences in terms of form (3). 
This nebulous genre is arguably present within any text, yet it seems to 
require a self-conscious declaration – a statement of intent – for it to be 
‘officially’ recognised as such. Though many critics insist on reading texts 
biographically, without the provision of the caveat of ‘autobiography’, the 
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extent of the author’s true intention to document their lived experience is 
always necessarily obfuscated by the fictional narrative. Given its dedication 
to the experienced realities of individual lives, it could be argued that 
autobiography is an inherently ‘authentic’ form; it may also be considered, 
conversely, naturally inauthentic, as autobiography may be viewed as a form 
which masks its inherent fictions with feigned ‘truth’ or ‘reality’.   
 In response to her debut novel Oranges, Winterson has partially 
acknowledged the autobiographical nature of the narrative, stating 
repeatedly that it is only partly autobiographical. This limited admission led to 
the widespread assumption that it must be more fact than fiction, with even 
her mother questioning why, if it was fiction, had Winterson named her 
protagonist ‘Jeanette’ (Why Be Happy? 5). Even an incomplete admission of 
autobiographical intent colours a reader’s experience of a text, but with the 
publication of Why Be Happy When You Could Be Normal? in 2011, the 
distinct differences between Oranges’ semi-fictional representation of the 
author’s early life and her later, frank confrontation of those experiences 
became apparent. As she comments: 
  
I suppose the saddest thing for me, thinking about the cover version 
that is Oranges, is that I wrote a story I could live with. The other one 
was too painful. I could not survive it. (Why Be Happy? 6) 
 
This shift from partial to total autobiography is unusual and draws attention to 
the form’s constructions and reconstructions of memory, the ways in which 
writers filter their conscious through to the reader and their legitimacy as 
factual accounts. As with mythology, autobiography is a narrative that cannot 
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ever be true in objective terms but is often recognised and felt to be 
representative.  
 Weight sits between these two, paired texts – light and dark twinned 
accounts of the same life. It also has, at its heart, many of the same 
struggles detailed in both Oranges and Why Be Happy: explorations of her 
identity as an adopted child, interrogations of her childhood and descriptions 
of the ways in which she used to escape that traumatic youth. But this 
‘personal story’ is unfinished, dislocated in terms of form, and has been 
considered in some quarters to be the ‘weaker’ narrative strand – reviews 
even lambasted Winterson for distracting from her mythological rewrite by 
inserting an autobiographical thread.30 Yet Winterson’s attempt to re-engage 
with the story she had already fictionalised is indicative of the importance of 
mythical narratives in structuring our unconscious thoughts and our 
conscious experiences. Myth’s metaphorical capacity is significant on many 
levels and in Weight, it facilitates a re-engagement with both Winterson’s 
own past and her current anxieties, even as it enables a re-evaluation of 
Atlas and Heracles. 
 In the foreword to Weight, Winterson comments upon her own 
process of myth selection: 
These chance sightings, these portents, these returns, begin the 
unconscious connection with the subject, an unconscious connection 
that waits for an ordinary moment of daylight to show its face. 
  
 When I was asked to choose a myth to write about, I realised I 
had chosen already. The story of Atlas holding up the world was in my 
mind before the telephone call had ended. (xvii-xviii) 
 




In her opening to the novella, Winterson’s narrator is thus mythologising the 
very process of inspiration, as well as the commissioning and production of 
this narrative. The fated circumstance of this myth being preordained and 
then produced for the reader is emphasised, with fate operating as a 
consistent theme throughout the novella. Winterson comments later: “I am 
not a Freudian. I don’t believe I can mine the strata of the past and drill out 
the faultlines” (139). Yet in Why Be Happy, there are frequent references to 
Freud and to Jung – it is a Jungian understanding of myth, waiting for 
unconscious content to meet with and be coloured by the individual 
consciousness – which she is demonstrating here.31 Whether through a 
Freudian or Jungian approach to myth, Winterson foregrounds myth’s 
relationship to psychoanalytic inquiry. 
 Winterson’s entire approach to autobiography is mythical. Indeed, as 
stated above, mythology and autobiography share many characteristics, 
preoccupied as both are with felt truths and pragmatic untruths. In the 
following description from Cosslett et al: “Autobiography makes trouble: it is 
difficult to define as a distinct genre, on the borderline between fact and 
fiction, the personal and the social, the popular and the academic, the 
everyday and the literary” (1), the exchange of ‘autobiography’ for 
‘mythology’ would lead to little loss of meaning. Winterson presents herself 
 
31 See 2011: 34; 58; 222.  In one such referential moment, she writes: “Freud, one of the 
grand masters of narrative, knew that the past is not fixed in the way that linear time 
suggests. We can return. We can pick up what we dropped. We can mend what others have 
broken. We can talk with the dead” (58). Myth is for Winterson, as for Freud and later as we 
shall see, for Vickers, a therapeutic process.  
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as a quasi-mythological persona within the text, even as she diminishes the 
mythological status and allure of her distasteful Heracles. Her struggles echo 
those of the titan Atlas as they both bear the world upon their shoulders: “my 
girlfriend says I have an Atlas complex” (Weight 97). Mythology’s nebulous 
roots mirror Winterson’s own unknown genesis and she uses its associations 
to document that absence of knowledge: “I know nothing of my biological 
parents. They live on a lost continent of DNA. Like Atlantis, all record of them 
is sunk. They are guess work, speculation, mythology” (140). 
 In this, Winterson is employing intertextual referencing in a way that is 
quite distinct from her earlier works. No stranger to ‘cover versions’, whether 
of her own life or the lives of others, she commented in Art Objects about her 
use of fairy tale and folk elements as merely something she can deploy to 
decorate the text – as Lynn Pykett has commented ,”shiny things which she 
deploys because she happens to have them about her person” (57). These 
intertextual moments become, Pykett argues, something Winterson uses 
merely to advance her writing to a higher cultural plane. But by the time we 
reach Why Be Happy, she seems to have re-evaluated this, describing her 
mother in fairy tale terms and acknowledging “Jung, not Freud, liked fairy 
tales for what they tell us about human nature” (31). This use of inherited 
narratives to make sense of experience was first presented in Weight, with 
its explicit desire to capture that which is ‘real’. We can, therefore, map a 
shift in the ‘weight’ she places upon such narratives, engendered at least in 
part by her Canongate Myth and also perhaps due to continuing changes in 
the literary landscape following the decline of postmodern scepticism. 
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Mythology is not, therefore, mere embellishment. It is the impetus for the 
whole text and it empowers future work. It is a framework which the author 
can use to explore her own unconscious experiences and, furthermore, to 
allow the reader to similarly make sense of those experiences.  
 Winterson discloses in Weight: 
My mother had a war-time revolver she hid in the duster drawer, and 
six bullets waxily embedded in a tin of furniture polish. When things 
were bad, she took out the gun and the polish and left them on the 
sideboard. It was sufficient.  
 
On revolver nights, I crept to bed and switched on my light-up 
universe. I used to travel it, country by country, some real, others 
imagined, re-making the atlas as I went. (138) 
  
She revisits the revolver repeatedly in Why Be Happy: “She [her mother] was 
a flamboyant depressive; a woman who kept a revolver in the duster drawer, 
and the bullets in a tin of Pledge” (1); and who thought it was “normal to have 
[…] a revolver in the duster drawer” (4). During her final visit to her mother 
with her friend Vicky, the revolver is a gauge of how the visit is progressing. 
There is no sign of it when Jeanette first arrives in the house, which has 
been “reknitted” for her arrival, but when tensions escalate: 
 I checked the duster drawer. 
 
 “I think it’s time for us to leave,” I said to Vicky. (151) 
 
The revolver is, in both Weight and Why Be Happy, symbolic of Winterson’s 
adoptive mother’s mental illness and the threat that is implicit in her 
oppressive behaviour. When the revolver is hidden in a drawer, Winterson 
feels safe to be at home and with her mother. When it is out, as a child she 
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escapes through imagined landscapes and remaps the earth; as an adult, 
she has the liberty to physically leave. 
 Yet this revolver, this remarkable facet of Mrs. Winterson’s character, 
is noticeably absent from the author’s earlier engagement with life-writing. 
There is no mention the revolver in Oranges. Despite, or because of its 
absence in the earlier incarnation, it is a prominent symbol of the dangerous 
relationship between mother and daughter. Winterson’s appropriation of 
Atlas as a mythical character forces her to explore his burdens and his 
continued presence in our imaginations, in the form of a map. The 
connection between the presence of the revolver and the child Winterson’s 
‘re-making the atlas’ is indicative of the connection between mythological 
reference and psychological self-evaluation. 
 This is further emphasised in Why Be Happy. Winterson uses, in the 
chapter entitled ‘The Wound’, multiple myth stories about ‘wounds’ to expand 
upon her emotional experiences. She questions: “How are you recognised? 
How do you recognise yourself?” and the answer, in the many myths and 
stories that she considers, is through the recognition of your own wounds. 
Listing numerous tales, from Harry Potter to Prometheus, she concludes her 
survey of wound stories as follows: 
Freud colonised the Oedipus myth and renamed it as the son who kills 
the father and desires the mother. But Oedipus is an adoption story 
and a wound story too. Oedipus had his ankles pierced together by 
his mother before she abandons him, so that he cannot crawl away. 
He is rescued and returns to kill his father and marry his mother, 
unrecognised by anyone except the blind prophet Tiresias – a case of 




Winterson is here making use of the same myth Freud ‘colonised’ by arguing 
that it is a story of loss, trauma and the difficulty of self-recognition. What 
Winterson is suggesting is that it is not just by our own wounds that we come 
to that self-recognition, but through stories about wounds; most particularly, 
through mythological stories of wounding. Here we see how the ‘halo of 
virtualities’ of the Oedipus myth has been extended to characterise it beyond 
Freud’s interpretation, to apply it directly to Winterson’s own coming-to-terms 
with her traumatic past. It becomes, in this iteration, not just a story about the 
unconscious self at war with itself, but a story of the recognition of the self.  
 Weight as a creative exercise, I contend, forced Winterson to consider 
more closely the mythology of the self. She comments: 
If only I understood that the globe itself, complete, perfect, unique, is a 
story. Science is a story. History is a story. These are the stories we tell 
ourselves to make ourselves come true. (145) 
 
Mythology is also, in this context, the story that Winterson is telling to make 
herself come true. Atlas’s plight – carrying the world upon his shoulders – is 
a metaphor for the burden of rejection and unknowing Winterson has carried 
with her. The repetitive nature of myth-making is also self-consciously 
explored – myth’s “endless[ly] self-generating power”, to quote Coupe, is 
what is allowing Winterson to reconsider the story she had herself told 
previously (58). As she writes in Weight, regarding her myth selection: 
I chose this story above all others because it’s a story I’m struggling to 
end. Here we are, with all the pieces in place and the final moment 
waiting. I reach this moment, not once, many times, have been 
reaching it all my life, it seems, and I find there is no resolution. I want 




 She does not wish to tell the story of Atlas and Heracles again for its 
own sake, but for the clarity and recognition that the myth affords the re-
telling of her own story. An awareness of the never-ending, constantly reborn 
mythical narrative elucidates her own desire to repeatedly return to the same 
personal narratives. 
 It is not just the burden of Atlas that echoes Winterson’s emotional 
conflict. The myth of Heracles details his adoption by Amphitryon (see, for 
example, Euripides’ Heracles or Plautus’ Amphitryon). Heracles is suckled by 
a woman, Hera, a powerful goddess who is not his mother. Indeed, the 
quasi-incestual and antagonistic interplay between Hera and Heracles in 
Weight could be perhaps viewed as, to some extent, a mediation on 
Winterson’s fractious relationship with her own adoptive mother. His inability 
to process rejection – his vengeful murder of Hippolyte, for example – is 
presented throughout. Indeed, despite his brutality, there are moments of 
sympathy for Heracles. In his dreams, his unconscious projects him as “the 
whistling hiss of the Hydra […] the whimper of a dog, he was the sigh of a 
dying woman” (79). In Weight, myth even shapes the dreams of a 
mythological character. His self-loathing and fear of repudiation are echoed 
by Winterson’s confession that her early rejection has left her afraid of further 
abandonment and able to walk away from conflict (98). 
 It is curious that in all three of these life-writing texts – Oranges, 
Weight and Why Be Happy – the main focus of her analysis is her youth and 
childhood. In Why Be Happy, which is unflinching in many ways, she is still 
avoiding certain stories: “I am going to miss out 25 years. Maybe later…” 
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(154). These early memories are clearly of unremitting importance for her 
understanding of the self. I would suggest that the negative space provided 
by Winterson’s ambiguous genesis and the precarity of childhood memory 
enables, and indeed, necessitates, her mythologising of the self. Freud and 
Jung have deployed myth as a means of making the unconscious, that part 
of the psyche we cannot know, understood. Winterson is using myth in a 
similar way. She is both trying to make her early life, the life she cannot know 
or guess, understood and attempting to re-evaluate and represent the 
traumatic yet unstable memories she does know. Her use of a mythical 
structure allows these indefinite narratives to be recognised by both herself 
and the reader. 
 The subsequent publishing of Why Be Happy has rendered Oranges a 
mythological version of Winterson’s early life – an ‘untruth’ which represents 
far more than it declares. The palimpsestic nature of Winterson’s own 
biographical writing is, too, mythological. From semi-autobiographical, to a 
‘personal story’, to an openly acknowledged autobiography, Winterson is 
indicating a marked trajectory in her appetite for and approach to 
representing herself and her life. It is interesting to note that when Winterson 
took part in another rewriting project – the Hogarth Shakespeare – she 
selected A Winter’s Tale for her next cover version, The Gap of Time (2015). 
A Winter’s Tale is also an ‘adoption story’, with abandoned Perdita adopted 
by a shepherd before her ultimate reunion with her family. Yet A Winter’s 
Tale does not feature the same confessional, autobiographical interjections – 
in many ways, despite its updated place and setting, it is a far more 
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conventional rewriting than Weight. Perhaps this may be understood as an 
indictment of the fact that myth, with its disembodied ‘universality’, is a more 
useful framework for self-evaluation than a stable text with a single, 
renowned author.  
 In the “Leaning on the Limits of Myself” chapter of Weight, the 
authorial persona repeats: “I can lift my own weight. I can lift my own weight. 
I want to tell the story again.” (100). Whilst the urge to confront this weight 
does not abate and prompts endless reconsideration, Weight’s status as a 
clear bridge between her two other autobiographical texts suggests that 
mythology is a framework which allows her to lift that burden. The 
metaphorical potency of the Atlas/Heracles myth provides a recognisable 
backdrop against which Winterson can project and manipulate her own 
creation story. In this way, within the layer of ‘personal significance’ for 
femininity, mythology is clearly a liberating metanarrative. It not only permits 
the unconscious content of the writer’s imagination to be shaped, but it 
makes that amorphous form recognisable to the reader, due to an inherited 
and shared knowledge of ancient archetype and form.  
 Yet whilst rewriting mythology has allowed Winterson to re-evaluate 
the ‘personal’ significance of the myth of Atlas and Heracles, to what extent 
does it engage with its other layers of meaning and importance? After all, it is 
not merely the author’s weight which this myth upholds. The subsequent 
section of this chapter will evaluate how Winterson’s developing methods of 
representation effect the ‘public’ significances of Weight’s source myth, 
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considering particularly what ramifications these methods may have upon 
broader engagements between femininity and mythology. 
 
Authenticity and Post-postmodern Representations of Gender in 
Weight 
 
In 2015, in an arresting paraphrase, Wolfgang Funk detailed how, in the 
twenty-first century, “the patient postmodern [lies] etherized upon the table” 
(2). If postmodernism is indeed incapacitated or irrevocably compromised – 
and many other critics seem to be in agreement with this assertion – then it is 
uncertain whether feminist critics should be in mourning; I have emphasised 
the fraught relationship between that discourse and feminist thought in the 
previous chapter of this thesis.32 Yet now, as Funk cites Roger Rosenblatt’s 
famous declaration following the 9/11 attacks “The Age of Irony Comes to an 
End”, what is it that is left in its wake? Funk has declared that with 
postmodernism’s current comatose state, we may observe a widespread 
inability to theorise the future (3). Replacing postmodernism’s desire to 
disintegrate and destabilise, he claims that twenty-first century fiction has 
adopted authenticity as a key theoretical driver, as the title of his monograph 
indicates: The Literature of Reconstruction: Authentic Fiction in the New 
Millennium.  
 
32 See, for example (Hassan 2003; Hutcheon, “Gone Forever, But Here to Stay: The Legacy 
of the Postmodern” 2007). A list including these authors and others is available in Funk 
(2015, 3).  
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 Winterson’s earlier work has been repeatedly identified as postmodern, 
by critics including Pykett and Keulks. Keulks has attributed this reputation to 
Winterson’s “high degrees of self-reflexivity, pastiche and intertextuality, in 
addition to frequent mimetic and temporal dispersions”; Pykett has 
commented upon her obsession with the time-space continuum (Keulks 147; 
Pykett 67). While these techniques are not absent within Weight, Keulks has 
asserted that Weight is one of three of Winterson’s texts which mark the 
author’s partial departure form postmodernism. Weight is, as with its 
autobiographical elements, in many ways a bridging text. Even as it 
endeavours “to [speak] of the life of the mind and the soul’s journey” (xvi), a 
professed epic odyssey breathing life back into the notion of a unitary mind or 
soul, Winterson still recognises the constructed nature of truth and makes use 
of many of the postmodern techniques that are distinctive of her work. If texts 
today are currently operating in an era without theory, Weight is an interesting 
indication of the tone of contemporary theoretical entanglements. 
 Rosi Braidotti suggests, however, that Funk’s depiction of 
contemporary theory’s “speechlessness and lack of direction” is incorrect. She 
does not believe that postmodernism has left in its wake a vacuum without 
theory. She has suggested, instead, that postmodernism has ushered in new 
master narratives: “be it the neo-liberal or the genetic brand: the former 
defends the superiority of capitalism, the latter the despotic authority of DNA” 
(169). She has decried the media’s joy at declaring the “end of ideologies”, 
questioning their drive to do so, and she believes that this has been repeated 
so often that she has considered defining ideologies as constant movements 
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without end. She believes that this dismissal of theory has instead resulted in 
the dominance of self-interest, in keeping with an ever-growing neoliberal 
outlook. In gender politics, this has, she claims, led to the post-feminist wave 
turning to neo-conservatism as women, compelled by a desire to succeed 
within corporate frameworks, disavow any collective struggles in order to 
propel individual success (170). The new generations of commercially-minded 
businesswomen and celebrities eschew, Braidotti believes, any debt to or 
connection with the rest of their gender and, as a result, the gaps in status 
between women regarding access and wealth are widening substantially. 
Whilst I do not despair so entirely of this generation’s feminist collectivism, it 
is worth noticing that feminism has become a multi-million pound business: 
from t-shirts proudly denoting the wearer’s feminist credentials to singers, 
actors and bloggers emphasising the importance of sisterhood, there are many 
who are benefitting financially from feminist discourse.33 
 Bearing in mind this valorisation of the individual female self, as 
opposed to the collective feminine, this capitalist demand for individual 
success may be the source of the search for ‘authenticity’, as declared by 
Funk. Instead of the disintegration of the individual subjectivity advocated by 
postmodernism, the contemporary appetite for that which is ‘real’ has been 
fuelled by our cult of the individual. Haselstein, Gross and Snyder-Korber have 
commented that this has led to a rejuvenated fascination with ‘real things’ 
(2010). Certainly, a reignited interest in selfhood could answer many of the 
 
33 A 2015 article in the Guardian commented: “Hashtag feminism has gone viral, with soap, 
shampoo and even energy firms launching social-media campaigns marketing feminism”. 
("Femvertising: how brands are selling #empowerment to women" Iqbal). 
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questions posed by the critiques of postmodernism posited by Waugh and 
others, particularly for marginalised groups. Yet ‘authenticity’ is necessarily a 
construct of privilege – for the belief that your own experience, your own 
religious practice, your own artwork is ‘real’ is to, in many circumstances, 
define your reality against the lived reality of others. It is also something that 
is demanded or expected from those same marginalised groups; Gayatri 
Spivak has warned that “demands for authentic voices” can be used to muffle 
calls for representation (63). Demanding authentic responses from groups, 
particularly underrepresented groups, becomes an act of appropriation, as the 
‘buyer’ becomes the judge of that which is real, rather than the creator. Self-
interest and self-determination become, therefore, an integral part of 
contemporary art and literature, if we are to believe Funk and the others. 
Charles Lindholm believes that “authenticity gathers people into collectives 
that are felt to be real, essential and vital, providing participants with meaning, 
unity and a surpassing sense of belonging” (1) but within the current socio-
political context, the key word in this assessment must be ‘felt’ – these 
collectives may seem to be real, essential and vital. There may be a growing 
taste or demand for the ‘authentic’ – but this does not necessarily lead to a 
collective feeling or sense of belonging. Indeed, Braidotti believes the opposite 
to be true, and that otherness remains at the heart of counter-subjectivities 
(17). John J. Joughin and Simon Malpas have called authenticity “a naïve 
mimeticism which posits the truth of an anterior or pre-existing reality, of which 
art is then a ‘true’ representation” (138). Lindholm’s cited public taste for 
authentic art, music and food may be understood as a commodification and 
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reappropriation of identities, rather than a desire to experience that which is 
‘objectively’ real. 
 In terms of representations of gender in literature, contemporary writers 
seeking to produce authentic works need to be aware of this paradox. Funk 
believes that postmodernism’s most enduring feature is the understanding we 
now have that however we try to fragment signifiers, we cannot escape our 
desire for “closure and congruence” (5). This ambiguity can be cultivated at a 
detriment to representations of femininity, because the spaces left when 
concrete meaning is erased can become filled by gendered assumptions. That 
being said, an overarching desire for certainty and coherence is equally 
limiting. Who is it, after all, who may be empowered to decide the boundaries 
for this closure? The privileged domain retains the right to ascribe such 
limitations. Whose narrative is to be accepted as the coherent one, when our 
processes of reason remain subjective? Optimistically, Funk cites Ihab 
Hassan’s appeal “to discover new relations between selves and selves, 
margins and margins, centers and centers” (6). Funk believes that 
“reconstructive texts” can improve communication within relational structures. 
Yet many forms of feminism do not wish for better communication between the 
self, the margins and the centre – they do not wish for such delineations to 
exist. The choice cannot be merely between a dismissal or re-inscription of 
such relational structures. 
 Indeed, there is a danger that if such structures are to be accepted and 
reabsorbed into contemporary fiction, then previously ‘disregarded’ categories 
of identity may once more become predominant. If writing in the twenty-first 
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century does indeed display a desire for a ‘return to the real’, then it is 
important to consider that this remains dependent upon a process of 
opposition and othering. If this is a product of the decline of postmodern 
disintegration, one outcome may be a return to limiting binaries that are felt to 
be real due to their entrenchment, and are seen to lend meaning through 
opposition. 
 Returning to Weight, we have discussed previously how mythology can 
aid the representation of the self. The personal significance of the Atlas and 
Heracles myth for Winterson has been discussed at length, its recognisable 
framework lending support to the author’s psychological inquiries into herself. 
Yet recalling Winterson’s endorsement of authenticity, there are tensions to 
consider when analysing its public significances. Ana Maria Sanchez-Arce has 
commented that “Authenticity [as a concept] is called upon, summoned as it 
were, in much the same way that God or the Muses would have been in the 
past” (42). Authenticity has, therefore, its own mythological status. But the 
difficulty comes when considering the myth beyond Winterson’s own 
psychological engagement. Weight’s operation within this new critical 
landscape seems to correlate with discussions regarding authenticity and, at 
times, is victim to the pitfalls of this preoccupation. Indeed, a reading of Weight 
at times comes close to promoting the individual female over the collective 
feminine. 
 As mentioned previously, Written on the Body presented a supposedly 
genderless vision of love. Yet this was found by critics to be problematic, 
resulting in two camps of Winterson criticism. Brian Finney has commented on 
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the wealth of critics who “[chose] to assume that the narrator is a thinly 
disguised lesbian lover… [and] promptly foreclose a text that Winterson has 
deliberately left open” (25). Perhaps it was this polarising critical response 
which led Winterson to develop a different methodology for gender 
representation as she enters her self-defined ‘second cycle’ of work. Keulks 
has noted the tension in her recent fiction as she: 
Resuscitat[es] love from postmodern exhaustion but also – especially 
in Lighthousekeeping and Weight – compound[s] that dynamic with 
reconstituted versions of history and mythology, restabilizing, in other 
words, both the emotional present and the historical past. (147)  
 
Whilst Keulks believes that Winterson’s recent works do remain under the 
auspices of postmodernism, he acknowledges Muller’s assessment that they 
indicate a worrying “desire to reconstruct previously deconstructed categories 
of orientation and classification” (Muller 42).  
 It is, I contend, erroneous to suggest that Weight is a merely 
restabilising text, or that Winterson’s drive is to make the ‘historical past’ 
concrete to modern readers. In fact, Weight is engaged in a fairly thorough 
process of destabilisation, as it attempts to degrade mythological heroism and 
judge ancient acts of violence through contemporary moral frameworks. Yet 
at the same time, this realignment of the Atlas and Heracles myth and 
Winterson’s satirical depictions of gender are achieved primarily through a 
process of gender othering and are distorted by Winterson’s calls for 
authenticity. Winterson is seemingly aware of the public significance of her 
source myth and is making a concerted effort to rebalance this, but her method 
of doing so is dependent upon the use of femininity as a counterpoint to 
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mythological masculinity. Atlas’s paradoxical problem – the whole world, 
without boundaries, is his prison – is underpinned by the novella’s repeated 
plea for boundaries, for that which is infinite to become limited. Yet Atlas’s 
ultimate freedom comes through his absorption into the limitless universe. 
Winterson’s desire to better understand her own limits within this framework 
are perhaps the cause of limiting categories of identity being present therein. 
The rest of this chapter will chart Winterson’s complicated response to the 
gender asymmetries of her source myth, analysing to what extent she 
destabilises mythological gendered archetypes and yet simultaneously 
reconstructs that which she previously attempted to nullify in Written on the 
Body. 
Deconstruction: Masculinity, Violence and Distorting the Mirror 
 
Heracles was the pre-eminent figure in the ancient world; his legendary 
exploits remain a huge part of our cultural imagination.34 He remains a famed 
figure of strength in Western society and his renowned labours are cited by 
those with seemingly impossible tasks in front of them. An animated Disney 
outing in 1997 (which, incidentally, began life as an attempted adaption of The 
Odyssey), Hercules presented the eponymous hero as a gentle giant cursed 
with superhuman strength (Thomas 156–57).  One of the most popular 
subjects for artistic depiction in the Greek world, he is stereotypically macho 
in Sophocles’ The Women of Trachis. His characterisation in the ancient world, 
however, was not fixed. Whilst Barlow comments that the tragic elements of 
 
34 See Barlow (1996).  
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the Heracles myth were rarely handled, later plays such as Euripides’ Heracles 
offer commentary on his madness and the slaughtering of his children, again 
providing evidence of the changing nature of myth (Barlow 3). The character 
of Heracles, marked symbol of strength and cunning, whilst never as cuddly 
as his Disney incarnation, was a consistently rewritten and redrawn hero. His 
labours, Barlow contends, were seen as a civilising act in removing menacing 
monsters from the world (1). 
 Whilst his story does not have the same cachet as Heracles, not having 
been transmitted through plays to the same extent as the labouring strongman, 
Atlas too remains a prominent figure in our collective psyche. His name is more 
commonly deployed today in reference to a collection of maps, but in this way 
he continues to hold the world upon his shoulders. He served too as the 
inspiration for Ayn Rand’s dystopian ‘Objectivist’ novel, Atlas Shrugged 
(1957).  
 In the earlier discussion of Atwood’s The Penelopiad, performativity 
was presented as an effective means of deconstructing performed gender 
roles. I contend that Winterson also uses exaggerated performances of gender 
as a mode of critique. Conrad of the Observer may have praised Weight for its 
“blood and sweat and semen”, rendering it “acceptable to the ancients”, but I 
here contend that it is a form of hypermasculinity designed to parody rather 
than truly represent heroism. In this way, it exposes the false constructs of 
gender within the mythological context. Indeed, whilst Sophocles’ incarnation 
of Heracles in The Women of Trachis may be, as Barlow contends, at times 
unlikeable, it is difficult to imagine a more unpleasant rendering of the mythical 
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figure than that which we are provided by Winterson. In overemphasising 
Heracles’s legendary masculinity and virility, she reveals that it is a 
constructed falsehood – a myth in itself. 
 Her Heracles is an over-sexualised, brutish, yet deeply vulnerable 
misogynist whose brutal sexuality is matched only by his prodigious strength. 
His heroic acts, such as his Twelve Labours, are humorously diminished in a 
similar vein to Atwood’s deflation of Odysseus’s escapades; the Twelve 
Labours are here not an allegory of civilisation, simply the time Heracles spent 
working for “a wanker” (29). The Labours are listed (33), but they are a means 
of attempting to inspire Atlas, rather than to provoke the same response in the 
reader. Indeed, the main focus of the narrative is not the cleaning of the 
Aegean Stables or the killing of the Hydra, but the hero’s years of decline and 
his eventual death due to poisoning. Repeatedly and ironically described as 
“The Hero of the World”, Winterson’s hero serves to subvert all that might be 
expected from him (35, 106, 107). 
 Indeed, as she considers the public significance of her source myth and 
in keeping with Atwood’s handling of the brutality of her chosen myth, 
Winterson forces the reader to face and consider the brutal acts of this ancient 
hero within a contemporary moral framework. Her twenty-first century 
language, including profanity, serves to render the ancient action at best 
ridiculous and at worst, savage. One of the Twelve Labours ascribed to 
Heracles was the removal of the girdle of the Amazonian queen, Hippolyte. 
Barbara Smith has detailed how Amazons were known in ancient Greek 
society as “man-eaters”; in fact, they were believed to slaughter any male 
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children that were produced by their lascivious coupling with unexpecting men 
(81). Curiously, according to Smith, the oft-repeated myth that Amazons would 
cut off one of their breasts to accommodate their bow was never depicted in 
art and statuary, indicating how we have received a bastardised version of this 
particular source myth (81). Pseudo-Appollodorus detailed Hippolyte’s death 
at the hands of Heracles and in Euripides’ Heracles it is mentioned in 
euphemistic fashion: “the gold-embroidered dress of the warrior maiden, the 
dead quarry of a girdle? Greece received the famous spoils of the savage 
Amazon and they are kept at Mycenae” (51). This reduction of Hippolyte to her 
curated item of clothing indicates her dehumanised status, as both woman and 
foreigner, in ancient tales.  
 Weight confronts this slaying; Hippolyte’s death is not simply included 
as part of Heracles’ list of tasks. Hippolyte is not “savage” or a “man-eater”, 
but quite clearly the victim of Heracles’ violence. He and Atlas discuss her fate: 
‘You’re holding up the Kosmos and I’m spending twelve years 
clobbering snakes and thieving fruit. The only good time was chasing 
Hippolyte, Queen of the Amazons, and she didn’t want anything to do 
with me when I caught her. Independent women are like that. I don’t 
know which is worse – the dependent ones who bleat at you all day, or 
the bitches who couldn’t care less.’ 
 
 ‘What happened to Hippolyte?’ 
 
 ‘I killed her of course.’ 
 
 ‘I knew her once.’ 
 
 ‘Sorry mate.’ (49-50) 
 
Hippolyte is no longer reduced to her magic girdle as in Euripides’s version, 
but is a flesh and blood human being slaughtered by Heracles in order to be 
172 
 
redeemed for the murder of his wife and children. That irony of killing being 
forgiven through more killing is not lost here. Atlas’s simple “I knew her once” 
indicates that she was known and her presence felt as a human, not merely 
a girdle. This at once rehumanises the previously reduced dead queen and 
dehumanises Heracles, her murderer. Heracles spouts the clichéd rhetoric of 
the men’s rights activist in his discussion of “independent women”. 
Winterson’s updating of his heroic diction makes him a man of this moment, 
as much as a ‘hero’ of the past. 
 Indeed, whilst Atlas’s response to Hippolyte’s death may be 
somewhat muted, it forces Heracles to reconsider her slaughter later in the 
novella: 
Hippolyte had almost got away with it. He had felt pity as he stood 
over her exhausted body […] He thought of marrying her […] he 
realised she was just a woman like the rest, who would never know 
what was good for her. He hesitated, and then knocked off her head 
the way you open a desert cactus. (60-61) 
 
Here the reader is forced to again confront Hippolyte’s unfortunate death. 
Running away from him to the point of exhaustion as she tries to preserve 
her independence and her right to never marry, she becomes the inverse of 
how the ancients depicted the bloodthirsty Amazonian huntswomen. 
Hippolyte also occupies an irreconcilable position for Heracles: he doesn’t 
want her to be easily caught, yet when he finally does wear her down, he is 
disappointed. By once again presenting the “just like all the rest” attitude 
towards women and juxtaposing it with such mindless brutality – as though 
one was peeling a plant – Winterson highlights how such negativity towards 
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the feminine can almost seamlessly lead to violence. Almost seamlessly – 
the consideration that occurs within his moment of hesitation actually 
compounds his crime. These are not heroic acts, and Heracles is no hero – 
from his dialogue to his small-minded misogyny, he may be considered by 
the contemporary reader to be the antithesis of nobility and honour.  
 Another telling example of Winterson’s acknowledgement of the public 
significance of myth through the administering of textual justice may be seen 
in her depiction of the goddess Hera. In the ancient myth, Zeus is unfaithful 
(an all too regular slip-up for the sexually violent king of the Gods) with 
Alcmene, enraging Zeus’s wife Hera. Hera’s loathing for Heracles spurs 
much of the action of the source myths. Indeed, it is her accidental provision 
of mother’s milk to the infant Heracles that bestows upon him his incredible 
strength and her endless taunting that causes him to murder his family. 
Whilst in Weight Hera is still Heracles’ tormentor, and as I have suggested, 
at times her formidable and cold maternal presence is reminiscent of Mrs. 
Winterson, she is also Heracles’ “dream”. The almost incestuous lust he 
feels for her adds to the readers’ distaste for him, particularly when he tells 
Atlas that contrary to the common story that after she suckled Heracles, it 
was semen rather than her milk that he spat out to create the Milky Way (52). 
Heracles reminds Atlas that his very name means “the glory of Hera”, 
recalling his connection to the goddess (29). When they meet in the garden 
of the Hesperides, Heracles reiterates the fateful link he imagines exists 
between them. He tries to hold her accountable for his dreadful crime – the 
butchering of his wife and children. This is a responsibility she outrightly 
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denies, asserting that she did not tell him to do such a terrible thing (40). He 
tries to insist that they are each other’s “fate”. She tells him, however: “If I 
seem like fate to you, it is because you have no power of your own” (41). 
Despite his legendary strength, Heracles lacks agency and identity when he 
finds himself severed from the feminine. Hera, in her denial of Heracles’s 
attempts to claim a connection between them, is refusing to act as a mirror 
for him. He may bear her name and have suckled from her, but he is, as she 
reminds him, not her responsibility or her ‘fate’. In this, this ‘great goddess’ 
refuses to serve in the capacity dictated by a male hero. Despite his physical 
strength, Hera counters that “No man was ever weaker” (41).  
 Countless critics have commented on how in western philosophy and 
literature, the feminine has repeatedly functioned as a mirror for the 
masculine.35 Yet in Weight, Hera will not permit this characterisation. 
Consider this refusal in contrast to Euripides’ castigation of Hera: “Who could 
pray to such a goddess? Out of jealousy for a woman loved by Zeus she 
destroyed the saviour of Greece who was guiltless”.36 Barlow has also 
commented on Hera’s immorality in the play (9). Rather than characterise 
Hera as a vicious and vengeful goddess scorned, Winterson’s Hera is 
instead aloof and amoral, a stark reminder that Heracles’ brutal choices are 
his own – he may not use her to try and understand himself. We are 
 
35 Cynthia Griffin Wolff comments: "The stereotypes of women vary, but they vary in 
response to different masculine needs. The flattering frequency with which women appear in 
literature is ultimately deluding; they appear not as they are, certainly not as they would 
define themselves, but as conveniences to the resolution of masculine dilemmas" (207). In 
this, Hera is refusing to meet Heracles’s masculine needs. Indeed, he resorts to 
masturbation as she refuses to entertain his desires.  
36 Translation taken from Thalia Papadopolou (2005: 95) 
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forthrightly told that “he defined himself through opposition”, but Hera tries to 
resist this process (71). Despite this, however, Heracles is in fact ultimately 
defined by women – his treatment of them. As the narrator comments: “Poor 
Heracles. Hera’s milk and Hippolyte’s blood. A man bonded by women” (61). 
Though there is a sympathy for the hero, it is not sustained. The bond he 
uses in order to make himself known is either denied, with Hera, or 
destroyed, as with Hippolyte. This is not a functional mirror in which Heracles 
can view himself; it is a distortion of his efforts to other women to achieve an 
oppositional self-definition.  
 Winterson’s Heracles is clearly facing a crisis of the self. Not only is 
his brutal masculinity undermined by the dissonance between his idealised 
self and his connections with femininity (“poor Heracles”), his dreams, as 
detailed earlier, reveal a further deconstruction of his heroic machismo. To 
return to that dream in closer detail: 
He was the chime of Ladon’s scales. He was the whistling hiss of the 
Hydra.  
He was the hoof-beat of Artemis’s hind. He was a cattle bell, he 
was the bottom G of the boar, he was the singing sound of 
Diomedes’s mares, he was the operatic shriek of the Stymphalides, 
he was the bass of the Nemean lion, the bellow of the Cretan bull. He 
was the noise of running water through the Augean stables, he was 
the whimper of a dog, he was the sigh of a dying woman. 
Then he was himself, and he was tearing at his flesh as though 
it were a shirt he could pull off. He was the sound of his own agony. 
(79) 
 
Heracles’ dreams are filled with the sounds of his endeavours and they end 
with a return to Hippolyte and her death. This cacophony of his exploits leads 
to him rejecting his physical body, the source of his legendary strength, as he 
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embodies the dying breaths of the murdered Amazon. This description not 
only serves to foreshadow his eventual death, caused by his wife giving him 
a poisoned tunic to wear, but it serves once more to remove Heracles from 
himself, from his heroic identity. He becomes, in dreams, a monstrous 
amalgamation of the tasks he has faced; the ‘heroic’ pursuits of his Labours 
combine to make him a Hydra of monstrosities himself.  
 Heracles’s exuberant masculinity has been established as burlesque 
in its construction (Staels 2009). Indeed, images such as attempting to 
balance Africa on his penis and it stiffening like a “kangaroo” at the sight of 
Hera are not only humorous but facilitate an overemphasis of his masculinity 
to the extent of parody. Throughout, the macho hero of old is presented as a 
bully who is at once a source of amusement and horror, ill-suited to his 
legendary strength in psychological terms (90). Hera’s proclamation of his 
weakness eventually comes to pass; his inability to “be still” results in his 
affair with Iole, prompting wife Deianeira to inadvertently kill him with a 
poisoned shirt. His emotional weakness is ultimately his undoing (119).  
 Winterson’s rejection of femininity as a mirror for masculinity is 
repeated in the relationship between Atlas’s parents, further undercutting 
gendered expectations of ‘mother’ and ‘father’. Atlas receives sustenance 
(fish and whales) from his father and precious goods from his mother (gold 
and jewels), suggesting that his father is ultimately occupying the more 
nurturing role (15-16). Indeed, his father treats him as an equal, whereas his 
mother merely indulges him (15). Atlas’s mother may be the earth, with 
which women are traditionally identified, but his father, the sea, possesses a 
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lack of boundaries traditionally associated with the feminine.37 Furthermore, 
her power over his father assured, enabling her to whip him “into a storm in 
moments”, allowing her to shape him through her actions (12). Indeed, as 
Atlas comments: “there was always something feminine about my father, for 
all his power” (13). His father even operates as his mother’s “moving mirror”, 
with Winterson here othering the masculine Titan in a direct reversal of the 
classic gender binary, yet Poseidon acts not as a perfect reflection but a fluid 
casting back. He serves the perspective of the feminine but does not 
perfectly shadow her.  
 Atlas’s burden – the earth upon his shoulders – may also be 
understood as a parallel to the burden that upholding a structure such as the 
patriarchy places upon masculinity. Heracles thinks of Atlas as “lonely, aloft, 
holding up the Kosmos like a boy with a ball” (109). Prior to his punishment 
and the receipt of his burden, Atlas builds a walled garden, creating a 
connection with his mother the earth and his daughters, the Hesperides (17). 
His daughters lead to his expulsion from the garden, multiple Eves eating 
sacred fruits, but this is not the worst experience to befall him. After his war 
with the gods and his acceptance of the world upon his shoulders, he can no 
longer maintain any connection with the earth as he struggles to hold it aloft 
(20). Winterson seems, in these moments, to be speaking to the conflict of 
 
37 Aristotle provided details of the Pythagorean Table of Opposites. In the same column as 
“female”, are attributes such as “unlimited”, “many” and “motion”. “Male”, conversely, is 
associated with “limit”, “one”, “rest” (Lloyd 3). Woman thus becomes fluid and boundless, 
while man is fixed.  
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patriarchal privilege when she discusses Atlas’s burden. It is at once a 
source of pride and a source of agony: 
Would he now, this minute, change his life for hers, give the world and 
pick up her pestle and mortar? 
 
He deceived himself. When he cried for any relief from his monstrous 
burden, he did not really mean it. He was still Atlas. He was Lord of 
the Kosmos, wonder of the universe. 
 
 His punishment was a clever one – it engaged his vanity. (70) 
 
The crippling weight of upholding the heavy Kosmos echoes the toll that 
perpetuating the patriarchy has upon men. But forsaking that prestige and 
privilege is a difficult choice to make, as Atlas indicates. Indeed, it is when 
Atlas is again able to have a nurturing relationship (this time with Soviet 
space dog Laika, whom he rescues and keeps as a companion) that he 
finally feels able to reconnect with the earth and relieve himself of his 
monstrous burden.  
Reconstruction: The Burden of the Binary? 
 
Winterson’s “authenticity” vs “autobiography” statement at the beginning of 
Weight is essentially a feigned polarising of different versions of truth and 
reality. Authenticity, she suggests, in a world of pseudo-reality reality TV, is 
personal and something to aspire to. The artist may be authentic where the 
individual is not. Yet in this rewriting, there are times when the art – the 
shared mythological narrative - is ignored in order to explore its personal 
significance for the individual writer. The issue arises from Winterson’s 
chosen method of gender deconstruction. It is successfully achieved through 
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a deployment of ironic hypermasculinity, designed to destabilise mythological 
archetypes of heroism and shine a light upon the inherent barbarity of her 
source. Yet as I have noted, this method is, at times, predicated upon the 
use of the feminine as a counterpoint. It is a shifting counterpoint, as with 
Poseidon-as-moving-mirror, but it remains the “opposite” of the masculine. 
Hippolyte is assigned the role of victim so as to emphasise Heracles’s 
brutality. Hera serves to elucidate his sexualised fear of women and his 
fractured sense of self, even as she denies their bond. When Atlas’s mother 
makes use of his father as a moving mirror, both parties are still occupying 
polarised positions with an ancient and entrenched binary, even if their 
places have been switched. 
 Thus I believe that rather than a purely deconstructive text, Weight is 
in many ways, one of Funk’s “reconstructive” texts, which indicates a 
yearning for boundaries. When we consider the narrative of Written on the 
Body and its space for readerly projections of a gender spectrum, we see 
that Weight is a text which offers closed understandings of gender. Twenty 
years after her genderless vision of love divided critics, Winterson seems, at 
moments, to be reconsidering this binary, even as she uses it to disrupt 
gender archetypes. This is necessarily a problematic approach for feminist 
critics. The gender binary has been long discredited as a genuine framework 
for understanding sex or gender, and for a contemporary novel written by an 
author whose works have been so informed by questions of gender to 
choose, in some part, to reconstruct the binary in this way, is significant. 
Winterson’s versions of masculinity and femininity may be poles apart from 
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their mythological sources, but if they remain polarised and dependent upon 
an outdated binary, this may be a difficult model for feminists to accept. 
 As she writes: 
The Myths series is a marvellous way of telling stories – re-telling 
stories for their own sakes, and finding in them permanent truths 
about human nature. All we can do is keep telling the stories, hoping 
that someone will hear. Hoping that in the noisy echoing nightmare of 
endlessly breaking news and celebrity gossip, other voices might be 
heard, speaking of the life of the mind and the soul’s journey. (xx) 
 
Winterson’s comment on ‘permanent truths’ is indicative of a dramatic shift 
from postmodernism’s purported eschewal of absolute truth. Yet her 
suggestion that a story for story’s sake should be heard above the story of 
breaking news due to its supposed authenticity is inherently paradoxical. 
Whilst Winterson’s preoccupation with questions of authenticity and truth 
should not be taken entirely at face value, their foundational presence in 
Weight represents a change in her work. Ultimately, if contemporary 
literature is indeed striving for ‘authenticity’, it is important to consider that 
this remains wholly dependent upon a process of opposition and othering. If 
this is indeed a product of the decline of postmodern disintegration and a 
desire for a “return to the real”, one outcome may be a return to limiting 
binaries which are felt to be real due to their entrenchment and are seen to 
lend meaning through opposition.  
 The resolution to this tension may come through the acceptance of 
pragmatic and temporary reconstructions, ironically deployed to suggest 
broader negotiations. Indeed, the attention Winterson draws to our atomic 
make-up at the opening of the text reminds us how we are temporarily 
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constituted in atomic form, ready to be remade in another shape, the very 
stuff of our being altering every time. In this rewriting, she uses myth as a 
means to re-engage with the mythology of herself as both individual and 
writer. In this, she draws explicit readerly attention to the writer-as-
mythmaker.  
 Winterson’s Weight presents a prime example of how mythology can 
help an individual to make sense of their experiences through recognised 
narrative structures and languages. The author actively engages with the 
personal significance of the source myth for her and for her unconscious 
processes. There is too a marked awareness of the public implications of her 
rewrite – her efforts to dislodge the heroic status of Heracles indicate her 
refusal to blithely accept a source which implicitly contains such savagery, 
particularly towards women. Yet there is too the tacit suggestion that this is 
best achieved through returning to the dichotomy of masculine and feminine. 
What is successful here for the individual may not be entirely beneficial to 
femininity as a collective, which is indeed an ongoing issue as we make 
sense of this post-postmodern theoretical landscape. Rewriting mythology at 
a time when the neoliberal master narrative is becoming increasingly 
entrenched becomes an ever more fraught, yet relevant, task for the female 
writer. Despite the complexities of this burden left upon our shoulders, 
Weight is perhaps best understood in the terms Plate uses to promote 
rewriting: “not as a kind of after-writing (rewriting implying some kind of 
repetition and secondariness) but as the life of writing itself: storing as it 
stories, transforming as it keeps and transmits, and so, preserving while 
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allowing change” (168). Winterson’s version of the binary, used ironically and 
as part of a pragmatic, partial reconstruction, may be seen as a way of 
making use of that which we have long been trained to think of as real and 
fixed to positive effect. Indeed, this is also where its placement within a 
broader project  becomes relevant, for as we turn now to Girl meets boy, a 
novel which distorts the gender binary, we see that there is space within this 
new literary landscape for multiple, overlapping and contradictory storytelling 
that still retains some form of sincerity.   
Chapter Three 
 
“Thank God we’re modern”: Metamorphoses, 
Ecofeminist Ethics and Metamodernism in Ali Smith’s 
Girl meets boy 
 
It's a time for Greek tragedies, is what I sense – a shift back to the 
tectonic plate-quality that story has, in whatever form it is delivered 
(novels and stories can both do it, in their different ways, to move us 
at foundation and remind us how to live and understand what we 
experience, individually and en masse.  
 (Ali Smith, as quoted in Kostkowska 125) 
 
I am thinking about the difference between history and myth. Or 
between expression and vision. The need for narrative, and the 
simultaneous need to escape the prison-house of the story – to 
misquote.  
(Kathy Acker, as quoted by Ali Smith in Girl meets boy's epigraphs). 
 
Whilst Ali Smith, perhaps Scotland’s greatest living author, did not select a 
Greek tragedy to revise for her addition to the Canongate Myths series, her 
novella Girl meets boy certainly functions as a profound enquiry into "how we 
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live and understand what we experience".38 Her concern for that which is 
experienced both as an individual and in groups within society is present 
throughout her chosen myth, that of Iphis and Ianthe, originally found in 
Ovid's Metamorphoses (first published in 8AD). This dual interest in both the 
personal and the public echoes the Myths previously discussed; throughout 
this chapter we shall see how she too attempts to address the varying 
significances of her chosen myth. Smith's reference here to tectonic plates 
also hints at another feature of her work – an examination of how humanity 
experiences and understands the natural world in which we operate. Her 
urge to "shift back" suggests that once more, we are dealing with a rewrite 
which does not conform with postmodern expectations, and in fact, 
constructively engages with both the past and the literature of the past in 
order to represent both the present and the future. 
"Nobody grows up mythless": Political and Personal Histories  
 
Whilst Ovid's myth of Iphis and Ianthe takes place on the island of Crete in 
an ahistorical, 'mythical' time, Smith has contravened Winterson and Atwood 
by updating her rewritten myth's temporal setting to "present day" (early 
twenty-first century Inverness). Ovid's tale, identified by the characters within 
Girl meets boy as the most optimistic of the Metamorphoses, presents the 
unfortunate dilemma facing Iphis, born a girl despite her father's desire to 
have a boy (97). To save the ill-fated Iphis's life, her mother decides to 
 
38 The honourable title of “Nobel Laureate in waiting” was bestowed upon Smith by 
Sebastian Barry in the Guardian ("Best Books of 2016 Part Two").  
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pretend that she is in fact a boy, and gives her a unisex name to aid the 
deception. All is well until Iphis falls in love with the beautiful Ianthe. The 
impossibility of their union causes Iphis a great deal of pain, until the gods 
take pity upon her and she is transformed into a man.  
 In Smith's contemporary version, Anthea (both a riff on Ianthe and an 
anagram of Athena, goddess of wisdom and war, often depicted as 
masculine and a virgin) falls in love with Robin Goodman, a play perhaps on 
Robin ‘Puck’ Goodfellow, a girl who is described as "the most beautiful boy I 
had ever seen in my life" (45). The joy of Anthea's love for Robin, 
simultaneously female and occupying a space of indeterminate gender, is 
dampened only by the prejudice and lack of acceptance shown through the 
parallel narrative of Anthea's twin, Midge. The novella ends with a 
celebration of love, with Midge allowing her sister's unconventional romance 
to liberate her own desires. At the end of the tale, both sisters, loved and 
seen by their partners, engage in varying forms of anti-capitalist and anti-
misogynistic activism. 
 One of the novella's epigraphs comes from Joseph Roth, who 
declares: "It is the mark of a narrow world that mistrusts the undefined". This 
is followed by a disarming opening line, which supports this assertion and 
establishes the text's privileging of the indeterminate. The reader's world is 
expanded from the outset: "Let me tell you about when I was a little girl, our 
grandfather says" (1). This unexpected phrasing begins the grandfather's 
unreliable, yet compelling, account of both his own personal history and the 
political history of women's suffrage. The grandfather seems to have access 
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to a specifically feminine historical narrative, telling Anthea and Midge about 
campaigns regarding female membership of golf clubs, the National Union of 
Women's Suffrage Societies 'Mud March', and the story of Burning Lil, an 
arsonist and activist (6-7). As his wife comments to the girls: "Your 
grandfather likes to think that all the stories in the world are his to tell" (17). 
The fact that he cannot possibly be describing his own experiences – as 
Midge points out, her grandfather is simply not old enough to have lived 
through the stories he is telling – doesn't diminish their power. Smith is, from 
the very beginning, questioning our access to history and the methods by 
which we choose to transmit important stories from the past. History is, as 
the girls’ grandfather is suggesting, a constructed narrative, but this 
enhances, rather than negates, its relevance. The usefulness of a grounding 
in the past is reiterated throughout the novella.  
 The grandfather's access to and transmission of this history is 
dependent upon two layers of performance. He recreates a history where he 
is a girl pretending to be a boy, who then in turn encounters Burning Lil, who 
is that moment dressed as a boy. The grandfather comments: "I looked a bit 
like a boy. Yeah, Midge says, cause you were one" (13). The 
granddaughters identify their grandfather as male, yet the reader sees that 
by eschewing a singular, fixed identity he is given insight into histories he 
could not have personally accessed. In contrast, the girls’ need to gender 
him suggests a childish desire for simplicity and clear delineation. Even if 
these are constructed insights, the stories that he is transmitting, of women's 
suffrage and equality, are important ones. Through his alternative history, the 
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grandfather becomes like Cilla Black, host of the dating show "Blind Date", 
an episode of which has just concluded before his story begins. As Anthea 
comments: 
But what is Cilla Black, then, boy or girl? She doesn't seem to be 
either. She can look at the boys if she wants; she can go round the 
screen and look at the girls. She can go between the two sides of 
things like a magician, or a joke. The audience always laughs with 
delight when she does it. (4-5) 
 
Cilla is emblematic of a liminal space between boy and girl where gender 
indeterminacy or fluidity provides access to knowledge. The grandfather 
endorses this: his "little girl" history, told by the living man in Midge and 
Anthea's past, has inserted himself into that liminal space. As a result, he is 
able to draw out history’s mythical character, as Smith highlights the 
constructed nature of both kinds of narrative. Furthermore, the indeterminacy 
of the grandfather's gender within his story-within-a-story draws attention to 
the uncertain, distorted way in which both history and gender are themselves 
constructed. Indeed, Smith is demonstrating how the past transforms as it is 
told, a strong recommendation for the revolutionary power of rewriting. 
 This may be seen further when we consider how the grandfather's 
dual identity also seems to give him the power to alter long-established, 
canonical narratives. He alters the words of Kipling's famous poem "If", his 
version concluding with: "And – which is more  – you'll be a woman, my 
daughter NO NO NO GRANDAD IT DOESN'T RHYME she [Midge] used to 
squeal" (21). Midge may be resistant to this regendering, but it is interesting 
that her grandfather's fluid, 'Cilla Black'-like status, occupying two sides, 
makes him a 'magician' capable of dramatically altering a famous poem. This 
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change speaks to rewriting as a methodology on a number of levels: 
addressing the resistance that rewriting may court, as evidenced by Midge's 
squeals, but also illustrating how abandoning fixed gender identities may 
lead to a liberation of narratives. Smith is here highlighting, in accordance 
with another of the text's epigraphs from Kathy Acker, the "power of 
misquotation" as an approach for rebalancing representation. 
 Indeed, this is supported by Smith's third epigraph, from Judith Butler: 
"Gender ought not to be constructed as a stable identity […] rather, gender is 
an identity constituted in time".  The grandfather's past identity – or at least, 
the identity he constructed for himself in his stories – allowed him to be 
female. It is constantly reassessed and represented as he recounts his own 
history, through his own alterations and interjections from both the girls and 
his wife. The instability of his gender establishes from the beginning of the 
text that Girl meets boy will not depend upon singular, stable or binaried 
understandings of gender. Furthermore, it posits that the abandonment of 
such a framework is in fact emancipatory for the characters and readers 
alike.  
 Robin, Anthea's classmate and later her lover, occupies a similarly 
liminal space. She is female yet also male, something highlighted during her 
first encounter with Anthea and repeatedly reiterated throughout the 
narrative. She insists that the proper identifying word for her is "me"; this 
allows her to become the interlocutor of the myth of Iphis. Anthea's narration 
first provides a standard retelling of the myth, with little commentary upon its 
iterations of gender politics. There is then a second telling, the version that 
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"actually" took place. Throughout this "real" version of Robin's storytelling, 
they share and shape the myth together, interjecting both personal and 
political commentary. When Robin tells Anthea that the story is set in Crete, 
Anthea interrupts the flow of the tale to discuss her holiday to Heraklion and 
subsequent trip to the hospital due to her father's motorbike accident. Robin 
uses this to reframe the story, situating it "long before motorbike hire" (88-
89). 
 Indeed, her retelling becomes a constant renegotiation between 
history and myth, both personal and political. She also gives Ovid's tale a 
more fixed historical moment, calculating this date with a historical event 
which informed a myth: "back before the great tsunami that flattened most of 
northern Crete and drowned the Minoan cities, which, by the way, was 
probably the incident responsible for the creation of the myth about the lost 
city of Atlantis” (89-90). Later, as Robin tells the story, Anthea constantly 
questions its veracity and is sceptical about much of its content, such as the 
idea that Iphis's mother suffered no pain when she was giving birth, or that 
Ianthe could not have loved Iphis as a girl (90, 93). Robin's indeterminacy 
permits her to be an authority capable of going beyond Ovid. Anthea asks: 
"Did their hearts hurt? [...] Did they think they were underwater all the time?", 
to which Robin responds: "Yes [...] All of that. And more", the “and more” 
suggesting the potential to expand the myth’s halo of virtualities even further 
than has already been achieved (94). When Anthea questions the casual 
nature of the dialogue in Robin's retelling, she is told: "The gods can be 
down-to-earth when they want", and by so doing, Smith is lowering the 
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register of this myth to make it accessible, offering a contemporary 
dimension to these ancient deities. Neither equivocally girl nor boy in her 
characterisation, Robin is able to see beyond and through the source myth to 
flesh out contemporary answers to Anthea's critical questions. Whilst Robin, 
as the source myth’s interlocutor, does acknowledge the “original story”, she 
also, following Anthea’s interjection that “Maybe her girl, what’s her name, 
Ianthe, wants a girl, I said. Clearly Iphis is exactly the kind of boy-girl or girl-
boy she loves”, Robin admits this could be right and that it is open to debate 
(95). 
 Robin's status as mythical revisionist, and the loving relationship 
between her and Anthea, permits Anthea to approach the myth, and the very 
concept of mythmaking, from an analytical and philosophical perspective. 
The myth of Iphis becomes, for Anthea, personal, as she considers the kind 
of boy-girl or girl-boy that she loves. She also wonders: 
I mean, do myths spring fully formed from the imagination and the 
needs of a society, I said, as if they emerged from society's 
subconscious? Or are myths conscious creations by the various 
money-making forces? For instance, is advertising a new kind of 
myth-making? Do companies sell their water etc by telling us the right 
kind of persuasive myth? Is that why people who really don't need to 
buy something that's practically free still go out and buy bottles of it? 
Will they soon be thinking up a myth to sell us air? And do people, for 
instance, want to be thin because of a prevailing myth that thinness is 
more beautiful? (90) 
 
Anthea considers all of the things that myth can be beyond just a story – it 
can be a representation of human consciousness, or a marketing tool for 
capitalist systems. The social myths constructed by market forces and 
human behaviour are similarly acknowledged. Whilst Robin gently silences 
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her questions, Anthea's comfort in her presence, and the way that Robin is 
constructing the mythological narrative allows her, and by extension Smith, 
to foreground these questions about what myth is and how we create, 
sustain, or challenge a myth. This also allows Robin's storytelling process to 
become something that Anthea can actively take a part in shaping, so that 
their retelling of Iphis and Ianthe ends as a mutual endeavour that accurately 
represents them as individuals and as a couple. The way Iphis and Ianthe 
feel – underwater, like their hearts hurt – echoes the emotions which Robin 
provokes in Anthea, and thus this version of the myth becomes as 
representative of them as of Ovid's ancient, archetypal characters. Smith is 
self-consciously offering an alternative form of mythmaking that is 
simultaneously collaborative and contemporary in its methods of 
representation. When waiting for the next part of the myth story to unfold, 
Anthea asks “What’s going to happen?” and Robin replies “What do you 
think?” Anthea’s understanding of the structure of myth helps her to predict 
what comes next but the shared questions show how the denouement of the 
story of Iphis is something being created and recreated at the moment of its 
retelling.  
 In addition to interrogating the misogynistic facets of Ovid's source 
myth, Smith also uses mythological reference as a way for Anthea to 
consider her own history. When she thinks about the tragic death of her 
grandparents lost at sea, she wonders:  
Was the seabed dark? Was it cold? Did any light get down there from 
the sun? They'd been kidnapped by sirens, ensnared by Scylla and 
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Charybdis.  Cilla and Charybdis. That's what got me thinking about 
Blind Date (23).  
Anthea attempts to use myth to explain a part of her history she cannot 
know, again indicating myth's capacity for accommodating the uncertain and 
for offering a narrative means of structuring that which is unknown. Her play 
on words brings her back from myth to history, identifying language as a 
bridge between them. Smith's reference to the adjacent Scylla and 
Charybdis, two perils so close together that any passing sailor is forced to 
choose which to confront when sailing by, may also be read as a warning of 
the dangers of polarity. If the first pole is Scylla, a six-headed sea monster, 
and the second is Charybdis, a terrifying whirlpool, the space between is the 
only respite for sailors and navigating the liminal ocean between the two 
hazards is the ideal course for a ship. Smith's constant insistence on the 
importance of the space between is again repeated here. 
 Throughout the novella, with the death of the twins' grandparents and 
Robin's retelling of the Iphis myth retold to the reader through Anthea, there 
are multiple layers of rewriting and an emphasis on the symbiotic relationship 
between history and myth. With the grandparents' death, myth is used to 
explain that which history cannot. In Robin's retelling of the myth, history is 
used to contextualise a story that otherwise operates in an unfixed time. At 
the moments where history's 'pastness' is used as a consolation, for 
example, in Anthea's declaration of "Thank God we're modern", she is 
reading myth as a history we have moved beyond. Yet, as Robin reminds us, 
the issues faced by Iphis are still present in contemporary society; she 
reminds us that it’s “still the way of the world in lots of places all over the 
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world […] red ink for a girl, blue for a boy, on the bottom of doctors’ 
certificates, letting parents know, in the places it’s not legal to allow people 
just to abort girls” (91-2). Myth and history are thus provided with a sense of 
urgency and the reader is reminded that myth is a present, living force that 
still needs to be confronted, enshrined in our social institutions and our 
personal prejudices. There is a reminder also of that the danger associated 
with the female sexed body, the very threat which faced Iphis, still faces 
women around the world today. The presence of this urgency is considered 
again later in this chapter as an aspect of the text which makes it 
metamodernist in its approach, but it also underpins Anthea, Midge and 
Robin's later acts of activist rebellion. 
 Anthea attempts to assert that she "grew up mythless". But this is 
denied by Robin, who tells her: "No you didn't. Nobody grows up mythless, 
Robin said. It's what we do with the myths we grow up with that matters" 
(98). The pervasive nature of myth, in its many forms, is acknowledged 
throughout, but so too is myth's capacity for change. Smith's joyful, tender 
depiction of same-sex love and sex separates her from Ovid's original and 
thus Smith confronts ancient understandings of how love and sex operate for 
men and for women.  
 The privileging of the indeterminate foregrounds the depiction of 
Anthea and Robin's love as simultaneously sensual and degendered, 
rendered significantly: 
It had been exciting, first the not knowing what Robin was, then the 
finding out. The grey area, I'd discovered, had been misnamed: really 
the grey area was a whole other spectrum of colours new to the eye. 
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She had the swagger of a girl. She blushed like a boy. She had a girl's 
toughness. She had a boy's gentleness. (84) 
 
In this way, Smith is again firmly eschewing the gender binary by elucidating 
the "spectrum of colours" possible in that space between male and female. 
She also undermines our gendered preconceptions of behaviour by playing 
with the gendered meanings of these behaviours to defy readerly 
expectation.  
 Myth and history are simultaneously connected, expanded and 
destabilised within the text, the collaborative nature of their construction 
repeatedly emphasised. Myth is not a fixed concept but something that can 
be adapted, and the process of adaptation is something which can bring into 
being new understandings of gender and sexuality. Smith confronts the 
restrictions of the source myth to make space for contemporary 
representations of femininity and, furthermore, for contemporary politics.  
 
"Ness I said Ness I will Ness": Culture and Nature in the Iphis Myth 
 
Anthea’s River Ness-based invocation: “Ness I said Ness I will Ness” comes 
at the end of the text as Robin and Anthea make their declarations of 
commitment to each other (151). It is a play on Molly Bloom’s climactic 
annunciation in Ulysses (1922) : “Yes I said yes I will Yes” (Joyce 732). 
Smith is thus evoking previous literary engagements with myth. In Ulysses, 
Molly Bloom’s final word in the epic novel is one of acquiescence – she is 
remembering when she agreed to marry Leopold Bloom. Her “Yes” has been 
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read as an act of submission and James Joyce referred to it as a “female” 
word (As quoted in Kenner 147). The final “Yes – yes – yes” of Sasha, 
protagonist of Jean Rhys’s Good Morning, Midnight (1939), has been read 
as an answer to Molly Bloom’s affirmative, as Sasha is, with her “yeses”, 
accepting further abuse and trauma. It has been described as “a response to 
and revision of Joyce’s version of woman” (Linett 171). With this play on 
words, therefore, Smith is toying with earlier stories – Ulysses being, of 
course, another rewritten myth, perhaps even the Canongate project’s ur-
myth. Her wit connects to earlier incarnations of female acceptance, but in 
Girl meets boy, the affirmative is not given as a final indication of passive 
agreement but as a joint statement made by both Anthea and Robin: “Into 
the thin air, to the nothing that was there, with the river our witness, we said 
yes. We said we did. We said we would” (151). The yes that is uttered here 
is a shared yes, a promise made between two women. Molly Bloom’s ‘yes’ is 
made “under the Moorish wall”, a reminder of ancient civilisation. Where 
nature intervenes on her experience, it is used as an ornament – “the rose in 
my hair like the Andalusian girls used” (732). Sasha’s “yeses” are uttered 
within the confines of the Parisian urban landscape that has, for her, become 
corrupted. Conversely, Anthea and Robin’s “yes” is said collaboratively and 
in commune with the river Ness, which not only forms the basis of the word 
play but acts as a witness to and participant in their connection, in contrast 
with Molly’s man-made wall. The literary reference has been subsumed into 
nature and nature’s role has also expanded, affording the non-human an 
equal status ‘with’ the vowing women. All three texts use ‘Yes’ as a form of 
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ritual invocation – but where Molly and Sasha’s rituals lead to their 
capitulation, Anthea and Robin’s affirmatives lead to joy and mutual self-
respect. Their mutual ‘yeses’ link them to the past – “we did” and a 
conditional future – “we would”, complicating Molly Bloom’s certain future 
tense which, as we know by the end of Ulysses, has been subverted by her 
infidelity with Blazes Boylan. Anthea and Robyn’s pledge to each other 
suggests that this a contingent promise, perhaps offering another level of 
indeterminacy whereby the commitment becomes conditional, based on it 
being shared and sustained. Girl meets boy’s interactions with the natural 
world not only suggest an ethical impulse and a form of literary sincerity, 
discussed later as a metamodernist approach, but they also help to further 
strengthen the text’s endorsement of liminality.  
 The River Ness’s intervention into and observance of Anthea and 
Robin’s promises to each other is one of many examples within the text 
where nature is proven to have its own agency. Nature comes from the 
Greek natus, meaning birth, its roots in biological reproduction perhaps 
explaining in part its sustained association with the feminine, referenced 
earlier in this study. Nature was defined by John Stuart Mill as “the sum of all 
phenomena, together with the causes which produce them; including not all 
that happens, but all that is capable of happening” (5). This all-encompassing 
abstraction may be what compelled Raymond Williams to characterise 
‘nature’ as the most complicated and nuanced word in English (219). Despite 
its complexities, he states: 
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It is relatively easy to distinguish three areas of meaning: (i) the 
essential quahiy [sic] and character of something; (ii) the inherent 
force which directs either the world or human beings or both; (iii) the 
material world itself, taken as including or not human beings. (219) 
 
Despite nature being intrinsic to the human experience, it can also mean that 
which humankind has not created. This has led to a binaried understanding 
of nature as opposite to culture. This oppositional understanding has often 
seen nature become subsumed into or made inferior to culture, within a 
capitalist framework that seeks to commodify the natural world. The 
polarising of nature/culture seems at times strange, given that culture springs 
from that which is intrinsic to humans, themselves products and subjects of 
the natural world. This conflict has been detailed by Gretchen T. Legler, who 
has warned of the two models of cultural engagement with nature: the “Walt 
Disney” version of anthropomorphization of the natural world and the 
Romantic “perversion model” of poetic objectification.39 Deborah Kamen 
argues that for Ovid in Metamorphoses, that which is natural may be 
understood as that which is “culturally intelligible” (35). This was not always 
the case for myth – for when mythology was first used to explain the cycles 
of the natural world, they might instead have been characterised as 
intelligible from nature. In Girl meets boy, through the use of an approach 
that I assert should be considered ecofeminist, Smith is expanding nature 
beyond its purported opposition to culture, through a reconnection with the 
natural and ritualistic elements of mythology.  
 
39 “In reconceptualising human relationships with nature (granting nature “agency”), how do 
you avoid the Walt Disney syndrome (anthropomorphizing the natural world) or the pitfalls of 
the Romantic “perversion model” (we were all right until Rene Descartes and Francis Bacon 
came along and separated us from our “natural” harmony with the world)?” (Legler 228) 
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 Ecofeminism recognises that the power structures which oppress 
women, people of colour, the disabled and other minorities also mistreat and 
oppress the nonhuman world (Warren XI). Greta Gaard states that 
ecofeminism calls for an end of “all oppressions” and asserts that any 
attempt to liberate women cannot be successful if nature is not also liberated 
(1). Regarding how to achieve that liberation, Kostkowska, building upon 
observations from Val Plumwood, has highlighted the importance of 
considering the language used to describe the natural world, advocating a 
removal of hegemonic modes of language, seeking “connectivity instead of 
separation, equality instead of hierarchy, diversity instead of homogeneity” 
(1). The removal of those hierarchies and emphasis on connectivity are 
surely goals for feminist authors and thus an engagement with non-
hegemonic language is a worthy pursuit. For Morton, ecology is about eliding 
“the distance between human and animal, society and natural environment, 
subject and object” (154).  
This theoretical consideration of the shared oppressions of femininity 
and nature has lead Legler to identify that many canonical works continue to 
enshrine nature as a place fit for only individual men to find spiritual 
enlightenment and access to an individual self, thus further embedding “the 
humanist notion that the ‘authentic’ self is necessarily dependent on the 
managing of spatial boundaries, especially the boundaries between nature 
and culture, between the me and the not me, between the I and the other” 
(229). An ecological approach to feminist writing acknowledges that the 
natural world is something we all share and are affected by, but our desire to 
198 
 
control the nonhuman has led to damage and commodification. The natural 
world has long been used as a useful lens through which we see how people 
are positioned and how they connect, but ecofeminist writing uses nature not 
only as a source for metaphor but shows that it is a subject with its own 
agency, seeking too to shake off the malign influences of oppressive power 
structures. An endorsement of nature becomes, naturally, an endorsement of 
a collective understanding of humanity; yet active rather than passive 
considerations of nature are necessary to truly achieve this. As Gaard has 
stated, supporting discussions conducted by Gilligan and Warren, 
“ecofeminism […] asserts the fundamental interconnectedness of all life [and] 
offers an appropriate foundation for an ecological ethical theory for women 
and men who do not operate on the basis of a self/other disjunction” (3). 
 To support literature which seeks to adequately represent this 
interconnectedness, Legler has offered a number of “emancipatory 
strategies” for contemporary women writers: 
1. ‘Re-mything’ nature as a speaking, ‘bodied’ subject. 
2. Erasing or blurring of boundaries between inner (emotional, 
psychological, personal) and outer (geographic) landscapes, or 
the erasing or blurring of self-other (human/nonhuman, I/Thou 
distinctions). 
3. Re-eroticizing human relationships with a “bodied” landscape, 
or the introduction in Euro-American texts and the 
reconfiguration in some Native American texts of ritual sexual 
intercourse as a means of speaking with the land. 
4. Historicizing and politicizing nature and the author as a 
participant in nature. 
5. Expressing an ethic of caring friendship, or “a loving eye”, as a 
principle for relationships with nature. 
6. Attempting to unseat vision, or “mind” knowledge, from a 
privileged position as a way of knowing, or positing the notion 
that “bodies” know. 
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7. Affirming the value of partial views and perspectives, the 
importance of “bioregions”, and the locatedness of human 
subjects. (2007: 231) 
I argue that Smith, throughout Girl meets boy, makes use of many of these 
“emancipatory strategies”. The focus on feminist revisionist mythmaking as 
an act which necessarily demands and creates connections and 
interdependence also serves to advance an ecofeminist approach, whereby 
hierarchies of gender, nature and story are all disrupted through liberatory 
practices.  
 Not only does Smith use her loving eye to re-eroticise nature, giving it 
an identity as a speaking subject, it also supports her dislocation of the 
gender binary within the text. This re-configured nature language sees Smith 
reconnect femininity with nature but also accommodates masculine sexuality 
within the same metaphoric field. The connection between femininity and 
nature is fraught and can lead to essentialist understandings of women as 
“closer” to nature due to their reproductive capacities. But Smith’s connection 
is here understood as a pragmatic act rather than an endorsement of 
essentialism. Lori Gruen, in “Dismantling Oppression: An Analysis of the 
Connection Between Women and Animals”, discusses how understanding 
the relationship between women and animals not as a “natural” link but as a 
“constructed connection” is useful for considering the ways in which 
patriarchy has oppressed both femininity and the nonhuman (61). Whilst 
women are not essentially more ‘natural’ than men, the pervasiveness of that 
link between femininity and nature means that it is pragmatic to consider the 
ways in which that affiliation has been forged and how it continues to be 
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understood. Smith’s repurposing of natural, mythical associations leads to 
representations of gender and sensuality that are more fluid and 
accommodating. In the context of a narrative whereby biologically essentially 
femininity is repeatedly called into question, the reappropriation of natural 
language becomes a necessarily “constructed connection”. 
 We can see this re-eroticisation of nature throughout the lengthy 
descriptions of Robin and Anthea’s love-making. The pair become entangled 
in each other’s arms, unable to identify whose hand belongs to who, 
establishing the fluidity in their bodies that is continued as “her [Robin’s] 
hand opened me” (101). We see here a disappearing of boundaries and a 
fluidity of subjectivity that leads to them becoming, through their coupling, 
“blades [...] a knife that could cut through myth” (103). Kaye Mitchell has 
identified the ways in which Smith uses metaphor that is traditionally 
associated with violence and masculinity: blades, snakes, stones (65). 
However, these associations are also “natural” – blades are forged using 
minerals from the earth, snakes and stones both being 
biological/geographical features of the earth. Such references are used too in 
conjunction with metaphors which might have traditionally conjured the 
feminine: “A bird, a song, the insides of a mouth, a fox, an earth, all the 
elements, minerals, a water feature” (104). The all-encompassing passion of 
their union is depicted in natural terms, from the unbound infinite to the 
granular. The distinction between the human and the nonhuman is blurred, 
as advocated by Legler. Not only are these metaphors natural, but many of 
them reappropriate mythical connotations. There are echoes of Leda and the 
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Swan in “Then everything about me became a wing, a single wing, and she 
was the other wing, we were a bird”, yet in this iteration, Robin and Anthea 
are two wings of the same bird rather than the female victim of Zeus-as-a-
bird (101). There are references too to Zeus coming to Danae as a shower of 
gold, but when Anthea asks “Was I gold?” it is she who is occupying the 
magical, powerful role. Medusa and the Gorgons are present in their 
intercourse: “I was sinew, I was a snake, I change stone to snake in three 
simple moves, stoke stake snake” (102). In Metamorphoses, Medusa is 
raped in Athena’s temple by Poseidon and her curse was to bear a head of 
snakes which would turn those who looked upon her to stone – a punishment 
described by Perseus as merited for the crime of being defiled (Ovid 589). 
Smith’s Medusa-power is turned on its head, where stone becomes snake. 
The playful changing of stone to snake in three simple moves, “stoke stake 
snake”, indicates language’s capacity to manipulate meaning in slight but 
swift increments. The emotional and physical connection between Robin and 
Anthea allows them to be “the blade that cuts through myth” and to embody 
elements of the natural worlds. The deployment of mythological reference, in 
symbiosis with natural language, helps to create a genderless love which is 
both human and nonhuman, and eroticises the natural. 
 Smith, like Winterson and Atwood before her, describes a corporeal 
breaking down into parts. Anthea says:  
I had not known, before us, that every vein in my body was capable of 
carrying light, like a river seen from a train makes a channel of sky 
etch itself deep into a landscape. I had not really known I could be so 





Whereas Winterson and Atwood’s breaking down is an individual act, for 
Anthea, it is precisely what allows her to connect to Robin. When she breaks 
her individualised self into natural components – light, like a river – she is 
able to find love and satisfaction in and with another, in a relationship which 
is not predicated upon domination. The removal of domination between the 
partners echoes a collapsing of the old hierarchies as Anthea recognises 
herself as constructed from these constituent parts. The natural elements of 
which she is comprised are foregrounded through this language, drawing 
attention to the symbiotic relationship between human emotions and the 
elements.  
 This inclusion and expansion of nature-based metaphor becomes 
particularly significant when we consider the construction of gender in Ovid’s 
original. Deborah Kamen, in “Naturalized Desires and the Metamorphosis of 
Iphis”, states that this myth is the only “mythological account of female same-
sex desire, not only in Ovid but in all of classical literature” (2).  Diane 
Pintabone has discussed the ways in which Ovid seems to briefly question 
heteronormative constructions of desire before ultimately endorsing 
traditional male/female binaries (256–81). Kamen provides an extensive 
engagement with the myth in the original Latin, and an analysis of the 
placement of the Iphis story within the broader structure of the 
Metamorphoses allows her to construct a framework for understanding how 
same-sex relationships might have been understood in ancient Rome. She 
cites scholars who have suggested reasons for the impossibility of Ianthe 
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and Iphis’s mutual love: Kirk Ormand (2005) believes the mutual nature of 
their desire renders it impossible, whilst Jonathan Walker (2006) asserts that 
the absence of penetration is what threatens its viability. The mutuality and 
lack of penetration results in, these critics are ultimately suggesting, the 
negation of any kind of existing social hierarchy – if a relationship is mutual 
and without what is perceived to be physical domination through penetration, 
then it does not fit within a socially acceptable model. Kamen reads the Iphis 
story in its original context and applies known understandings of Roman 
attitudes towards the sexual act to establish her framework of what may be 
considered “natural”, what may be considered socially acceptable, and why 
same-sex relationships were understood, in both the context of classical 
Rome and the source text, as neither (22). Whilst Pintabone complicates 
this, suggesting Iphis believed herself and her feelings to be “natural”, she 
has also asserted that their love story is characterised by equality, which 
makes it something of an oddity in both Ovid’s writing and within socially 
acceptable forms of ancient Roman sexuality (279). 
 Kamen asserts that “alongside the well-known ‘penetration model’ of 
Roman sexuality, in which sexual acts were defined by a differential between 
a (dominant and masculine) penetrator and a (subordinate and feminine) 
penetrated, there existed a separate scheme for characterizing sexual acts” 
(22). She develops a compelling argument as to why, in Metamorphoses, 
Ovid’s representations of incest may be understood as illegal, rather than 
unnatural. Incest as a union is unacceptable because it contravenes social 
conventions; it is still perceived as a “natural” sexual act as heterosexual 
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incest can result in reproduction, thus retaining a link with the natural. In this 
understanding, the unconventional element of an incestuous relationship is 
that society has characterised it as prohibited, rather than nature itself. The 
myth of Iphis follows, within the chronology of Metamorphoses, the story of 
Byblis, who falls in love with her own brother. The segue between the stories 
indicates that Iphis’s experience would be, in fact, more shocking to an 
ancient Roman audience than incest: “The report of a new monstrosity 
[Byblis] perhaps would have filled the hundred Cretan cities, if Crete had not 
recently had its own miracle in the metamorphosis of Iphis” (Book 9. 666-
8).40  
 The reason that Iphis’s story is more worthy of discussion than the 
story of Byblis, is that not only is Iphis’s love for Ianthe unconventional, it is 
unnatural. Kamen believes that unnatural here may also be a metonym for 
“culturally unintelligible” (26). Incest, in this model, is contrary to cultural 
convention, but homosexual love is not something that culture can rationalise 
due to its incapacity to naturally reproduce. She offers this example from the 
source myth: 
Love does not burn a cow for a cow, nor a mare for a mare; the ram 
burns for the sheep, the doe follows the stag. Birds also mate thus, 
and among all the females no female is seized with desire for a 
female. (Book 9.731-4)41  
 
In this excerpt, Iphis is ruminating the impossibility of her love and how it 
seemingly defies the natural order. This schema for gauging the acceptability 
 
40 The translation here is Kamen’s (24). 
41 Kamen (26). 
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of desire is based on models from nature. A female human loving another 
female human does not seem to fit into the behaviour the ancient Romans 
were able to observe in their world. Of course, Iphis’s understanding of 
nature is based on limited observations; after all, homosexual behaviour has 
to date been recorded in over 450 species.42 Iphis is using the natural world 
to try and make sense of human behaviour, and finds her desires to be 
contradictory to what she can see in animals. Iphis’s love contravenes what 
society, and the version of “nature” that her society has constructed, expects. 
 Ultimately, Kamen argues that Metamorphoses contains three 
conceptual categories of sexual acts:  
1) Natural and conventional  
Pederasty etc 
2) Natural and unconventional 
Incest etc 
3) Unconventional and unnatural 
Non-penetrative sex. (32) 
Mitchell has also highlighted the “perceived unnaturalness of lesbianism” and 
cites Judith Roof’s comment on the ““inconceivability” of lesbian sexuality in 
a phallocentric system” (245). Kamen’s categorisation and reading of the text 
emphasises that Iphis’s desires were not just unnatural, or just 
unconventional within a patriarchal hierarchy, but both. 
 
42 See, for example, Bruce Bagemihl’s research into animal homosexuality (2000).  
206 
 
 Returning to Girl meets boy, we may see how directly Smith confronts 
and undermines not only Ovid’s conceptualisation of sexuality, but the 
continued myths about homosexuality that are voiced to this day. By 
reforging the “constructed connection” between femininity and nature, she is 
creating a version of the “natural” which accommodates homosexual love. 
Her engagements with a culture which seeks to denigrate this relationship 
are also grounded in natural language, leading to a love story that challenges 
understandings of what is natural and what is conventional. 
 When Midge, still reeling from the discovery that her sister is in love 
with a woman, has a drink with Norman and Dominic, her loathsome 
colleagues from Pure, they talk extensively about femininity and lesbianism.  
Freud defined it, Norman says (Norman did psychology at Stirling), as 
a state of lack. A state of lacking something really, you know, 
fundamental.  
 
[…] Dominic says. I mean, never mind anything else. Never mind how 
weird it is. Like, what gets me is, there’s nothing to do the job […] And 
that’s why Queen Victoria didn’t make the rugmunch illegal. 
 
How’s that? Norman says. 
 
It was on Channel Four. Apparently she said there was no such thing, 
like, it didn’t exist. And she was right. I mean, when men do it, poofs, 
in sexual terms, I mean it’s fucking disgusting and it leads to queer 
paedophilia and everything, but at least it’s real sex they have, eh? 
But women. It’s like, how can they? I just don’t get it. (70) 
 
Here, Dominic and Norman are betraying the same inability to conceive a 
non-penetrative model of sex. They are also conflating the unnatural (“how 
can they?”) with the unconventional (“Apparently she said there was no such 
thing”). Lesbian intercourse is, for Midge’s colleagues, culturally unintelligible 
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and thus unnatural. They are also endorsing the hierarchy of sexual 
categories posited by Kamen – male homosexual sex, including pederasty, is 
understood by these men as being more natural than same-sex female love, 
due to it being “nothing”. The opinions the two men are sharing are also 
formed from cultural myths. Norman’s understanding of lesbian sex comes 
from studying Freud, whose theories were framed by ancient mythology. It’s 
supported by the myth, circulated by Channel Four, that Queen Victoria 
didn’t understand lesbian sex and thus did not prohibit it. Indeed, according 
to the Scotsman, this myth was first circulated in 1977 when an equality 
march focussed on a statue of the Queen.43 This interchange thus again 
reveals how damaging myths can be when misapplied. However, due to 
Smith’s careful endorsement of that liminal space between, discussed earlier 
in this chapter, this “state of lacking” has become populated with 
multitudinous somethings. Smith’s insistent reconstruction of the connection 
between female same-sex love and nature also allows that which has 
previously been “culturally unintelligible” to become viewed as an integral 
part of the natural world. Indeed, the novella concludes: 
What I mean is, we stood on the bank of the river under the trees, the 
pair of us, and we promised the nothing that was there, the nothing 
that made us, the nothing that was listening, that we truly desired to 
go beyond ourselves. (159) 
 
Here when they say “yes” (or “Ness”) to each other, they are communing 
with nature and the “state of lack”. But the nothing always signifies meaning 
 
43 See, for example, “Forget What You Think You Know about Queen Victoria and Lesbians” 
(2015), which cites Professor David Spiegelhalter’s discussions of the proliferation of 
lesbianism at the time.   
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and indeed, it is the space between that provides ‘true’ meaning. The pub in 
which Norman and Dominic make their offensive proclamations becomes a 
microcosmic society in which Ovid’s categories of sexuality still ring true. Yet 
the reader recognises the toxicity of this environment, in which Midge feels 
pressurised to drink and is treated with a lack of respect. It is also followed, a 
few pages later, by the previously cited description of Anthea and Robin’s 
lovemaking, constructed through natural, degendered, mythological 
metaphor. The “state of lack” is in fact populated by “an earth, all the 
minerals”, and pages of other intricate references. As Anthea notes, the 
supposed grey area is in truth a whole new spectrum of colours (84). When 
Robin tells Anthea the story of Iphis, not being able to be with Ianthe is the 
true unnatural act for her Iphis, who compares to standing in a stream, “dying 
of thirst, with my hand full of water, but I won’t be able to drink it!” (96) What 
has hitherto been understood as an unnatural union becomes a truly natural 
congress that defies convention – Midge’s surprise, Norman and Dominic’s 
bigotry – yet is ultimately rendered socially acceptable. 
 The “ecosystem” of the text does not just eroticise nature or use it as 
a frame of reference to problematise culture.44 Nature has its own agency 
within the novella and ecological concerns form a driving role within the 
narrative, particularly through the plotline detailing Midge’s work for Pure. 
Stories, in particular, are characterised as elements of the natural world, as 
opposed to cultural products – what Smith describes as the “tectonic plate-
 
44 Laurence Buell asserts that all texts are ecosystems (44). 
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quality that story has”, cited at the opening to this chapter, whilst an 
acknowledgement of how they are constructed within culture shapes an 
understanding of how culture moulds and controls that which is natural.  
 Not only is nature used to describe Anthea falling in love with Robin, 
but the act of falling in love gives Anthea an insight into the natural world that 
she previously could not access: 
I looked out at the hills at the back of the town, at the trees on the 
hills, at bushes in the garden, at the birds, at the brand new leaves on 
a branch, at a cat on a fence, at the bits of wood that made the fence, 
and I wondered if everything I saw, maybe every landscape we 
casually glanced at, was the outcome of an ecstasy we didn’t even 
know was happening, a love-act moving at a speed slow and steady 
enough for us to be deceived into thinking it was just everyday reality. 
(105)  
 
The landscape has been eroticised here and again, the line between the 
human and the nonhuman has been blurred through the narrative. Anthea’s 
new feelings allow her consider the hills and to note the regeneration of 
leaves, but she is not merely using it as a canvas upon which to project her 
own feelings but to guess at the feelings of others and the ecstatic acts of 
creation continually at work within that bodied landscape. When the natural 
world is treated with such wonder and respect, the unethical activities of the 
Pure corporation become even more abhorrent to the reader. 
 Keith, Midge’s boss at Pure in Milton Keynes, details his ambition to 
make it “not just possible but natural for someone, from the point of rising in 
the morning to the point of going to sleep at night, to spend his whole day, 
obliviously, in Pure hands” (116). He lists a broad scope of activities which 
he wants to bring under the auspices of Pure – not merely the drinking water 
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that is “administered, tested and cleaned by Pure”, but the breakfast food, 
newspapers, baby nappies and pharmaceuticals that a person might use 
during a day would, according to his vision, all come from Pure companies. 
The blatantly unnatural nature of this desire emphasises the ways in which 
the water company is at odds with its natural product. The unethical desires 
of the company are repeated over and over – from denying Indians water for 
their crops to fudging statistics about water testing – but the most offensive is 
the idea that “water is not a human right. Water is a human need. And that 
means we can market it. We can sell a need. It’s our human right to” (124). 
The prioritising of the “human right” to business over the human need to 
drink water becomes particularly abhorrent in light of the reiteration of 
nature’s importance throughout the rest of the text. We are reminded of Iphis, 
standing in a stream of water, dying of thirst, unable to drink anything. Keith’s 
prominent erection, obvious to Midge throughout their discussions, and the 
sexist ways in which he speaks about her professional capabilities, unite in 
the reader’s mind a lack of respect for nature with a lack of respect for 
women.  
 Once Midge stands up to Keith and leaves the company, she takes 
the train home and is invigorated by her own act of rebellion. She passes by 
the Lowland sea and ponders the water, asserting that it “belongs to all of us” 
– “belongs to everyone” (129).  Upon her return, she discovers that her sister 
and Robin have been painting feminist slogans upon buildings in town. The 
correlation between the issues of gender equality and ecology is thus 
stressed; Midge is inspired by their acts of irreverent activism to use nature 
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to spread its own message: “thought I might drive out to a garden centre first 
and buy some seeds and bulbs […] planting a good slogan or two that’ll 
appear mysteriously in the grass of it [the river bank] next spring. RAIN 
BELONGS TO EVERYONE. Or THERE’S NO SUCH THING AS A SECOND 
SEX. Or PURE DEAD = BRILLIANT. Something like that” (145). Midge’s idea 
would allow the natural world to advocate for its own protection through a 
reappropriation of the marketing language she has learned during her time 
with Pure. Midge is, like Anthea, drawn to a new appreciation of the natural 
world through her experience of love – after she sleeps with Paul, she 
comments: “I never knew how much I liked the rain until now” (139). Anthea’s 
desire to advocate for gender equality and Midge’s newly found, 
environmental anger, both impulses incited and propelled by non-hierarchical 
love, binds the two sisters together in a mutual desire for change and an end 
to varying but related forms of oppression, leading to the climactic “all 
together now” section of the novella (147). 
 This reconnection between the self, the other, the community and the 
natural world is also achieved through a consideration of ritual. Ritual, an 
intrinsic part of myth as stressed by Armstrong (3), was traditionally a way for 
humans to make sense of or to chart changes in nature. Early in the text, 
Anthea observes the surface of the Ness and the presence of floating petals. 
Beside the river sits the cathedral and other churches. She comments:  
Maybe they thought it made a difference, all the ritual marryings and 
christenings and confirmings and funerals, all the centuries of asking, 
in their different churches each filled with the same cold air off the 
mountains and the Firth, for things to reveal themselves as having 
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meaning after all, for some proof the world was held in larger hands 
than human hands. (27)  
 
The disconnect between ritual and nature seems to lead to Anthea’s 
scepticism – the Ness is close to the bank but the churches have lined its 
path, and there is no organic connection between culture, represented by the 
church, and the river. The listed rituals have taken place beside the river, but 
to Anthea at this point, when she has not yet met Robin and not yet found 
her own connection to nature, the river does not play an active part. This is 
remedied at the end of the novella, when the river acts as a witness to their 
love, reconciled to the “nothing that made us”. They think they are alone but 
that moment of communion becomes also a moment for the creation of a 
community, as they imagine being joined by Midge, Paul, colleagues from 
Pure, the Inverness Constabulary female-voice choir and Midge and 
Anthea’s lost grandparents. Whilst this is all in Anthea’s imagination, ritual 
provides the scope for this when it is connected to the natural. The 
connection between the ritual of storytelling – the meta level of Smith’s 
retelling of myth – and nature is also emphasised at the very end of the tale. 
Stories are “the rope we could cross any river with” and the constructed story 
of nature itself is considered, “ever-inventive, making one thing out of 
another” (161).  
We are reminded in this way of how nature has been constructed as a 
story, drawing attention back to the “constructed connection” between nature 
and femininity. Self-consciously exploring the creation of such narratives of 
femininity and the non-human, Smith manages to present a complicated 
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engagement with ecofeminism which simultaneously valorises the natural 
whilst highlighting the way in which it has been and continues to be created 
and controlled by narrative. This ever-inventive quality that nature inherently 
possesses, through its cycles of growth and regrowth, allows the text to 
establish a dynamic relationship between nature and humanity. The 
landscape is bodied and eroticised and the “loving eye”, the caring friendship 
that Legler advocates, is carefully cultivated throughout, leading to a text 
where ethics of gender and sexuality are addressed simultaneously with 
ethics of the environment.  
 When Andrea and Robin say “Ness” at the river’s bank, playfully 
echoing Molly Bloom and Sasha, they are not just communing with nature. 
They are connecting to a modernist past, indicating contemporary fiction’s 
efforts to engage with that past as it moves away from postmodernism. They 
are acknowledging the meaning of the “lack”, and indicating their desire to 
“go beyond themselves”. The text is thus keying into a philosophy which has 
been gaining increasing levels of traction in literary theory, and art theory 
more generally: metamodernism.  
“Going beyond ourselves”: Metamorphoses and Metamodernism  
 
Metamodernism was theorised formally in 2010 by Timotheus Vermeulen 
and Robin Van den Akker in their now seminal essay “Notes on 
Metamodernism”. They consider metamodernism to be the cultural logic of 
the new century, noting how art produced in the post-postmodern landscape 
frequently expresses an “(often guarded) hopefulness and (at times feigned) 
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sincerity that hint at another structure of feeling, imitating another discourse” 
(2). Metamodernism is taken from ‘metaxis’, meaning the human state of 
being in-between described in Plato’s Symposium. Metamodernism is thus a 
contemporary critical theory based on this liminality, contending that in the 
post-postmodern world meaning comes from the oscillation between multiple 
poles. Vermeulen and van den Akker argue that this new modernism:  
Is characterized by the oscillation between a typically modern 
commitment and a markedly postmodern detachment […] For we 
contend that metamodernism should be situated epistemologically 
with (post) modernism, ontologically between (post) modernism, and 
historically beyond (post) modernism. (2)   
 
In short, this theory suggests that many artworks produced at the beginning 
of the twenty-first century are, by virtue of their oscillation between the 
modern and the postmodern, in keeping with my earlier characterisation of 
successful rewritings: at once earnest in their philosophies but ironic in their 
practices. 
Where The Penelopiad acknowledges the contemporary limits of 
postmodernism and Weight’s longing for a return to some sense of 
authenticity is indicative of some elements of the post-postmodern literary 
landscape, Girl meets boy directly and repeatedly displays tendencies which 
could be understood as metamodernist. The first section in this chapter 
discusses the ways in which a veneration of the liminal space between fixed 
understandings of meaning can lead to liberating representations of gender. 
The final section will show how the text amounts to metamodernism avant la 
lettre through this Scylla and Charybdis ontology, where the only way 
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through is to negotiate between. It will also discuss Girl meets boy’s 
performed naivete, ultimately indicating an engagement with modernism and 
an optimistic yet realistic countering of postmodern deconstruction.  
 Whilst the term metamodernism was first mentioned in passing in 
1975, and debates regarding the critical lacuna following the ebbing of 
postmodernism have raged for many years, it wasn’t until Vermeulen and 
Van den Akker’s aforementioned article that some of the trends in twenty-first 
century art were broadly recognised under this nomenclature. Whilst 
Vermeulen and Van den Akker accept that many of postmodernism’s textual 
(or visual) strategies continue, metamodernism acknowledges the necessity 
of grand narratives, even whilst it appreciates their dangers. They comment 
that metamodernism creates meaning through a constant swinging between 
modernism and postmodern – between  
A modern enthusiasm and a postmodern irony, between hope and 
melancholy, between naivete and knowingness, empathy and apathy, 
unity and plurality […] One should be careful not to think of this 
oscillation as a balance, however; rather, it is a pendulum swinging 
between 2, 3, 5, 10 innumerable poles. Each time the metamodern 
swings toward fanaticism, gravity pulls it back toward enthusiasm. (6)  
 
That meaning is created through reverberations between more than just 
binaried positions offers a potentially emancipatory framework for non-
essentialist and positional representations of gender. It also seems that 
some of the failures of postmodernism as a feminist discourse – the 
dismissal of grand narratives, the disintegration of the self – might be 
checked and remedied through this process of oscillation between modernity 
and postmodernity. The carefully adopted construction of temporary 
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totalities, undertaken with knowing irony and undermined by an awareness of 
its construction, may permit political action without the establishment of new 
fanaticisms – the metamodern promises, with characteristic optimism, a way 
beyond extremity towards a nuanced future.  
A recent special issue of English Studies attempted to map out how 
modernism is reasserting itself in contemporary fiction.45 James and 
Seshagiri, whose conception of metamodernism differs slightly to Vermeulen 
and Van den Akker, and who have applied the term directly to literary fiction, 
have referred to modernism’s place within metamodernism as an “aesthetic, 
and an archive”. They caution the idea that “fading one domain into the 
other, we run the risk of assuming modernism to be inherently positive, 
transportable across time, and transferable to the work of contemporary 
writers” (James and Seshagiri 88). Yet Vermeulen and Van den Akker’s 
construction of metamodernism, whilst inadvertently and erroneously 
bestowing upon modernism positive qualities such as optimism, commitment, 
hope and empathy through their ironically polarising definition, identify 
oscillation between multiple poles as a primary feature of the theory, surely 
off-setting this characterisation (2005). Rewriting is itself a form of oscillation, 
a negotiation with, through and beyond. The idea of metamorphosis – the 
constant promise (or threat) of change is a marked Modernist tendency, with 
Franz Kafka’s Metamorphosis offering just one example from a literary period 
shaped by and preoccupied with change. In the post-postmodern landscape, 
 
45 See 99.7, 2018.  
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the dramatic technological change experienced over the past 30 years again 
foregrounds transformation. Girl meets boy's revision of myth enacts its own 
metamorphosis, both searching the modernist archive and oscillating 
between the multiple poles of the (post) modern.  
Before Anthea meets Robin, she comments on feeling "so young, so 
stupidly knowing, so stupidly forgetful". She yearns to feel old, and clearly 
indicates a desire to ground her own identity in a past that will offer her 
access to something deeper than "a single fast-loading page on Facebook or 
Myspace" (23). Indeed, she worries about logging in to these metaphorical 
servers and finding that "not even that version of 'I' existed any more, 
because the servers all over the world were down. And that's how rootless. 
And that's how fragile" (23-4). This rootless fragility at the expense of a 
disappearing 'I' could be understood as an anxious engagement with the 
state of the subject following decades of postmodern disintegration. Anthea's 
yearning to be anchored by a past, and one with some depth, leads her to 
compare the links of the internet to "thin white roots on a broken plant dug 
out of the soil, dying on its side" (23). In more of the natural language 
discussed above, Anthea is clearly indicating a dissatisfaction with 
contemporary feelings of disconnection, digital superficiality and loss of 
subjectivity. This is later, as we know, remedied by her connection to Robin. 
Robin and Anthea's telling and retelling of the myth of Iphis seems to provide 
Anthea with that depth she has been searching to find. This longing to feel 
"old" is subdued by a connection to history – both in terms of Anthea's own 
personal history and in terms of a modernist literary history. Yet as our earlier 
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discussions have detailed, the history Anthea wishes to access, is a 
constructed narrative, mythical in nature. Her own history is rendered, 
through her grandfather, through truth and untruth. Her feelings of yearning 
are thus simultaneously felt to be real but acknowledged to be impossible – it 
is the thought of accessing that connection to the past that is comforting, 
rather than its achievement. 
We see in Anthea's distress some of what Gilles Lipovetsky has 
highlighted in his treatise on "hypermodernity" as the intrinsic worthlessness 
of contemporary cultural practices due to their inability to connect to either 
past or future (2005) . But this position is not maintained here, and whilst 
Lipovetsky believes that this results in both anguish and ecstasy, we see that 
a regrounding can lead to a sincere joy that allows for fantasy but also 
tempers its excesses ("Uh. Okay. I know. In my dreams." 159). The text 
indicates that there is the potential for more than just the existential crises or 
wild hedonism Lipovetsky believes are the direct result of the hypermodern. 
Indeed, in this metamodernist text, the desire to go "beyond ourselves" is 
depicted with hope but also contains a realistic acceptance of the limitations 
of those desires. 
Indeed, Anthea and Robin manage to "make" the myth of Iphis "new" 
three times within the story – when Anthea tells the story, when Robin tells 
the story through Anthea and once, when we consider the overarching arc of 
the narrative as a whole. Robin and Anthea's lovemaking, discussed above, 
follows a stream-of-consciousness format that could be read as another 
echoing of Molly Bloom's soliloquy. But more than this, Girl meets boy is 
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constantly searching to engage with themes and narratives that 
postmodernism had once dismissed. History is emphasised frequently, but 
always as a fluid concept and ultimately as a subjective construction. Indeed, 
Smith betrays in this novella what Kostkowska has identified in her other 
works as an "essentially modernist confidence in the redemptive, 
transformative value of art" (3), as we are left with the conclusion that 
storytelling is the ultimate tool for dealing with the rivers that we may be 
required to cross, even as we acknowledge its limitations, debates, and 
overlapping versions. After all, as Anthea and her grandfather both agree, 
stories can make you brave and change you (160). 
This use of modernism as an archive, through direct textual reference 
("Ness I said Ness") and theme (history, the individual and society, change 
and transformation) is not merely a hankering back to an early literary 
moment or attempting to transpose that moment to this. There is also distinct 
evidence of the oscillation Vermeulen and Van Den Akker describe. The 
text’s resistance of one set binary is clear when Smith refuses to completely 
define Robin's gender, and allows the grandfather to claim to be both male 
and female. But there is also an oscillation in narration through the 
polyphonic narrative – the story moves between the two poles of the twins – 
I" and "You", but then it becomes a story of "Us", “Them”, and, ultimately is 
told "all together now". Indeed, as twins, Midge and Anthea were created in a 
natural binary, but the text overcomes their original, oppositional relationship, 
and shows, through a narrative that they share, how they are both capable of 
romantic and personal metamorphosis.  
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Raoul Eshelman has termed one of the most prevalent metamodernist 
practices "performatism", which he believes is a pragmatic choice to identify 
with something in spite of itself. Eshelman writes: 
Performatist works are set up in such a way that the reader or viewer 
at first has no choice but to opt for a single, compulsory solution to the 
problems raised within the work at hand. The author, in other words, 
imposes a certain solution on us using dogmatic, ritual or some other 
coercive means. The coercive frame cuts us off, at least temporarily, 
from the context around it and forces us back into the work […] On the 
one hand, you’re practically forced to identify with something 
implausible or unbelievable within the frame to believe in spite of 
yourself, but on the other, you still feel the coercive force causing this 
identification to take place, and intellectually you remain aware of the 
particularity of the argument at hand. (Eshelman NP) 
 
 
Girl meets boy's self-conscious, wry happy ending may thus be understood 
as an act of performatism, whereby the ‘single, compulsory’ solution is 
presented within a ‘coercive frame’ which repeatedly reminds us of the 
process of identification. Earlier in the narrative, Robin comments on her 
desire to live “happily ever after, which is impossible, both in story and in 
life”. Anthea responds that it’s “a bit lightweight, as stories go” (86). Having 
thus foregrounded the impossibility of the happy ending, the final chapter 
begins thus: 
Reader, I married him/her. 
It's the happy ending. Lo and behold.  
I don't mean we had a civil ceremony. I don't mean we had a civil 
partnership. I mean we did what's still impossible after all these 
centuries. I mean we did the still-miraculous, in this day and age. 
(149) 
 
There is a political point being made here about the then, in 2007, illegality of 
gay marriage, but there is another point too about the perceived impossibility 
of a happy ending. An almost sarcastic beginning, with a degendered 
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reference to Jane Eyre, gives way to the kind of optimism that 
accommodates garlands of flowers and ceilidh dances. The wry "lo and 
behold" acknowledges the tiredness of the happy ending, battered and 
bruised by cliché and rejected by postmodernism, but Smith is also 
acknowledging the importance of ritual – handfasting, eating kola nuts and 
chestnuts to "symbolise righteousness, plenty, fertility, the thirteen gold coins 
to symbolise unselfishness". This is a happy ending that subverts domination 
or hierarchy, indeed, as Anthea says, "With these rings we us wedded" 
(150). They even say the traditional vows to each other, thus acknowledging 
the potency of recognised ritual. There is scepticism here, seen also in their 
contingent vows “yes we would”, and eventually its optimism becomes 
fantasy, with the arrival of dead family members and singing police officers. 
But it is an effort to re-engage with and re-evaluate an ancient narrative 
trope, despite the fact it is tired, despite the fact it cannot, due to the law and 
structures of power, necessarily match our lived realities – it is asking us to 
identify with something which has previously been described as impossible. 
It is, therefore, a performatist version of a happy ending that once again 
indicates a countering of postmodern deconstruction and hints towards a 
new form of twenty-first century literary culture. This could also be extended 
to the idea of rewriting myth as a whole – the text may perhaps be seen 
ultimately as a performatist attempt to do this. Myth may be problematic, as 
we have discussed repeatedly in this thesis, but rewriting it –constantly 
revising it and making it about the us, not the I, as Anthea and Robin do in 
their marriage ceremony, may still be fruitful. 
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 Vermeulen and Van Den Akker have claimed that "New generations of 
artists [are] increasingly abandoning the aesthetic precepts of 
deconstruction, parataxis and pastiche in favour of aesth-ethical notions of 
reconstruction, myth and metaxis" (2). This interest in "aesth-ethical notions", 
aesthetic driven by ethics and seeking reconstruction whilst recognising its 
impossibility, can be seen throughout all of the text’s ecofeminist elements, 
leading the text to function not only as a piece of art but a work of activism. It 
also informs Smith's reading of myth more generally, reconstructing the past 
to allow it to inform, without dominating the present. The dangers of reading 
myth as a counterpoint to contemporary reality are highlighted, when, upon 
Anthea declaring "Thank God we're modern now", Robin reminds her of the 
places in the world where baby girls are still abandoned at birth (91-2). Yet 
that distancing does not lead to dismissal, for the story still serves as an 
important informing parable for Anthea, and later for the reader, when they 
consider the thirsty Iphis and the commercialisation of water. Thus we begin 
to see how an aesth-ethical engagement with myth, in a performatist mode, 
might be possible within a metamodernist framework. 
 When Smith talks about that "shift back" in story, and endorses an 
exploration of what "move[s] us at foundation and remind[s] us how to live 
and understand how to live and understand what we experience, individually 
and en masse", she is essentially asking for the reader to do what Anthea 
and Robin promise to do: to go beyond themselves. This does not 
necessitate a return to the real – indeed, as we have seen, it can lead to 
flights into fantasy – but it does offer a space where the real might be 
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considered, along with other previously dismissed grand narratives, between 
a variety of poles. These narratives remain problematic and ever-changing, 
but they can still be present within twenty-first century fiction.  
 This approach makes for a truly ethical revision of mythology. Both 
Winterson and Smith have found ways to make mythology a liberating 
framework, but Smith's method of engagement expands myth beyond its 
roots, beyond its existing associations, to make it pluralistic and fluid, a 
narrative of both individual and communities. Her ecofeminist inquiries within 
the text help link myth back to ritual, which is impossible to escape in the 
text, but is also reappropriated within the text as a positive and potentially 
feminist marker of human experience, through manipulations of language – 
"with this ring us we wed".  The text ultimately concludes that: "things can 
always change, because things will always change, and things will always be 
different, because things can always be different" (160). This is a consoling 
perspective for both mythographers and feminists; after all, it's "what we do 
























“Blessedly wordless birds”: The Talking Cure and Speaking Through 
Silence in Salley Vickers’ Where Three Roads Meet 
 
 - No one hears the same story since your retelling, Dr Freud. 
 - Is that a compliment or an insult? 
- Don’t get me wrong, Doctor. You got the size of the drama right, if 
not the entire point of it. 
(Sally Vickers 169) 
 
The Lord whose oracle is at Delphi neither reveals nor conceals, but 
gives a sign. Heraclitus, as quoted by Vickers in the epigraph of 
Where Three Roads Meet. 
 
In the eponymous short story from Salley Vickers’ 2010 collection 
Aphrodite’s Hat, the protagonist, who has been conducting an extra-marital 
affair with an old love, visits the National Gallery with her paramour. She is 
entranced by Cranach the Elder’s painting “Cupid Complaining to Venus” 
and asks: “Why is she wearing a hat?” Her lover does not answer, but she 
narrates that “It was rhetorical anyway; posed for myself, for some future 
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enquiry” (75). She later, upon discovering that her lover’s wife has cancer, 
decides that “Aphrodite’s hat” was a means of self-protection, and he agrees, 
commenting “Perhaps it’s too dangerous if she’s completely naked” (82). The 
hat in the mythological painting becomes, for the narrator and her partner, 
the hat that must be kept on when people suggest that you “keep your hat 
on!” – a physical limit to indicate a necessary boundary placed upon emotion. 
 After the end of the affair, the narrator calls and speaks to an art 
historian at the National Gallery to uncover the truth about the hat. She is 
duly told that it is not a hat, but upon being given a rationalised description of 
what the item “is” or “means”, she hangs up. She remarks: 
But I needed no longer to hear what anyone else thought or knew for I 
knew for myself why Aphrodite wore that hat. It wasn’t total mischief 
making. It was a recommendation to avoid total exposure. In case you 
give everything to someone who can’t give it all back. (84) 
 
In this moment, the narrator is acknowledging that mythological 
interpretations can have different and distinct public and personal 
significances. She is also suggesting that myth’s generation of meaning is 
bound to time and context – Cranach’s motivations are not as relevant to her 
at this moment as her own extrapolations. The “true” reason for the 
supposed hat on Cranach’s Venus, displayed publicly for all to see at the 
National Gallery, has been collectively agreed upon by art historians and is 
disseminated over the telephone by the Gallery employee. Yet even this 
supposedly stable and extremely public interpretation of myth, filtered first 
through the painter then through the art historians, can be ignored or 
overwritten if necessary. We see, as we have seen throughout our 
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discussion of the novellas in this series, how myth, whether presented in a 
painting or in a work of literature, leaves itself open to a slew of readings and 
that these are often entirely subjective, fuelled by individual experiences, 
motivations and emotions. These are also, like the narrator’s observations of 
Aphrodite’s hat, dependent upon time and context.  
 This awareness and acceptance of myth’s potential for multitudinous 
layers of interpretation and significance has, as repeatedly asserted, formed 
a repeated theme within the Canongate Myths project. “Aphrodite’s Hat” 
succinctly indicates that our mythological understandings are driven by 
individual emotion, experience, and also the pragmatic needs dictated by 
context. It is more important for the narrator to have a sensitizing image to 
allow her to comprehend her grief than for her to understand the motivations 
of the painter or received art history discourse.  
Vickers is thus pointing to myth’s fertility as a framework for 
conceptualising emotion, whilst simultaneously acknowledging its fluidity and 
potential for variance depending upon individual subjectivities. A Jungian 
psychoanalyst, it is no wonder that Vickers is sensitive to myth’s 
psychological power. We have seen thus far how a mythological rewrite can 
respond to the pragmatic needs of a variety of different women writers, and 
this chapter will detail how Vickers’ engagement with her myth of choice is 
influenced by pre-existing public and personal significances, yet also 
functions as a prising apart of established narratives. Where Three Roads 
Meet suggests that myth, like the oracle at Delphi, neither reveals nor 
conceals, but can provide signs which are open to interpretation and thus 
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may be read, in the correct time, context and considering appropriate 
subjectivities, in a feminist way. 
Where Three Roads Meet provides an enigmatic yet provocative 
engagement with the ways in which myths, and most particularly, myths 
about femininity, become embedded in our cultural conscious; it also 
provides an example of how those same myths can still become sites for 
enquiry and expansion. Most significantly, Where Three Roads Meet very 
successfully demonstrates how the way we choose to speak to or silence 
aspects of mythological narratives can have an impact on both the public and 
personal ‘halo of virtualities’ surrounding said myths, forcing the reader to at 
least acknowledge, if not fully redress, previous misconceptions of femininity. 
The Oedipus Myth 
 
Considering Vickers’ profession, it is not difficult to understand why she was 
drawn to rewriting the Oedipus myth, given its central importance in the 
historical development of psychoanalytic theory. The Oedipus myth, 
referenced in early fragments from Homer, Hesiod and others but most well-
known from the trilogy of plays written by Sophocles, served as the 
foundational framework for Freud’s (in)famous psychoanalytic theory.  
 In the myth, as detailed by Sophocles in Oedipus Rex, King Laius 
(Laios in Vickers’ text) and Queen Jocasta are having difficulty conceiving a 
child. Laius duly goes to the Oracle at Delphi, who provide signs which Laius 
interprets to mean that any child born to him and his wife will kill him. When 
Jocasta does give birth to a son, she thus binds his feet together and 
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abandons him to prevent the prophesy from coming true, the expectation 
being that he will die from exposure. Instead, he is rescued by a shepherd 
from Corinth, who presents him to his childless king and queen, Polybus and 
Merope. Later, as a grown man, Oedipus goes to the oracle himself and is 
told that he is fated to kill his father and marry his mother. Appalled by this 
fate and unaware of his adoption, he flees Corinth. On his travels, he 
encounters his birth father Laius and kills him in a brawl, the fight occurring 
at the place “where three roads meet”, the source of Vickers’ title. 
Subsequently, he encounters the fearsome Sphinx, who has been terrorising 
the city of Thebes, and following his successful solution to her riddle, he wins 
the crown of his home city and marries its now-widowed queen, Jocasta. 
 Years later, Oedipus and Jocasta are happily married and rule the city 
together, but increasingly, Thebes is cursed with infertility. Inspired by love 
for his people, Oedipus decides to eradicate this curse, and sends his 
brother-in-law Creon to Delphi for more wisdom from the oracle. The oracle 
declares that the city will only be relieved of its curse when the late king’s 
death is avenged. The denouement reveals Oedipus to be the murderer of 
Laius, and the tragic hero discovers in due course that Laius was his 
biological father and Jocasta his birth mother. Upon the discovery of this 
dreadful news, Jocasta hangs herself and Oedipus blinds himself with her 
brooch. 
 This tragic story has captured many imaginations throughout the 
centuries but none so markedly as Sigmund Freud. Freud believed that the 
fundamental curse of this story – to kill one’s father and marry one’s mother 
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– was representative of a symbolic, universally held subconscious desire and 
applicable to all human beings. He wrote that his discoveries regarding 
childhood sexuality and neuroses were 
Confirmed by a legend that has come down to us from classical 
antiquity: a legend whose profound and universal power to move can 
only be understood if the hypothesis I have put forward in regard to 
the psychology of children has an equally universal validity. (Complete 
Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol 4, Part 1 261)  
 
This rather circuitous logic, that Freud’s hypothesis elucidates the meaning 
of the play rather than vice versa, not withstanding, Freud wrote that he 
believed the Oedipus Complex, its negotiation and its resolution, represented 
an inescapable and ubiquitous experience for humans in early childhood. 
Reactions to and modifications of the Oedipus complex have characterised 
psychoanalytic discourse since its inception. 
Indeed, even beyond psychoanalytic circles, the term “Oedipus 
complex” is widely understood. Barthes posited that “every narrative lead[s] 
back to Oedipus”, suggesting that “storytelling [is] always a way of searching 
for one’s origin, speaking one’s conflict with the Law, entering the dialectic of 
tenderness and hatred” (The Pleasure of the Text 47). Barthes seems to 
share the belief that the Oedipus myth has a universal application or at the 
very least, a universal interest, even if we do not extend it to psychosexual 
development. Any engagement with the Oedipus myth, therefore, particularly 
from a writer who works as a professional psychoanalyst, becomes a 
necessarily complex and fraught endeavour.  
This chapter will discuss the many ways in which the Oedipus myth 
has been filtered through Vickers’ novella.  A complex text, the reader 
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experiences Freud tell the myth with a citation from Interpreting Dreams, 
Vickers-as-Freud discusses the myth and the legacy of Freud’s theory, and 
Vickers-as-Tiresias retells the source myth from an alternative perspective, 
querying the first two retellings.46  This multi-faceted undertaking is 
particularly relevant for feminist inquiry given both the prominence of Freud 
and his theories, and the challenges made by feminist theorists to Freud’s 
work, criticising the ways in which the Oedipus complex fails to appropriately 
accommodate or interpret femininity or the female sexed body. 
Psychoanalysis and feminism have a difficult relationship and thus the 
novella becomes a unique site for discussing feminist rewriting in connection 
with Freudian theory. This dense and intricate text shows how a feminist 
rewriting can engage with narratives we may recognise as limited or 
misogynistic and destabilise or alter received readings of those narratives.  
Whilst a full and in-depth analysis of Freudian psychoanalysis is not 
possible or indeed appropriate within the scope of this project, a working 
understanding is necessary in order to gauge the ways in which Vickers 
manages to simultaneously honour the father of psychoanalysis, scrutinise 
aspects of his theories, and repeatedly insist upon the possibility of multiple, 
multi-dimensional interpretations of mythological narratives.  
The significance of Sigmund Freud and his theories in Western culture 
is difficult to overstate. Freud himself aspired to be held equivalent to Darwin 
or Copernicus in terms of impact and importance (Freud, The Penguin Freud 
 
46 Whilst more commonly referred to as The Interpretation of Dreams, Vickers chooses to 
translate the title as Interpreting Dreams and as such this is what will be used herein.  
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Library, Vol.1 326), indicating that he believed his theories were capable of 
engendering paradigmatic shifts on a remarkable scale, equal in magnitude 
to the theories of heliocentrism and evolution. Zajko and O’Gorman have 
highlighted that psychoanalysis’s lexicon, including terms such as 
“narcissistic” and “oedipal”, both of course mythological in root, are broadly 
understood and used today (3); this argument is corroborated by Jill Scott 
(3). Roger Horrocks, in his 2001 Freud Revisited: Psychoanalytic Themes in 
the Postmodern Age, notes that Freudianism had an overwhelming influence 
upon thought in the twentieth century, asserting that along with Marxism and 
Darwinism, Freudianism can be understood as one of the “climactic 
movements in modernity, that is, post-Renaissance thought” (8). 
Having thus acknowledged the sheer impact of Freudianism upon 
both society and discourse, it would be beneficial to briefly characterise 
some of the key theories presented by Freudian psychoanalysis. Freud 
popularized the notion of the “unconscious mind”, the automatic and 
instinctual processes which occur within our minds but which we are not able 
to directly access. Freud believed our behaviour was rooted in these drives 
and attempts to access such drives leads to defence mechanisms such as 
repression, regression and fantasy. The conflict between the conscious and 
the unconscious can, he asserted, result in neuroses and other mental health 
issues. The unconscious, though not available to us through introspection 
can, according to Freudian psychoanalysis, make itself known through 
dreams or accidental behaviours. This ground-breaking theory suggested the 
existence of a self which was not the unitary, deep, Humanist self of the 
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Enlightenment and was instead, divided. This fragmented understanding of 
the human mind lead to the psychic apparatus of the id, ego, and superego, 
first discussed in Beyond the Pleasure Principle (first published in 1920). The 
formation of the superego comes when the conflict between the id and the 
ego is resolved and the child internalises cultural laws and behaviours to 
thus override Oedipal desires. These theories have become engrained in 
Western culture and left an indelible mark on the twentieth century; Erich 
Fromm wrote in 1980 that Freud, Einstein and Marx were the “architects of 
the modern age”, although he considered Marx to be a more significant 
thinker than Freud (11). Michael Bell has written about how both Marx and 
Freud were determined to remove “the unwitting mask[s]” which hide the, in 
the case of Marx economic and social, and in the case of Freud 
psychological, processes at work which need to be brought to 
consciousness. Bell has commented on how they were both preoccupied 
with the nature of myth, and even characterised them as simultaneously 
“mythopoeic de-mythologisers” (18).  
The theories of the man Camille Paglia has called “Nietzsche’s heir” 
have had a profound impact upon our understanding of the self, early 
childhood development and mental disturbances (2). Yet these theories have 
courted a great deal of debate and controversy. The Oedipus complex has 
been a particular point of contention; Freud wrote that  
With the progress of psychoanalytic studies the importance of the 
Oedipus complex has become, more and more, clearly evident; its 
recognition has become the shibboleth that distinguishes the 





The level of Vickers’ adherence to this distinguishing belief will be discussed 
further on in this chapter, but Freud’s theories can thus be acknowledged as 
divisive.  
 A primary argument against Freudianism is that it is anti-scientific and 
not supported by empirical data, as argued by, for example, Bussey & 
Bandura (1999). Indeed, Storr has highlighted that Freud did not attempt to 
offer any quantitative support for his own theories after 1896 (23). Freud’s 
own collaborator Breuer wrote: “Freud is a man given to absolute and 
exclusive formulations […] this is a psychical need which, in my opinion, 
leads to excessive generalization” (Storr 13). Scott claims Freud is the 
source of “unprecedented controversy and debate” (3) and in 2003, PMLA 
published this blistering critique: 
Historians and philosophers have shown that Freud’s ‘findings’ were 
coerced, muddled and unsupported except by his own self-flattering 
anecdotes; that psychoanalytic inquiry, with its question-begging 
concepts, its open-ended rules of interpretation, and its inadequate 
precautions against suggestion, is always fatally circular. (Crews et al. 
216) 
 
Freud was anti-religious; Horrocks has asserted that Freud “describes 
religion as an ‘enemy’, which provides false explanations of reality and offers 
false comforts to those who are suffering” (11). Yet at the same time, as 
Storr’s biographical account makes clear, Freud was also a highly 
superstitious man and retained a strong cultural association with Judaism 
(1). The comfort Freud himself took from superstition, not to mention the 
explanations of reality he provided to ease suffering which could not be 
quantified or proven true, indicate further certain contradictions in Freud’s 
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approach. Freud found it deeply insulting that psychoanalysis was not 
considered scientific, characterising it a “gross injustice”, but refused, or was 
unable to adhere to, empiricist methodologies (An Autobiographical Study 
42).  Indeed, as Horrocks has observed, “It is not surprising that Freud has 
been criticized for being too rationalistic but also for being too irrational, since 
arguably he subverts reason whilst giving it a high priority” (13). 
Nolan and O’Mahony have commented on the shared aims of 
feminism and psychoanalysis, seeking to challenge accepted norms and to 
go beyond society’s consciousness to better understand its resistance to 
change. They also indicate that psychoanalysis allows for a complexity of 
subjectivity and observes how traditionally performed roles of femininity can 
lead to neurosis (160). They assert: “It was Simone de Beauvoir who said 
‘one is not born but becomes a woman’, and it is psychoanalysis which gives 
an account of that process of becoming” (161). However, Freud’s theories go 
beyond mere identification of the process of becoming a gendered human. 
They are predicated upon interpretations of our psychological relationship 
with our genitalia, which, if not necessarily in itself essentialist, can certainly 
lead to essentialist responses. 
 Nolan and O’Mahony’s accommodating response to Freud would be 
refuted by a large body of feminist critics who assert that Freudianism is at 
best, limited, and at worst, directly damaging to women. Shulamith Firestone 
has emphasised the metaphorical nature of Freud’s theories, acknowledging 
that sexuality is indeed a problematic issue in modern life which can lead to 
mental disorder, but denigrating Freud’s completely apolitical refusal to 
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acknowledge the socio-political context which leads to the construction of 
sexuality (1970). Paul Robinson even believes that the decline in 
psychoanalysis in the late twentieth century could be attributed to continued 
critiques from feminist writers (1–2). The key thrust of many feminist critiques 
of Freud is that he, as a writer and an analyst, does not understand 
femininity. Scott comments that Freud’s primary dissatisfaction with the 
female Oedipus complex was a result of its failure to effectively operate as a 
“convenient mirror image of the male process” (9). Scott builds upon Jung’s 
suggestion of an “Electra complex” to apply to women, claiming that “Unlike 
Oedipus, who wanders like a sleepwalker into his fate and commits his acts 
unknowingly, this Elektra is conscious of her task and goes about murder 
with a will” (6). The Electra of this proposed complex is the daughter of 
Clytemnestra and Agamemnon, who, along with her brother Orestes, 
murders her mother and her lover Aegisthus as revenge for their murder of 
Agamemnon. I would certainly challenge Scott’s reading of Oedipus, 
particularly her emphasis that he acts out of a desire for power. Sophocles 
repeatedly insists that Oedipus’s action is driven by a love for his people, in 
addition to a desire to learn the truth about his roots, rather than love for a 
power he has always had and clearly abdicated to save his parents when he 
left Corinth. Whilst detailed above, the myth existed in fragments prior to 
Sophocles, his is the most authoritative Classical version and was repeatedly 
mentioned in Aristotle’s Poetics.47 
 
47 See, for example, his use of Oedipus to elucidate the term ‘peripeteia’ – a sudden change 
in fortune (Aristotle 87). Marjorie Barstow (1912) discusses how Oedipus Rex was the 
ultimate tragedy, according to Aristotle (2-4).  
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I also find the figure of Electra a curious fit for any feminist 
psychoanalytic framework – she committed matricide in order to defend the 
honour of her father, the man who began the invasion of Troy by sacrificing 
her virgin sister Iphigenia and who brought the Trojan princess Cassandra 
home as a sex slave following the end of the bloody conflict. If anything, 
Electra could be read as a misled agent of the patriarchy, murdering her 
mother to re-establish the primacy of her cuckolded father. Her somewhat 
circular justification for promoting a new Electra complex is informed by the 
fact that “his [Oedipus’s] story is entrenched forever as a complex, [while] her 
story opens up to alternative avenues of discovery and adaptation. Electra is 
therefore an inviting blank slate” (Scott 11). Scott sees this as a way of 
accommodating Freud’s “eroticization of the familial axis […] without the 
normative objectives of the psychoanalytic structures” (9). An alternative 
model which does not, in some way, challenge the model of interpretation 
dependent upon biology and removed from sociopolitical context, is no 
alternative at all. Indeed, the suggestion that Electra is a blank slate open to 
multiple interpretations while Oedipus is a fixed entity shows a fundamental 
misunderstanding of how myth operates and furthermore, re-establishes 
femininity as essentially fluid, as opposed to a fixed and stable masculinity. 
 Scott is correct, however, in asserting that the Oedipus model does 
not function adequately when used to treat women. Freud acknowledged a 
certain weakness in his analysis of women, suggesting female analysts may 
have more luck (from Female Sexuality, as quoted in J. Mitchell 1). Horrocks 
asserts that despite certain recent reconciliations between feminism and 
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psychoanalysis, “without doubt Freud’s theories concerning girls and women, 
and the development of feminine identity and female sexuality, are shot 
through with phallocentric and masculinist ideas” (127). The over-arching 
importance of the penis as the primary sex organ, to which the child reacts 
positively or negatively, places a weight of significance upon the visible male 
sex organ. Horrocks offers an interesting comment upon the limitations of 
Freud’s psychosexual model, noting the absence of the breast. He notes the 
importance of breasts in pornography and that children are often fascinated 
by breasts. He writes: “If little boys and girls are said to be fascinated by 
superior and inferior penises, one would also expect them to be fascinated 
by breasts, since many of them have an intimate contact with them from 
birth” (127).48 Indeed, the breast is often far more visible to the child than the 
penis. Freud does not comment on this and as a result, “the development of 
a feminine identity and of a feminine sexuality is completely overshadowed 
by the looming presence of the penis, and a universal phallic sexuality. 
According to Freud’s notorious words, ‘the little girl is a little man’” (as quoted 
in Horrocks 128). It is interesting to note that even in a critique of 
psychoanalysis that attempts to perform a feminist engagement, there are 
moments where Horrocks slips into binaried models of gender: “Freud’s 
creation of psychoanalysis strikes me as a kind of ‘feminine’ creation, for this 
space is contemplative rather than active, it nurtures reflection, feeling and 
intuition rather than extrovert aggression or action” (135). This disheartening 
 
48 Certainly the contact between the breast and infants is necessary and nurturing, whereas 
the configuration of the penis is abstracted, but still it is a curious omission. 
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conclusion reminds us how difficult it is to escape the associations between 
femininity, emotion and passivity, and masculinity and aggression.  
 In other ways, Freud has indicated a certain hostility towards the 
feminine. Helen Block Lewis has pointed out that “Misogynist statements in 
Freud’s writings are not hard to find”, and provides one such example from 
his work on narcissism in 1914: 
Complete object-love of the attachment type […] is characteristic of 
the male. Women are by nature more subject to an intensification of 
their original narcissism. Strictly speaking, it is only themselves that 
women love. (89)  
 
 Freud writes too of the “wound to her narcissism” caused by the female 
child’s realisation that she does not have a penis, an analysis that Horrocks 
summarises: “Freud could not really set out his position more clearly: 
women’s castration is universal and leads to a sense of inferiority and self-
hatred – in fact, Freud is really stating that women are inferior!” (130) 
 Juliet Mitchell famously tried to rehabilitate Freud, claiming that 
“however it may have been used, psychoanalysis is not a recommendation 
for a patriarchal society, but an analysis of one” (XV). Certainly, there is merit 
in her argument which suggests that Freud was cognizant of the sexual 
limitations placed upon Victorian women and the damaging effects this could 
have, leading to neuroses (10). Freud also established normality as a 
continuum, suggesting a certain tolerance for different forms of behaviour 
and sexuality (13). Indeed, as Nolan and O’Mahony suggested regarding the 
process of “becoming”, Freud’s notion of sexuality denies the idea that 
sexuality is a completed or fixed ‘thing’, and instead asserts that sexuality is 
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forged “as it travel[s] over a long and tortuous path, maybe eventually, and 
even then only precariously, establishing itself” (17). This emphasis upon 
how sexuality, in general, is constructed, is a useful perspective, but it fails to 
fully acknowledge how female sexuality is constructed within patriarchy, 
contenting itself instead with dealing with the results of that construction. By 
the ages of 3-6, the Oedipal stage, particularly having experienced and 
witnessed the mother as the primary care-giver, it seems ludicrous to 
suggest that child has not, to a greater or lesser extent, through observation 
witnessed the social underestimation of women in practice and absorbed it 
into their process of “becoming”.  
Freudian psychoanalysis may not be anti-feminist in essence, but it 
has been in application and it cannot be viewed as a theory which prioritises 
or emphasises femininity. Its language is inherently and inescapably 
patriarchal and neither Freud nor Mitchell make any effort to use neutral 
language. Mitchell offers an example which she claims is particularly 
offensive to feminists: 
So far there has been no question of the Oedipus complex, nor has it 
up to this point played any part. But now the girl’s libido slips into a 
new position along the line – there is no other way of putting it – of the 
equation ‘penis-child’. She gives up her wish for a penis and puts in 
place of it a wish for a child: and with that purpose in view she takes 
her father as love-object. Her mother becomes the object of her 
jealousy. The girl has turned into a little woman. (Freud "Some 
Psychical Consequences of the Anatomical Distinction Between the 
Sexes" 26) 
 
Mitchell says that the desire to have a penis is incompatible with actual 
possibilities, and is therefore repressed. In the subconscious, it becomes a 
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desire for a baby, and when in time the woman comes to have a baby, that 
deep repressed wish will be satisfied: “if it is a baby boy the reality offered 
will give even greater satisfaction as it will coincide more pertinently with the 
unrecognized wish” (8). Firstly, today the acquisition of a penis is not an 
impossibility for a girl, surely resulting in different responses to and contexts 
for that wish. Furthermore, the assertion that the desire to have a baby turns 
the girl into a “little woman” reduces a woman to her reproductive capacities. 
Ultimately, Mitchell’s suggestion that a baby boy will be more pleasing to the 
woman because of her unsated childhood wish ignores the social reality that 
in many cultures and spheres, the arrival of a baby boy is more pleasing to a 
parent because of the higher relative value of a male child over a female, 
thus ignoring the sociological context which may contribute to this feeling of 
satisfaction. 
 Mitchell tries to justify Freud’s characterisation of the libido as 
masculine, claiming “certainly he calls it ‘masculine’ but this is precisely 
because of his attempt to define masculinity as activity – a feature both 
sexes can and do share” (28). This supposed universality does not explain 
why activity has been thus associated so fully with the masculine. Why is it 
necessary for that association to continue, when instead Freud, who has 
generated so many terms we now use freely, could have proposed a 
different, less gendered nomenclature to denote something we are all 
supposed to be able to do and share? How do we practically overcome the 
historical connection between maleness and activity, and by way of 
opposition, femaleness and passivity? Freud’s language precludes any true 
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equality of value for the sexes within his theories; whilst there are elements 
which admittedly remain useful and can perhaps be effectively appropriated 
for feminism, it is right for feminists to continue to challenge terminology and 
theories which encourage essentialism. 
 Having thus attempted a brief but nuanced engagement with Freudian 
psychoanalysis and feminist positions on Freud’s theories, we turn to 
Vickers’ literary assessment of the myth which informed the complex. What 
is fascinating about Where Three Roads Meet is that it manages to provide a 
subtle critique of Freud, the Oedipal complex, and psychoanalysis, whilst 
simultaneously mythologising and eulogising its creator in a markedly 
affectionate way. The topics of debate pertaining to psychoanalysis detailed 
here seem to act as pressure points in the tale, forcing Vickers’ Freud to 
respond to his critics, whilst the silences the author creates at various points 
in the narrative speak to Freud’s inability to understand or address particular 
issues. Overall, Where Three Roads Meet serves as an interesting example 
of the ways in which even an all-pervasive reading of a myth, symbolised by 
the Oedipus complex, can be expanded beyond its accepted limits. Whether 
consciously or unconsciously, Vickers is engaging in an Oedipal interrogation 
of her forebear, suggesting the “anxiety of authorship” theorised by Gilbert 
and Gubar, building upon Bloom’s “anxiety of influence” (1979). Rewriting 
could be understood as a form of Oedipal conflict, yet Vickers’ text indicates 
that a writer does not need to ‘murder’ her predecessor in order to question 




Freud as Mythmaker, Freud as Mythology 
 
Where Three Roads Meet details the final years of the ailing Freud’s life. The 
novella begins with an opening citation from Interpreting Dreams, detailing 
the section where Freud summarises the plot of Sophocles’ King Oedipus 
and offers the following assessment: 
Like Oedipus, we live in ignorance of the wishes so offensive to 
morality with which nature has burdened us and following the 
unveiling of which we should no doubt all rather look away from the 
scenes of our childhood. (xi) 
 
We do not return to the scene of Freud’s childhood and consider the scenes 
which he might rather turn away from. Instead, Vickers tackles the end of his 
life, querying perhaps whether Freud had, in his old age and infirmity, 
attained access to any previously elusive clarity. The conversational 
framework of the novel, where Tiresias and Freud act as each other’s 
confessor and analyst, allows the reader to consider the ways in which Freud 
may perhaps have lived in partial ignorance about aspects of his life beyond 
childhood and the ‘nuclear complex’ for which he earned his fame. That is 
not to say that the Oedipus complex is not at the heart of the novella; 
however, Tiresias’s retelling of his own life and the life of the ill-fated king 
returns to the source myth which inspired the complex, and there are 
moments where Freud is proven to have fatally misunderstood or overstated 
elements of that story. Neither a complete dismissal nor an endorsement of 
the Oedipus complex, Vickers instead problematizes the unitary reading of a 
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myth and suggests that the complex has further complexities which Freud 
either failed to apprehend or to theorise. 
 Thus, following the reference to Interpreting Dreams, Vickers opens 
the novella with a description of Freud’s years of relative decline, paying 
particular attention to the numerous botched surgeries he endured as part of 
the treatment for mouth cancer, from which he suffered for 16 years until his 
(suspected) physician-assisted suicide in 1939. In Vickers’ biographical 
summary, two main aspects are repeatedly stressed. The first is the physical 
pain and discomfort caused by Freud’s cancer treatment, and the way it 
incurred upon his ability to speak and ultimately, the quality of his life. She 
lists the “series of traumas and discouragements” Freud experienced during 
this period; the deaths of his beloved grandson Heinz and Heinz’s mother 
Sophie primary amongst these (7). Vickers vividly describes Freud’s 
“monster”, the prosthesis designed to aid speech given Freud’s missing 
palate. The monster became, therefore, “a necessary function of his clinical 
work” (8). Also emphasised in this brief opening account are the classical 
antiquities collected as domestic adornments, particularly his statue of 
Athena, “singled […] out among all his treasures […] When the family finally 
reached England Freud wrote, ‘We arrived rich and proud under the 
protection of Athena’ (11). She writes of the decision to have his ashes 
interred in a Greek urn. Storr has written about Freud’s collecting of 
antiquities, characterising him as a thoughtless and artless collector and 
ascribing his acquiring impulse to an obsessive personality (11). However, 
here they are identified as something more: the statue of Athena is 
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talismanic for a person forced to experience severe trauma (the loss of a 
child and a grandchild, fleeing Austria due to Nazi persecution, 33 separate 
mouth and nose operations). Vickers’ reminds us that in this latter portion of 
his life, communication was extremely difficult for him: 
The little bronze figure of Athena without her spear had pride of place 
on Freud’s desk, with other precious relics of past civilisations. Here 
[…] Freud continued to work: to think, to write, to talk to colleagues 
and his many distinguished visitors, and to analyse a few patients, 
though by this time his ability to speak was severely impeded by “the 
monster” and talking at any length was painful and tiring. In addition, 
as a result of the many operations and subsequent infections, he was 
all but deaf in his right ear. (11-12) 
 
The mention of Athena’s lack of spear is interesting; the absence of that 
phallic image and weapon of war suggests an emasculated goddess. Indeed, 
Vickers refers to Athena as the goddess of wisdom, but this multi-faceted 
deity’s purview also included warfare, handicrafts, the city of Athens, law and 
justice (Vickers 11; Cotterell 146) Athena is thus reduced, in Freud’s 
domestic realm, as a symbol of rationality and reason, removed from the 
physical activity of warfare. Interestingly, The Oxford Dictionary of World 
Mythology claims she “always remained the energetic goddess of action”, at 
odds with ancient Greek associations between femininity and passivity 
(Cotterell 147). It is all the more telling to see her thus estranged from the 
long characterisation of her as a “goddess of action”. Perhaps, as detailed 
earlier, this is due to Freud’s association of activity, particularly aggressive 
activity, with masculinity. Athena, as a notoriously chaste and virginal 
goddess, is also a curious mascot for a man who believed that anatomy is 
destiny (Freud and Freud 274) . Athena’s symbolic ‘rationality’ is unusual, 
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given the connection in classical philosophy between masculinity and 
reason. However, later in the text, Freud repeatedly diminishes the 
significance of her power during discussions with Tiresias, calling her his 
“little goddess” (39) and “little Athena” (31). Tiresias, however, does not 
consider Athena to be an emasculated or inactive source of passive wisdom; 
he reminds Freud that “if you cross her she can be ferocious” (31). Yet in the 
opening autobiographical section, the reader is left with three distinct 
impressions: Freud is an unwell man, a patient who has endured trauma and 
is unable to adequately carry out his clinical work. He is also, it is suggested, 
a man who is in need of treatment for his own mental suffering. Furthermore, 
he is someone who has used mythology to embellish or make sense of his 
life. As Freud attempts to draw comfort from a mythological past or bestow 
upon himself a certain timelessness through the collection of ancient 
artefacts, he is revealed to be all the more human and, as indicated by 
Tiresias’s interjections, fallible in his understanding. This brief insight into 
Freud’s life sets the scene for his direct dialogue with a famed character from 
mythology, the seer Tiresias.  
 References to Freud’s ability, or inability, to communicate, continue 
throughout his discussions with Tiresias. He frequently comments upon his 
own powers of speech: “I’m in no shape to speak to you now” (16), “half my 
mouth has gone down the drain” (17), “And you’ll forgive me if I don’t say 
much? Talking tires me” (23-4). He mentions his emotional suffering at his 
inability to comfort his dog, Lün, with reassurances that she will shortly be 
removed from quarantine (21-2). His dependence upon speaking and his 
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failing verbal powers thus foreground the power of speech and the emotional 
and intellectual space left empty when it fails. The discussions between the 
two characters are subsequently rich in relevance, both in what is articulated 
and what is not, or cannot be, given voice.  
The text speaks to Freud’s renowned status on numerous occasions. 
Tiresias is frequently admiring, respectful, and even occasionally sycophantic 
in his discussions with the psychoanalyst, calling him “my dear Doctor” (102), 
commenting gratefully upon the “precious time” Freud has bestowed upon 
him (101) and occasionally making references to Freud’s superior knowledge 
and work: “As you yourself have revealed, Dr Freud” (97). Tiresias even 
ascribes Anna Freud’s bravery in facing the Gestapo to the fact that she has 
Freud for a father: “It is good to have a courageous daughter. But not 
surprising in your case, Dr Freud” (17). Thus Vickers’ Tiresias is certainly 
respectful of the intellectual and cultural importance of the man he is 
speaking to. Freud even seems to be aware of his own mythos, stating 
“Forgive me, but it doesn’t take Sigmund Freud to see that it was your own 
father you wanted to kill when you had that hallucination in Delphi” (104). 
Using his own name as a signifier for an acute understanding of the human 
psyche and as a culturally recognised metonym indicating intellectual insight 
is indicative of Freud’s awareness of his own importance and status. Yet his 
self-valorisation is at times, a little overblown – he comments in welcome to 
Tiresias upon one of his visits “Introite, nam et hic dii sunt” (145). “Enter, for 
here too are gods”: Freud seems to almost be suggesting that he too is a 
kind of god, in keeping with the parallels Tiresias draws between 
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psychoanalysis and literature. Thus Vickers is not Oedipus or even Electra, 
killing off their forebears, for her interrogation of Freud through conversation 
with Tiresias is at all times respectful and affectionate.  
 However, there are several key moments where Vickers makes gentle 
attempts to dislocate Freud’s belief in the universal validity or primacy of his 
own interpretations of life and the human mind. On numerous occasions 
within the text, Tiresias tells Freud that he is incorrect, at least partially. He 
tells him “Think what you like”, when Freud is trying to rationalise Tiresias’s 
god Apollo as a “temporary psychotic inflation” (51). He is similarly, if not 
dismissive, sceptical, when Freud denies any similarities between the priests 
at Delphi and Freud’s own psychoanalytic practices. Freud claims that 
psychoanalysis is an exact science and Tiresias tells him “Whatever you say, 
Dr Freud” (48), before insisting that there are parallels between the two (49). 
Given that one of the chief criticisms of psychoanalysis is its failure to adhere 
to the standards expected of an exact science, we could infer that Vickers is 
here speaking to Freud’s failure to apprehend the elements of his “science” 
which defy empiricism and pure logic.  
Angie Voela has stated that “Myth was considered by post-Kantian 
philosophers as an early form of human thought, the ‘childhood of man’ or 
‘fiction that preceded Logos [It was] seen as the condition that paved the way 
for the advent of the Spirit, the latter being bound to maturity, language and 
the philosophical notion of arche (origin)” (6). Whist Stiegler does allow that 
this understanding has been replaced in more recent years, citing Detienne 
(1986), Freud himself believed that myth predated firstly faith and then 
248 
 
science and is thus the discourse of a more primitive human and society. 
However, Tiresias seems to question this conception of a linear chronology 
of epistemology. It is important to note, furthermore, that this supposed 
opposition of science and belief is rearing its head particularly at a time 
where science has entirely failed to cure Freud’s worsening condition. Freud 
has ultimately been let down by science and his work is not considered to be 
scientific, but he still is dismissive of Tiresias’s theistic religion, calling it a 
“displacement for repressed infantile desires” and the “primitive need to 
rationalise natural justice” (31). Yet Tiresias is quick to identify that Freud has 
not abandoned ‘irrational belief’ entirely: 
Whatever you say, Doctor. But I observe that you still treasure your 
“little Athena”, to whom, not wholly humorously, I suspect, you 
attribute your own safe passage here. 
- You are right to pick me up on that. The humour no doubt conceals 
some relic of superstitious animism. It is hard to surmount entirely our 
primitive mentality. 
 
The conversation continues and Freud asserts 
- My dear fellow, I have no god. 
- But is it not a religious matter that took you from your home and 
brought you here? 
- Please continue with your own story. I’ve had enough of mine. (31) 
 
Tiresias is here referring to Freud’s faith bringing him to England, escaping 
persecution in Austria. He is thus drawing attention to the fact that despite 
the anti-theism Freud has always endorsed, there is a religious cultural 
association which still has significant meaning for Freud and thus its 
dismissal seems simplistic. Freud’s attempt to shut down this particular line 
of Tiresias’s interrogation seems to speak to his inability to verbalise such 
conflicts within himself – unlike the “wishes offensive to morality” he seeks to 
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uncover, this wish of Freud’s, to find some form of comfort or point of 
recognition in what he has always claimed to be irrational, seems to be a 
wish offensive to his own intellectual position. This moment of defensiveness 
also seems to suggest a certain liminality in terms of who is analysing who in 
this discussion. Freud is encouraging Tiresias, who has come to him to talk, 
to continue with his own story, but his reasoning is not that it is because the 
story is about Tiresias or that they ought to focus on only one story, but that 
Freud feels an exhaustion when it comes to discussing his own life. There is 
the suggestion here of ego defences coming into play and preventing Freud 
from adopting a more critical view of his own recent behaviour. 
 Vickers also speaks through Tiresias’s commentary on Freud’s lived, 
historical experience, particularly regarding Hitler. Freud died in 1939 and 
would not live to hear the full details of the brutality of the Nazi regime, 
particularly the death of four of his sisters in the Nazi camps. However, 
having been forced to flee his homeland, he was naturally aware of the 
damaging potential of the regime. His describes Hitler as “A narcissist with 
half a set of testicles, a colossal inferiority complex and a compensating 
grandiosity, that’s our little Adolf. Paranoid” (23). The fact that this discussion 
quickly moves on to observations of Mrs Woolf (Virginia)’s mental health 
problems is indicative of a coping strategy which leads to a reductive 
engagement with contemporary politics. This deliberately underplays the 
enormous upheaval that he, and his entire family, had extremely recently 
experienced as a result of “little Adolf” (23). This speedy diagnosis of Hitler 
later leads to euphemism, when he bemoans the fact that the “little corporal’s 
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activities” have prevented him from attending a performance of Mahler’s 
Ninth (145). His use of “little” seems to echo the diminutive qualifier he uses 
for Athena, indicating that perhaps, whether the power is used positively or 
malignly, Freud has an irresistible urge to diminish figures or ideas who, 
whether metaphorically in the case of Athena or literally in the case of Hitler, 
have power over him.  
Hitler enters the conversation again when Freud and Tiresias discuss 
absolutist approaches to truth, which Freud characterises as “a dark horse”. 
Tiresias suggests the truth may offer differing perspectives, to which Freud 
responds: “In my view, our best hope of survival is that reason will establish 
a dictatorship, finally, over the human psyche”. Tiresias counters this with 
“‘Dictatorship’, Dr Freud? I see. Might not your little corporal agree with you 
there?” (50). Tiresias is thus underlining Freud’s intractability, whilst also 
clearly indicating that while the road to absolute reason leads to dictatorship, 
Freud himself is clearly not capable of behaving in entirely rational ways, as 
symbolised by his Athena statuette. These fleeting references to Hitler also 
seem to speak to a certain extent to Freud’s inability to firmly situate himself 
and his thinking in his own historical moment. Countless detractors of 
psychoanalysis have challenged the theory’s lack of engagement with the 
inevitable influence of a person’s socio-political environment upon their 
psychological state. As his theories progressed, as Matt Aibel has claimed, 
“Freud in effect disavowed the salience of cultural trauma” (16). Indeed, 
Aibel, drawing upon the research listed, endorses the view that the traumatic 
experience of growing up poor and Jewish in a society with deeply held anti-
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semitic views may have led to him to become disassociated from “the 
sociocultural/political buffeting he himself suffered” (17). It may also, Aibel 
believes, have been part of his desire for his theories to be seen as purely 
scientific. Yet here, in his euphemisms, generalisations and avoidance of 
discussion of his “own story”, Vickers is revealing the limitations of Freud’s 
ability to speak to politics, history, and perhaps his own trauma. Indeed, the 
insistence upon science at a time when science was interpreted in such a 
way as to facilitate complete moral degradation, highlights Freud’s own 
hypocrises, as well as offering a more general commentary on that which 
may be considered to be an “exact science”. 
 There is another interesting area where Vickers subtly reveals Freud’s 
confidence in his own interpretation to be misplaced. The novella is full of 
references to birds – their songs and behaviour are frequently mentioned. 
Tiresias often was said to gain his oracular insights from birdsong; he asserts 
their timeless importance when he says “Aeons before men spoke or walked 
on two legs the birds were here” (26). Birds are therefore, quite literally, pre-
Oedipal creatures, and they are also often associated with the feminine. A 
bird is often, in colloquial slang, a word for a woman, and Blake’s painting 
shows Eve naming the birds, though the Bible attributed all naming rights to 
Adam (Genesis 2.20). Birds are for Tiresias a source of insight which goes 
beyond language. He chastises Freud for placing too much importance upon 
language, characterising words as a “fabrication, a reflection of things as 
they are. At the same time […] words can shape our future, which is why the 
judgments of the oracle were ambiguous, riddling; though not, as some have 
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concluded, intended to confound” (57). Following this discussion, he 
intimates his desire to remove himself to the heath and the “blessedly 
wordless birds” (58). Birds become, therefore, symbolic of a higher form of 
meaning which cannot be adequately represented by language and must 
always be a fabrication. 
 Birds are the source of another conflict between Tiresias and Freud: 
There were chaffinches “pinking” on the heath. Walking to you, 
Doctor, memories fly to my mind like returning swallows […] You know 
the little finches with the scarlet polls and gold-barred wings?  
- I’m afraid even in German I’m not conversant with the names of 
birds. 
- Eight of them. A charm.  
- What hocus-pocus are you proposing to confound me with now? 
- Calm down, my dear Dr Freud. A “charm” is the term for a number of 
goldfinches. (69) 
 
Freud admits that his awareness of language does not extend to an avian 
lexicon. Indeed, he misunderstands Tiresias’s use for the collective noun for 
goldfinches, and a defensive response protecting himself from the feared 
“hocus-pocus” is the result. Indeed, the use of “confound” here echoes 
Tiresias’s statement that the oracle was not intended to confound – Freud 
seems oversensitive to suggestions of mystical powers which he will not be 
able to make sense of. In this example, “charm” is just a collective noun and 
not intended to be indicative of anything more, yet Freud’s reaction is highly 
suggestive.  
 The acknowledgement of his lack of knowledge of the names of birds 
is significant for other reasons. When Tiresias discusses his early passion for 
birds and his grandmother’s recognition of his prescience, Freud observes: 
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You remind me of another man, who also believed that he was 
predestined to study the flight of birds. It was his fantasy that a 
vulture’s tail brushed his mouth when he lay in his crib as a baby […] 
The vulture, of course, was a disguised refashioning of his repressed 
adult desire for fellatio. (36)  
 
This is referring to Freud’s analysis of the writings of Leonardo da Vinci, and 
is in fact, representative of a proven error due to misinterpretation. Da Vinci’s 
writings indicate homosexual inclinations and also detail an early memory of 
a large bird opening his mouth with its beak. Freud read this, as Vickers 
indicates, an expression of homosexuality. But Freud associated the bird 
with the mother, translating the bird in question as a vulture and citing 
numerous examples of the association between motherhood and vultures in 
Egyptian mythology. Yet this was a mistranslation on his part; the bird was in 
fact, a kite, which does not share the same mythological connotations (Storr 
96). Thus when Vickers’ Freud says that he does not know the name of 
birds, and when he misunderstands Tiresias’s use of the word ‘charm’, the 
narrative is making visible the gaps in Freud’s thinking and psychoanalysis’s 
potential to misread memory. Later in the text, Freud claims to be beginning 
to read about birds and discovers that the goldfinch is a symbol of Jesus 
Christ. Tiresias responds and asks if Christ is the man who died and returned 
to life, like Dionysos? (89). This suggests again the ways in which symbols 
are time and context bound; in the Judeo-Christian world the symbols of 
Christ may be broadly recognised, but they are not for Tiresias and they 
would not have the same currency elsewhere in the world.  
 We will return to discuss birds, and in particular their connection with 
femininity, later in this chapter. But this section will conclude with a final 
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consideration of how Freud has, according to Vickers, read the Oedipal 
myth, the myth which inspired (or revealed) his most famous theory of 
psychosexual development.  
 Tiresias acknowledges the cultural significance of Freud’s re-telling, 
acknowledging that he has forever shaped our interpretations of that story. 
Yet there is, from the perspective of Tiresias, something fundamental about 
the mythical narrative which Freud fails to appreciate. Freud asks Tiresias if 
he is insulting him or complimenting him when he says that no one hears the 
same story now. Tiresias answers: 
Here in all the world was the one person you could safely say didn’t 
have the complex you dreamed up for him. He was Oedipus, plain 
Oedipus. But not simple. What was complex about him was not that 
he wanted to sleep with his mother (as she herself said, that impulse 
is not so uncommon) nor even that he killed a man who had once 
threatened his life […] What was so remarkable was that his own 
safekeeping was usurped by the need to know what he needed not to 
know. He needed to know it so imperatively that he pushed on, 
against everyone’s effort to prevent him, even – most powerful – his 
own. It was as if his very life hung upon the thread of knowledge 
which could destroy it. (169) 
 
Tiresias thus indicates that Oedipus’s driving motivation is different to those 
suffering from Freud’s Oedipus complex. He is not sublimating his desires for 
his mother or his aggression towards his father, for in all of his actions he is 
pushing himself constantly toward self-knowledge. Repression, prompted by 
social taboo, is not relevant here, for Oedipus has acted in direct response to 
the curse laid upon him. If Oedipus, therefore, did not suffer from his own 
eponymous complex, then could we not, by extension, infer that this is not 
the universal event Freud assumes it must be? Certainly there is a tacit 
suggestion in the text that Freud’s mythos, whilst powerful, culturally 
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significant, and indicative of certain behaviours and practices, cannot be held 
to be a unitary and universal narrative.  
 Throughout the novella, Vickers draws parallels between mythology 
and psychoanalysis. They both attempt to make sense of the space between 
what we know and understand and what we cannot know and understand. 
They both have huge cultural importance and are both dependent upon their 
own status as narratives for survival. Yet what Vickers proves is that neither 
ought to be fixed or prescriptive, and that ultimately even Freud’s deployment 
of mythology is not immune to an expansion or interrogation of meaning and 
significance. Freud’s construction of the Oedipus complex is, more than 
anything, a ‘gendering’ narrative detailing how we come to be and recognise 
ourselves within our sexed bodies. Yet this gendering narrative does not fully 
explain how femininity comes to be. Vickers, as we shall now see, directly 
confronts this through the use of female silence and exclusion, and thus uses 
the wordlessness of her “blessed birds” as a silent chastisement to her 
muse, Freud. 
 
Femininity Speaking Through Silence: Anna Freud, Antigone and 
Jocasta 
 
There are ways in which Freudian psychoanalysis has failed to make sense 
of or adequately represent femininity, female lived experience, and the 
female body. A primary example of this oversight is, according to Horrocks, 
its lack of consideration of the female breast. In another of the short stories 
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from her 2010 Aphrodite’s Hat collection, interestingly called “The Sphinx”, a 
passing mention is made of a psychoanalyst at a dinner party: “[he] had been 
lecturing the rest of the table on the manifestations, late in life, of addiction to 
the breast, shoved his oar in at that point […] somewhat aggressively 
bringing up the Oedipus complex. But Sylvie was too intrigued by her young 
man to be led into the misty labyrinth of psychoanalytic theory” (134). The 
love affair between mature Sylvie and the far younger Jamie clearly has 
Oedipal implications but what is curious is the mention of the breast, which 
Freud tended to ignore but that this male psychoanalyst is certainly now pre-
occupied with. It is interesting too that Sylvie likens psychoanalysis to the 
labyrinth, that mythological installation of entrapment and puzzlement. Where 
Vickers’ dinner party bore speaks loudly about the breast, Freud himself was 
curiously silent. 
 Freud’s limitations in terms of his theorising femininity are, like the 
labyrinth, both restrictive and puzzling. His famed failure with patient Dora 
was because, according to Nolan and O’Mahony, he failed to understand her 
femininity (2).49 Where Three Roads Meet seems to make the reader aware, 
through very obvious gaps and a repeated questioning, of where 
psychoanalysis, as a conversation between analyst and patient, conscious 
and the unconscious, individual and society, falls silent. 
 A key example of this is how the novella depicts, or rather, does not 
depict, Freud’s daughter Anna. Anna was the only one of Freud’s children to 
 
49 They add: “His description of women as more vain, more jealous, more dependent, more 
submissive and less moral, less active and less able to love than men was indeed far from 
friendly and bound to provoke a negative response” (2).  
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continue his clinical legacy and was certainly a psychologist of great 
importance. However, despite her significance in Freud’s life and her 
importance in the history of psychoanalysis, she never once appears directly 
within the text. Her presence is constantly inferred and remarked upon, but 
she never makes herself known to the reader. In fact, when she does infringe 
upon the discussion between Freud and Tiresias, she is constantly 
established as disruptive to their dialogue. 
 The failed communication between father and daughter is established 
early in the novella. Freud does not tell Anna, or even his wife Martha, that 
he is going into hospital, and yet they are still expected to bring over his night 
things (3-4). As mentioned earlier, Anna’s bravery in the face of Gestapo 
questioning is attributed by Tiresias to her brave father (17). We are told of 
Anna’s faithful nursing and see evidence of this in her constant interruptions 
with the tea tray, but we never see this in action, nor do we hear the voice of 
Freud’s famous daughter.  
 Anna’s first appearance with the tea tray is established as something 
Freud must “warn” Tiresias about. He comments “I shall try not to interrupt 
again, though I must warn you that my daughter will bring in my tea tray at 
five. She is most punctual, my Anna. But till then we can make believe we 
are free men” (28). Despite Anna’s punctuality, she remains a threat to warn 
Tiresias about, performing her timely duties for her father and preventing 
him, as he wryly suggests, from being a free man. Her entering into their 
masculine therapy space, Freud suggests, would restrict them both. Upon 
another occasion, Anna’s interruption comes at a key moment. Tiresias 
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describes a visit to Daulis, one of the sanctuaries of Athena, and his 
association between the “wine-dark swallows” and his mother. Freud 
responds: 
- My little goddess. And your mother […] ah, I am sorry, this will be my 
daughter with the tray and the best china. The Viennese vagrants 
have transmogrified into bourgeois English already. (39) 
 
The symbolic connection between Tiresias’s mother and the birds, as well as 
the mention of Athena, is something which Freud would surely wish to 
comment upon. Yet Anna serves as a useful interruption, preventing him 
from engaging with two things we can argue Freud had difficulty in 
interpreting: birds, femininity and particularly, motherhood. Anna is 
performing a ritual, one that Freud acknowledges to be an enactment of 
cultural expectations, but does this without us actually being able to observe 
or gauge her investment in the performance. She is reduced to the tea tray 
itself, Freud’s own “best china”. Later, Tiresias does not even mention her by 
name: 
I hear the guardian of the tea tray beginning to snuffle. The sacred 
vessel is about to arrive. 
 - I can send it away again. (107) 
 
The casual disregard for Anna’s punctual administrations of care – “I can 
send it away again” – is further enhanced by their failure to even mention her 
now by name. Her arrival is heralded by the sniffing of a dog, and as soon as 
she enters their space, conversation is to desist. Indeed, when Tiresias 
refers to the “sacred vessel”, he could be referring to the tea tray itself or to 
Anna. The significance of reducing Anna to a vessel – of tea, of her father’s 
bravery, of his clinical work – suggest that this is how Freud, and by 
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extension Tiresias, have come to view Freud’s primary caregiver. She is not 
a person, whose name or time is to be respected. She is instead merely a 
vessel. Indeed, she is merely a signifier of the cultural expectations of a 
daughter. It is possible to extend this reading of Anna to aspects of Freud’s 
reading of women. They are vessels for children, objects for masculine 
children’s psychosexual interest, and carriers of the meaning which men like 
Freud will give them. At other points, Anna’s care is seen as reducing Freud, 
and he connects his weakness to femininity, calling himself an “old woman” 
when he wears the shawl Anna insists upon (59).  We begin to see from 
Freud a pattern of fear or avoidance in the face of female-provided care. 
 The text silences Anna, but her presence silences her father. Her 
arrival ends his conversations with Tiresias and her administrations are seen 
as ways to entrap or weaken him. Femininity is, elsewhere in the text, seen 
as silencing; the part-female Sphinx is noted to impede speech and is 
compared to Freud’s prosthesis (99). Tiresias discusses Pelops, who served 
his son in a stew for the gods, and remarks that “one of them, Demeter, was 
abstracted by the loss of a beloved daughter and took a bite out of the boy’s 
shoulder which they couldn’t restore”, and attributes the beginning of the 
curse of the House of Atreus (including Laius, Agamemnon and later, 
Elektra) “to that rape” (103-4). It is interesting that Tiresias comments on 
Demeter’s grief as abstraction, even as he describes the situation which 
befell her daughter Persephone in euphemistic terms – a loss. It is not 
merely Persephone’s rape which caused the various curses and 
catastrophes caused and experienced by the House of Atreus, but its 
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abstraction. An inability to speak to such experiences leads to familial 
breakdown and Freud’s failure to talk to his daughter in this context is even 
more interesting. Significant too is his reference to women as “gorgons in 
petticoats”, prompting “a mere man to freeze into submission” (41). This 
reference, again to Anna, characterises her as another female monster. The 
gorgons are an interesting example of a mythological monster, given that 
their snake-heads and ability to turn men to stone were cursed upon them by 
Freud’s “little goddess” for being raped in her temple.50 Not only is Anna 
being unfairly characterised here by her father, but the most famous of the 
gorgons, Medusa, has become synonymous with evil intent due to being 
punished for her own victimhood. This statement contains layers of 
misrepresentation of femininity.   
 Later in the novella, Anna is about to “interrupt” once more, but Freud 
this time asks if he can introduce her to Tiresias. Tiresias declines, however, 
assuming that Anna will not see him in the recess: “if your daughter notices 
me at all she will take me for one of your precious antiquities” (155). Despite 
the offer of a flesh and blood introduction to Anna, she remains elusive and 
furthermore, it is assumed that she does not have the insight or gifts 
necessary to see what her father does. If Tiresias is a figment of Freud’s 
morphine-addled imagination, then even his fantasies do not credit Anna with 
the perception or access to knowledge that he has. In the next paragraph, he 
“play[s] with a few crumbs of scone, for Anna’s sake”, acknowledging his part 
 
50 See earlier discussions about Medusa (p35) 
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in the father/daughter performance which they are now enacting. Yet in this 
same section Freud is finally able to voice some of his trauma, 
acknowledging the pain he experienced at the death of his grandson, Heinz. 
He claims he would rather have lost an arm than this precious child, before 
remarking that he has “brushed the scone crumbs from my whiskers and am 
ready to listen like an obedient child” (156-7). This is how Freud views 
himself when being cared for by Anna, an obedient child consuming the 
scone she provides. Yet by accepting this position of obedience and 
submitting to Anna’s care, he is allowing himself to access traumatic 
memories. This confession of trauma from Freud also comes to the fore as 
Tiresias discusses Oedipus being bound and left as an infant. The point of 
recognition for Freud here, the moment of empathy which allows him to 
consider his own pain, is the thought of Oedipus being treated cruelly and 
abandoned. But Freud has not been abandoned, and is instead being cared 
for by the ever-present Anna, allowing him to continue with the story despite 
his pain. The fact that there is a clear psychological recognition here, beyond 
the Oedipus complex, is interesting. So too are his projections of motherhood 
onto Anna, indicating a different framework for familial relationships 
previously unaccommodated within the restrictive bounds of the Oedipus 
complex. After all, what defines Anna here is not her anatomy – she is not a 
bodied presence within the text. Rather, it is the gendered nature of the 
position she is occupying: daughter and carer. Ultimately, despite Anna’s 
primary importance within Freud’s life – she is, at this point, keeping him 
alive – she is still not afforded a ‘live’ space in the text and still not given the 
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same access to insight as her father. The position she has been allowed to 
occupy does not provide her with access to that – the absence of her body 
indicates that her destiny cannot be ascribed to her anatomy, but to her 
experiences.  
 Freud compares Anna to Antigone, Oedipus and Jocasta’s daughter. 
Antigone is an enduring symbol of familial fidelity. In Oedipus at Colonus 
(Sophocles), she is a stalwart supporter of her father in exile, even in the 
face of her brothers’ deathly quarrels. The plot of Antigone (also by 
Sophocles) focuses on her efforts to ensure the respectful burial of her 
brother Polynices. She is buried alive in a tomb as punishment for defying 
her uncle Creon’s orders, and when he relents and goes to release her, finds 
that she has hanged herself.51 The very name Antigone means "in place of 
a mother" in Greek, from anti- "opposite, in place of" and gone" 
womb, childbirth, generation”, according to the Online Etymology Dictionary.52 
She is a character who is defined entirely by her familial relationships and 
when Freud compares his Anna to Antigone, he is casting her as both 
mother and daughter. Freud finds great comfort in this analogy, likening 
 
51 Interestingly, Euripides wrote a version of Antigone, where Dionysus intervenes to save 
Antigone. This version is now lost, bar some fragments (Paton). In Where Three Roads 
Meet, Tiresias suspects that it was not Apollo, but Dionysos (sic) who influenced the oracles 
at Delphi pertaining to Oedipus’ curse (105). However, this version has been lost. In 
Euripides’ other play on the subject, Jocasta does not kill herself after discovering that 
Oedipus is her son but at the mutual deaths of Polynices and Eteocles. Antigone ends her 
engagement to Haemon and accompanies her father into exile (The Phoenissae). Once 
again, it is obvious how different versions of myths can obtain primacy over others, but 
indeed, the existence of varying versions is surely testament to the desire to constantly re-
tell these tales even early on in their reception history.  
52 https://www.etymonline.com/word/Antigone#etymonline_v_13535 Accessed 14/03/2019. 
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Anna’s faithful service to him in exile to Antigone’s support for her father 
following his expulsion from Thebes. Freud and Tiresias discuss this: 
 - It was the daughters who stood by him? 
 - The girls, Antigone and Ismene. Especially Antigone.  
 - Like my Anna! (177) 
 
For Freud, the point of comparison between Anna and Antigone is her faithful 
support of her father. But by extension, Freud is becoming Oedipus. Yet this 
Oedipal experience is not coming at the beginning of his life, between the 
ages of 3 and 6. It has extended beyond childhood and is instead occurring 
as he nears death. Indeed, with Anna functioning both as his daughter and 
as his mother, she is occupying plural roles; Freud-as-Oedipus’ central role 
in this is of note. Perhaps the conclusion here is the inevitable circularity of 
all female familial relationships. If Anna is an aging Freud’s maternal 
projection, even as she is also associated with Antigone, at once daughter 
and sister, then we see that the fraught and possessive male/mother 
relationship has not yet been resolved. It is not merely a matter of 
psychosexual development in the early years of life, but an ongoing 
renegotiation at different stages of our lives as each family member responds 
to and asserts different needs. Anna is not identified as Freud’s mother due 
to her genitals, but to the care she is giving him. He becomes an “obedient 
child” when he eats the food she gives him. Thus we see that motherhood is 
not merely a matter of anatomy, but of performed feminine behaviour, 
particularly physical care. Indeed, Freud’s identification here with Oedipus at 
a different stage of his life than the supposed Oedipal phase not only 
grounds the deeply personal connection Freud feels with the myth, but that 
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its simplicity and universality have been somewhat overstated. Tiresias 
characterises Antigone as Oedipus’s “prop till the end”, commenting that the 
exiled king “inspired loyalty” (179). Again, the connection between Oedipus 
and Freud is stressed, but so too is Anna/Antigone’s usefulness merely as a 
support to her father and a reflection upon his good qualities. Indeed, 
Antigone’s desire to stay with her father is attributed to her possessing “his 
stubbornness”. Neither daughter is permitted, within the space of the text, to 
speak or act independently of her father; this is highlighted throughout by the 
obvious silencing of Anna Freud each time she visits with the tea tray. 
 Ultimately, it is Anna’s behaviour and relationship to Freud which 
characterises her in a gendered way, rather than her physicality, which is 
noticeably missing from the text. What we are seeing is how gender is 
predicated upon positionality and relational behaviour; Anna is a woman 
because she is recognised as such and because she behaves in the ways 
expected of a woman. We do not witness the behaviour but instead receive it 
filtered through the male recipient of Anna’s attentions and thus arrive at her 
construction as woman. This forces us to also consider the acts of definition 
Freud and Tiresias are undergoing when they relate to each other, 
suggesting that neither of them is the autonomous “free men” they would 
wish to be, with or without Anna’s supposedly invasive influence.   
The stifling of a second key female figure is repeatedly interrogated 
throughout the text, another female figure who is also defined by the 
gendered positions she occupies. However, whilst Anna’s sexuality and 
sexed body are completely removed from the narrative, Jocasta’s sexuality 
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and her body, are given a new importance, particularly her breasts. Jocasta, 
as Oedipus’ mother and lover, is, as Tiresias notes, curiously missing from 
much of Freud’s discussion of and extrapolation from the source myth. He 
says to his friend “I have thought of her so often and wondered why you 
made so little of her in your account of the story” (149). Vickers, on the other 
hand, foregrounds Jocasta’s impulses and motivations from the outset, in her 
use of Spyros Harbouris’ poem “An Old Story” as one of the text’s epigraphs. 
The poem suggests Jocasta’s awareness and sexuality, commenting on how 
she used a sexual relationship to keep her son close to her. Yet even more 
than being “Afraid of him should he choose free”, her first concern is that she 
is “mistress in my house still”, suggesting the importance she places on her 
powerful queenly role – a position she wishes to continue to occupy. 
Ultimately, “An Old Story” speaks to both Jocasta’s understanding and her 
agency: 
 […] This my subtle scheme. 
 You know the plot, here is the theme: 
 I, Jocasta, knowingly said 
 “Bring my son to my bed”. (xii) 
 
Thus we are presented initially with a version of the Queen who not only is 
aware on some level of her husband’s identity, but in order to keep him close 
and to retain her important position, is willing to “scheme” and conduct their 
incestuous relationship. The importance of the “I, Jocasta” shows how she is 
now speaking that which has never been previously said and she is 
vocalising this truth for herself and on her own behalf.  
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 Whilst the Jocasta discussed by Tiresias and Freud is not nearly so 
blatant in her machinations, she is still the subject of many of Tiresias’s 
questions for Freud. This highlights Freud’s curious avoidance of Jocasta in 
his initial theorising, but also demonstrates how incomprehensible her 
actions are to her male observers. She is presented as a riddle even more 
enigmatic than the Sphinx; whilst “An Old Story” offers one version of 
Jocasta, Vickers’ Jocasta is remarkable not for her absence or her sexual 
agency, but for her inscrutability. 
 Tiresias confronts Freud’s abstraction of Jocasta, but is not able to 
adequately account for her own mental processes himself, despite his unique 
ability to access knowledge. Of course, if he is a fantasy of Freud’s, then this 
is simply an extension of Freud’s own ability to understand her, but that 
Freud cannot even imagine a being who can make sense of Jocasta is 
noteworthy. Tiresias frames any discussion of Jocasta with questions:  
So ask yourself this, Dr Freud. How could she not […] have recalled 
another small-statured man with the same temper and copper-
coloured hair, and not have asked herself a question? (107) 
 
Who can tell what she was thinking by then, the woman for thirty-six 
years had a mortal secret to hide? (149) 
 
Was it really regard for her husband’s life – or that she cared so 
passionately for the boy she couldn’t endure the prospect that he 
might ever leave her? (149) 
 
But how, in the name of all that’s sacred, how could she not have 
known that the man she lay with nightly, in the bed vacated by his 
father, was that same man’s offspring, her own lost son? You are the 
expert, Dr Freud, but don’t tell me she didn’t know.  




Here we see the ultimate riddle of Jocasta. How can she be understood 
without first judging whether she knew or did not know of the true identity of 
her son-husband? Indeed, Jocasta can be seen as the ultimate, single 
embodiment of the whore-Madonna complex, both lover and mother, the two 
identities in constant conflict and inevitable, circular recurrence. Yet despite 
Freud’s assertion that “she knew all right”, this is not something he 
considered of import within his earlier work on the Oedipal complex. The 
mother is a blank canvas upon which the Oedipal child can project their 
sexual feelings. Tiresias says that it is perhaps “the blank mind” which 
prevented Jocasta from knowing, and attributes her behaviour to the 
“apparent erasure of the terrible secret she had buried inside her” (107). 
While Freud believes Jocasta knew on the unconscious level, neither of the 
two speakers consider that Jocasta may be more than a “blank mind” upon 
which they can project, that she may have in fact behaved throughout with 
complete, conscious knowledge of her own behaviour. They can attribute it 
to her desire to be restored to her missing son, but despite acknowledging 
the sexual nature of her relationship, they do not understand or confront her 
sexuality as a potential motive. This speaks in part to Freud’s failure to 
appropriately theorise female sexuality and sexual deviance. Jocasta 
becomes a cipher for all that Freud cannot, or chooses not, to try and 
comprehend. Tiresias says that to have Oedipus back was “her deepest, 
never-to-be-spoken desire: to recover to her womb her precious first- born 
son” (161). Yet “An Old Story” sees a Jocasta who plots to achieve this 
desire, and within the poem speaks of it openly. Jocasta becomes a cipher 
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for all that Freud cannot, or chooses not, to try and comprehend. Jocasta, 
like Anna, occupies more than one role and position, and her gendered 
identity ultimately derives from these positions, because with one version of 
the Queen who is forthrightly sexual and another who is ultimately 
unknowable, we discover that the only signs we can read regarding gender 
come from interpretations of positionality.  
 Returning to Horrocks’s concern regarding Freud’s lack of 
engagement with the breast as a sexual symbol, there are here two 
significant mentions of Jocasta’s breast. One is the mention of her feeding 
Oedipus at her breast for three days before casting him out, highlighting that 
even if it was not included in Freud’s phallic framework, the breast has an 
important role to play in child development.  
Before he was taken from his mother’s breast, Oedipus had lain with 
her three days and three blissful nights. She told us so herself, that 
dreadful day in the throne room, three days and three nights during 
which the thought of the male child, lying in bed with his mother, must 
have been a living death to his father. (173) 
 
The fact that Oedipus’ presence at his mother’s breast brings her bliss 
indicates that she is not just a vessel emptying of sustenance but that mother 
and baby are engaged in a mutually beneficial act. Furthermore, this 
suggests that the ‘Oedipal’ relationship Oedipus had with his mother was in 
part attributed to the connection brought about by breast-feeding. The 
second mention of breast comes when Oedipus blinds himself with “two 
bronze brooch-pins from the breast of his mother-wife’s dangling corpse”. 
These brooch pins are the very same as those used to pierce his ankles as 
an infant. The reference to Jocasta’s breast and the fact that the pins used to 
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blind him came from her breast could be read as a counter to Freudian 
psychoanalysis’s blind refusal to consider the symbolic importance of the 
breast. Being removed from his mother’s breast the first time led to Oedipus 
being maimed, and a second removal resulted in him maiming himself. This 
absence therefore becomes a charged space and prompts us to question 
once more Freud’s omittance of the breast from his discussions. Tiresias 
acknowledges that Jocasta and Oedipus were fated to endure this suffering, 
but he clearly acknowledges their connection through the breast: “It was in 
the blood of that mismatched couple’s ill-starred son; imbibed with his 
mother’s milk and drilled into his bone” (174). 
 Ultimately, despite their fluctuating judgments on Jocasta’s 
motivations, they fail to entirely apprehend her character or behaviour. 
Tiresias can imagine her behaviour: “she, I could almost see it, all but 
danced in her little gold-heeled sandals for joy” (150); “I would bet on it she 
patted his hand” (151). Yet he cannot actually see how she behaves for he 
was blinded many years before Oedipus blinds himself. The behaviours he 
imagines are entirely stereotypically feminine – dancing in gold sandals, 
patting hands. But he can only almost see her. Despite the fact that she 
“enunciated with frightening precision”, her voice was, to Tiresias, “all but 
unrecognisable”. Then, when she is found dead, he narrates: 
He found his mother-wife in the bedchamber, hanging from the massy 
upper beam of the royal bed by a noose of her own devising: a child’s 
swaddling bands. 





Tiresias is making the assumption here that the swaddling bands belong to 
Oedipus; they could well have belonged to one of the four children they had 
together. He is attempting to project motive onto her yet he cannot, 
ultimately, answer her Sphinx-like riddle. Freud and Tiresias may speak 
endlessly about Jocasta, yet they cannot speak to her. As with Anna Freud, 
she is an important presence who the reader struggles to make sense of due 
to the two speakers’ own ambivalence. The multiplicity of the gendered 
positions both women occupy lead to confusion on the part of the men who 
wish to observe them, and suggest the failure of limited archetypes to 
accommodate nuanced representations of gender. 
 Vickers’ novella does not, as the epigraph from Heraclitus suggests, 
“conceal or reveal” feminism’s critique of Freudian psychoanalysis. It merely 
provides “a sign”. In this context, the silences created as Freud and Tiresias 
perform their talking cure are signs, spaces in their discourse which ought to 
be considered. Anna Freud’s silent omnipresence, in addition to Freud’s 
telling references to her in mythological terms, speaks to his failure to truly 
communicate with her or apprehend her femininity. The way she impedes his 
speech and makes him feel weak, or like a child, points to Freud’s fear of 
feminine care, and the way he characterises her performed behaviours as 
maternal undermines his own assertions that anatomy alone must be 
destiny. Furthermore, whilst Freud and Tiresias talk around Jocasta, their 
ultimate failure to decipher the signs she gave – “Who can say for what 
purpose?” – indicates an inability to comprehend or theorise female 
motivations when they are complex or contradictory. The Jocasta of “An Old 
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Story” does not sublimate her desires; in fact, it is Freud and Tiresias who 
are here repressing the possibility of Jocasta as an actor with full agency and 
sexual desires beyond all recognised moral frameworks. Vickers’ loaded 
references to Jocasta’s breast highlights the breast’s absence from Freud’s 
theories and uses her mythological rewrite to expand and refocus 
psychoanalytic approaches to this most complex complex. 
 The final section of this chapter will address another way in which 
Vickers’ conversational novella speaks in signs: this time, to modernism and 
its methods of creating meaning through fragmentation and silence. 
 
I Tiresias: Myth and Meaning 
 
A sign, like those provided by the novella and by the oracle, may be 
understood as a repressed emotion manifesting itself from the unconscious 
into lived behaviour. It could be a slip of the tongue, a dream, or as in 
psychoanalytic history, the need to urinate (Anna O.) or a cough (Dora). This 
thesis has hitherto suggested the ways in which the feminist rewritings in the 
Canongate Myths series indicate a shift from postmodernism and a yearning 
for that which might be perceived as “authentic”. This move away from 
postmodernism’s dismissal of unitary truth, and the series’ demonstrated 
interest in various mythological and critical metanarratives, extends to 
Vickers’ myth. Where Three Roads Meet, along with the other challenging 
texts in this series, could perhaps be considered a sign manifested by 
contemporary literature as it engages with all that it has repressed. It does 
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not necessarily present meaning, nor argue for its destruction, but is 
indicative of the ongoing meaning-making processes we are all engaged in 
and cannot avoid.  
 The previous chapter has suggested that Girl meets boy adopts a 
metamodernist approach, using modernism as both an archive and an 
attitude to riff against. Where Three Roads Meet is similarly haunted by the 
ghosts of literary modernism and Vickers plunders that archive to give weight 
to her rewriting. The text contains a number of significant references to 
modernist figures and works; one of its two protagonists, Tiresias, is an 
important and instantly recognisable figure within the modernist canon. Just 
as no one can hear the story of Oedipus the same way now that Freud has 
retold it, the character of Tiresias has been shaped by his primary role within 
T.S. Eliot’s The Waste Land. A brief concluding consideration of 
modernism’s engagement with mythology, and Vickers’ use of that literary 
heritage, may help to advance one of the central arguments: that all of the 
Canongate Myths are suggestive of a new kind of twenty-first century 
literature. The Vickers’ myth, much like Girl meets boy, also suggests that 
this new context may allow (or indeed prompt) female writers to connect with 
or speak to literary modernism. Furthermore, Vickers’ Tiresias offers an 
additional point of gender enquiry: her decision to rationalise or undermine 
his famed gender-switching is of particular interest to the feminist critic. 
 Freud and modernism co-existed; indeed, many of Freud’s theories 
(such as the unconscious) fed directly into modernism’s fragmented 
approach to meaning and interest in the interior landscape of the mind. 
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Buchanan has referred to the “Freudian fad” in modernism (4). Meaning is 
not, in modernist literature or Freudian psychoanalysis, a fixed and 
immediately knowable concept but something which must be inferred by 
negotiating abstract symbols. It is interesting to note that there was a surge 
in interest in Sophocles’ Oedipus Rex during the modernist period; Buchanan 
has attributed this to Victorian censorship of the play (4). Censorship may be 
perhaps understood as a form of repression, and perhaps this interest in the 
myth may have been understood as a means of expressing that which had 
been exiled to the cultural unconscious. Perhaps as the re-emergence of 
Oedipus Rex after censorship led to the Freud’s mythological retelling, the 
dismissal of singular truth and meaning integral to postmodernism has given 
birth to the feminist reappropriations we find in the Canongate series. 
 In Where Three Roads Meet, Freud refers to Virginia Woolf, 
commenting that the birds “speak Greek to her” when she is suffering from 
periods of mental illness (23). Freud’s life is thus clearly identified as situated 
within the Modernist period; in fact, Woolf was one of the people who greeted 
Freud when he arrived in the UK and he presented her, rather tellingly, with a 
narcissus (Woolf, The Diary of Virginia Woolf 202). In addition to locating 
Freud’s life within a literary history, it also draws attention to the fact that the 
birds speak Greek in Woolf’s literature: she, along with many other modernist 
writers, had an enduring preoccupation with mythology.53 Bell has noted the 
importance of Frazer’s The Golden Bough, published in 1890 and cites John 
 
53 See, for example, discussions about mythologies in To the Lighthouse (Guth 2). 
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B. Vickery, who has observed that despite being a work of Victorian 
scepticism, The Golden Bough incited in modernist writers a keen interest in 
the mythological stories which had lost prominence (Bell 18).54 Bell has 
characterised mythopoeia – mythmaking – as the “underlying metaphysic of 
modernist literature” (1–2).  Within this modernist process of myth re-
evaluation, the figure of Tiresias was of particular interest. Woolf’s Orlando 
(1928) is the story of a man who becomes a woman and lives for 300 years – 
a Modernist Tiresias. Guillaume Apollinaire wrote a surrealist play entitled 
“The Breasts of Tiresias” in 1917. Tiresias is, perhaps most famously, a 
named speaker within T.S. Eliot’s The Waste Land and like Vickers’ Tiresias, 
against the landscape of the waste land he is still struggling to make sense 
of that which is revealed and concealed. The Waste Land will be used here 
as a lens through which to make sense of Vickers’ means of creating 
meaning, particularly meaning pertaining to gender.  
 The poem is significant in other works by Vickers; The Other Side of 
You (2003) has, as its epigraph, the section of the poem which reads: 
 Who is the third who always walks beside you? 
 When I count, there are only you and I together, 
 There is always another one walking beside you  
 … 
 But who is that on the other side of you 
 (Eliot, The Waste Land and Other Poems 79-80) 
 
“The other side of you” is in Vickers’s text understood as the unconscious 
version of the self, as the novel details the psychiatric relationship between 
 
54 Vickers comments: “What is most striking is the depth to which it has permeated the 
cultural strata of our time. In literature alone it touches nearly everything, from the most 
significant to the most ephemeral works” (3).  
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its protagonists. Published after The Other Side of You, Where Three Roads 
Meet also indicates an awareness of, and interest in, Eliot’s most famous 
poetic work. 
Eliot discusses James Joyce’s use of mythology as “a way of 
controlling, ordering, of giving a shape and a significance to the immense 
panorama of futility and anarchy which is contemporary history […in] using 
the myth, in manipulating a continuous parallel between contemporaneity 
and antiquity, Mr Joyce is pursuing a method which others must pursue after 
him”  (“‘Ulysses’, Order and Myth” 177). Jewel Spears Brooker has called the 
mythic method “a defining feature of this modernism, namely, the tendency 
to move forward by spiralling back and refiguring the past” (1–2). Myth 
becomes a framework which can order that which is felt to be chaotic and 
disordered, and allows a writer to access and understand a literary history, 
using that history to map the present and suggest the future. Eliot seems to 
follow his own advice, using mythological references which provide moments 
of order – or at least, recognisable tradition – within the “heap of broken 
images” presented throughout (The Waste Land and Other Poems 64). 
 The role Tiresias plays in this process is significant, as Marlowe Miller 
has observed. Tiresias is the “controlling sensibility” of the poem, “a blend of 
both male and female” (138). Eliot himself confirmed his importance in his 
notes on The Waste Land, claiming that “Tiresias, although a mere spectator 
and not indeed a ‘character’, is yet the most important personage in the 
poem, uniting all the rest”. Eliot also states that he believes all the women in 
the poem are one, and all the men are one, and together the polyphonic 
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community of speakers come together, united in the hermaphrodite Tiresias 
(The Waste Land and Other Poems 73). Nancy R. Comley has commented 
on the power of Tiresias (286), and in Tiresian Poetics: Modernism, 
Sexuality, Voice 1888-2001, Ed Madden comments on Tiresias’ cultural 
significance: “There is something very queer about Tiresias. Blind seer, 
articulate dead, and mythic transsexual, he has always represented a kind of 
liminal identity, and the special knowledge attributed to – or acquired as a 
result of – the crossing of epistemological and ontological boundaries” (3). 
However, he notes that in twentieth century literature, the boundaries being 
transgressed or negotiated by the “Tiresian figure” are primarily sexual. The 
suggestion is that sexual or gender liminality can lead to a special level of 
access to knowledge (similar to what we see with Cilla “Scylla” Black in Girl 
meets boy). As Madden asks:  
If the figure of Tiresias offers a fantasy of performative power that 
simultaneously depends upon and denies sexual meaning – that is, if 
the Tiresian figure evokes the sexual as an origin of corporeal and 
psychic particularity and yet constructs it as that which must be 
transcended in order to attain larger or more universalizing powers of 
vision – we must ask what is being marked, disavowed, displaced or 
refuted in representations of the Tiresian body and the Tiresian voice. 
(15) 
 
Indeed, as Madden suggests, the Tiresian is  
More often than not, a figure of the feminine located within or behind 
the male, temporally anterior or spatially interior: a feminine sensibility 
within the body of a male prophet […] Nicole Loraux identifies Tiresias 
as an “eponym” for the feminine rather than “a generalized mediator” 
of sexuality (17). 
 
 What, therefore, does it mean when we have a Tiresias who is not a 
hermaphrodite or who has had the queer lived experience of sexual 
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transformation refuted? Vickers’ Tiresias does not, after all, change genders. 
He tells Freud: 
I was a pretty boy and my mother’s colouring marked me out as 
unusual. I learned soon that I could attain special favours by offering 
favours of my own. And believe me, I did so to protect my own skin. 
There has grown a rumour that I spent seven years as a woman. Well, 




Bisexuality is an entirely natural phenomenon. I spent years analysing 
my own homosexual tendencies. (52) 
 
There is a failure here in Freud’s interpretation of Tiresias’s descriptions of 
homosexual acts. At no point does Tiresias discuss homosexual or bisexual 
desire; rather, he quite clearly states that the sexual encounters he had as a 
boy were fuelled by a desire to protect himself from threatening older males. 
These relations are ultimately transactional and were dictated by the 
situation Tiresias found himself to be in at the temple of Apollo, something 
Freud fails to consider. His rather glib response – that bisexuality is natural 
and that he himself experienced bisexual desire – ignores the context which 
influenced Tiresias’s sexual behaviour. This is not to suggest that Freud is 
incorrect here and the bisexuality is not an entirely natural phenomenon, but 
at no point does Tiresias actually talk about desire or pleasure. Rather, for 
him, bisexuality is an act he performed in order to receive certain privileges 
and to keep himself safe. The suggestion of coercion, oblique or otherwise, 
prompting Tiresias to enact these sexual behaviours to “protect his own skin” 
is rationalised rather than confronted by Freud. 
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 What is also interesting is that Tiresias explains the reason why he 
has been identified as a woman is because he performed sexual acts upon 
men. We see once more the suggestion that what makes a ‘woman’ is not 
anything intrinsic or a magical force enacted upon a being, but performed 
behaviours and occupied positions. In a manner of speaking, Tiresias did 
spend seven years as a woman, not because he was cursed to change his 
body physically but because his disadvantaged position forced him to 
behave in a way that would have been recognised, in classical Greece, as 
‘feminine’. Freud’s failure to appreciate this and to instead situate Tiresias’s 
experience within his own frame of experience again suggests his observed 
inability to consider sociological influences upon sexual behaviour. 
 The Tiresias of The Waste Land is made flesh with two descriptions of 
his physical feminine signifiers. He is described firstly as an “Old man with 
wrinkled female breasts” and then again as “old man with wrinkled dugs”, 
dugs an archaic word for the female breast (The Waste Land and Other 
Poems 74). The poem suggests that whilst Tiresias may have breasts, he 
remains an “old man” and this femininity is external to his internal, masculine 
self. Indeed, the repeated assertion that they are “wrinkled”, suggesting age 
and obsolescence in terms of milk and sustenance, emphasises that while 
Tiresias may have been conceived as a liminal, unifying voice within the 
fractured poem, he is essentially male with the adornments of femininity. This 
supports Madden and Loraux’s reading of the poem, whereby femininity is 
fixed “on top” of masculinity as an extra sensibility or symbol of an access to 
expanded understanding. Yet Vickers’ Tiresias is not rendered in this way. 
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The symbol of the breast, discussed earlier and particularly significant within 
critiques of Freudian psychoanalysis, is never evoked and in fact, the 
physical, gendered aspects of Tiresias’s liminality are removed. Instead, we 
find a Tiresias who supports a view of gender as positional and performed, 
an interesting departure from earlier retellings. Vickers’ Tiresias is no longer 
a primarily male figure containing femininity within him in a “temporally 
anterior or spatially interior” way, nor is he used as an “eponym” for the 
feminine. What at first could be read as a dismissive rationalisation or 
scorning of hermaphroditism could instead be seen as a way of 
acknowledging that femininity is not something which can be contained 
within masculinity, in contradiction to Mitchell’s argument about masculinity 
meaning activity and being accessible to all.  
 This emphasis of gender as positionality allows, therefore, other 
liminal aspects of Tiresias’s character to be prioritised. He is the conduit 
between the gods and mankind, and sits between the past and the future. He 
is also the interlocutor between Where Three Roads Meet and the literature 
of the past. There are two other key shared intertextual references worthy of 
consideration: an allusion between Apollo and Cleopatra, and a reference to 
the myth of Philomela, whose tongue was cut out after she was raped by her 
brother-in-law. Regarding the first of these, Tiresias says that Apollo first 
appeared at Delphi as a dolphin. Freud quotes Antony and Cleopatra to 
make sense of this for himself: “His delights were dolphin-like; they show’d 
his back above the element they lived in”; Tiresias agrees with this 
characterisation (172). Antony and Cleopatra is one of the four Shakespeare 
280 
 
plays which are referred to within The Waste Land, where we find Cleopatra 
sitting on a “burnished throne” (77). It is interesting that these two points of 
intertextual reference relate to female victimhood: Philomela, who cannot 
speak her trauma, and Cleopatra, who cannot live with hers.  
The novella’s direct engagement with the myth of Procne and 
Philomela is of particular interest. Vickers describes the myth as “the story of 
the pair of benighted sisters whose spirits were transformed at death, one 
into a swallow, the other a nightingale” (36). Philomel(a) is thus described in 
The Waste Land: 
 The change of Philomel, by the barbarous king 
 So rudely forced; yet there the nightingale 
 Filled all the desert with inviolable voice 
 And still she cried, and still the world pursues, 
 “Jug jug” to dirty ears. (68) 
 
In the classical myth, Philomela was raped by Tereus, the husband of her 
sister Procne. Defiantly daring to speak against him, he cut her tongue out. 
Unable to speak, she wove a tapestry to tell her story and sent it to her 
sister. In revenge, Procne killed their son Itys and served him to Tereus to 
eat. They fled Tereus’ brutal axe-wielding fury and were saved by the gods, 
who turned them into birds. Philomel became the nightingale, a bird rich in 
literary significance, with writers from Homer to Keats to Margaret Atwood all 
considering the tragic story in their works. Vickers’ fleeting mention of 
Philomela in Where Three Roads Meet when Tiresias discusses his mother 
draws attention to how his mother too was the victim of male violence. It also 
connects the text to The Waste Land, with Tiresias the “controlling 
sensitivity” of both texts, and Philomel’s sorrowful voice echoing within both.  
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Beyond reference, Where Three Roads Meet is speaking to 
modernism in a more profound way. Angie Voela has tied contemporary 
postmodern exhaustion to the Oedipus myth. She says that “Oedipus never 
doubted his ability to reach the truth and the Sophoclean drama never 
problematized truth, making it the only possible outcome of a rational inquiry” 
(4). Whilst Vickers’ version of the truth is not singular – Freud’s 
interpretations are often incorrect or open to discussion, Jocasta’s 
motivations are never truly understood – the drive to truth is similarly 
presented in Where Three Roads Meet, though the drive to pure rationality 
is, as Vickers points out, a “dark horse”. Voela states that in the twenty-first 
century, “We generally accept that contemporary individuality is constituted 
reflexively […] the situation is made worse by the ongoing crisis of the 
financial and social institutions which are both unable and unwilling to 
support the individual as before” (4). This reflexive constitution is commented 
upon by Tiresias: 
Who are any of us, “finally” Dr Freud? As the riddle suggested, he was 
both many and one. 
 - Of course we are all a crowd. 
 - Or a play. (186) 
 
Here, the two speakers are acknowledging the ways in which we contribute 
to each other’s identity, the multi-faceted nature of individual identities, and 
furthermore, identity’s ultimate performativity. Voela, considering that 
postmodern exhaustion, agrees with Stiegler, who believes we need to find 
“new ways of re-enchanting the world and re-igniting hope” (4). Whilst Where 
Three Roads Meet is not necessarily a source of hope, it certainly may be 
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seen as a re-enchantment of a story and is clearly a subtle reassessment of 
both its subject and its source myth. Oedipus’s life beyond Freud is 
considered and hints toward a return to, if not the unproblematized truth of 
Sophocles, a truth that is created and performed reflexively and communally. 
In the novella, for Tiresias and Oedipus, truth is something one must attempt 
to access, whatever the personal cost or even the ultimate futility of the 
endeavour. Eleven years after the publication of Where Three Roads Meet, 
we find ourselves concerned with the damaging effects of a post-truth world 
and the social media propelled threat of ‘alternative facts’. But these novellas 
are all suggesting that the drive towards truth, even when it is damaging and 
uncomfortable, even when it is impossible, is something that we all 
experience.  
 Thus revising mythology becomes, rather like Freud’s 
conceptualization of psychosexual development: something done continually, 
in a performed way, and only ever vicariously. Yet the drive to do this 
remains. The Canongate Myths’ response to modernism, marking a stark 
move away from postmodernism, is varied and nuanced. Whether we 
ascribe to the ‘metamodernism’ seemingly at work in Girl meets boy, or 
consider the post-postmodern elements of Weight, modernism may be 
traced as a ghost haunting these works. Zajko and O’Gorman comment on 
how: 
Even the very name of a mythic figure can function as a profoundly 
intertextual moment, which connects a text to a well-known set of 
important issues. The moderns have their own form of exemplary 
usage, where ancient myth enters the vocabulary in order to endow 
ordinary and everyday experience with a sense of more profound 
283 
 
significance. Myth becomes one of the means of narrating, 
comprehending, but also elevating human experience. (3) 
 
In the post-postmodern world, literature’s heap of broken images is more 
fractured than ever before. But we see how rewriting mythology becomes a 
performed act, acknowledging the ways in which we and our stories are 
constructed from these shards. After all, as Tiresias says to Freud, “stories 
are all we humans have to make us immortal” (174). 
 
An Ivory Shoulder 
 
Where Three Roads Meet makes use of both the myths of Philomela, sad 
nightingale of The Waste Land, and of Pelops. These two myths share 
certain themes. As discussed, Demeter’s “abstraction” following 
Persephone’s abduction led to her taking a bite out of Pelops’ shoulder. 
Philomela’s rape led to Procne feeding her son Itys to his father. In the face 
of sexual assault, Philomela is left silent and Demeter is utterly preoccupied 
by her grief; both stories end in cannibalism. The aftermath of rape resulting 
in the consumption of male flesh may be read as a comment on the 
corrupting nature and inheritance of sexual violence. It is an interesting use 
of two such brutal tales. When discussing the myth of Pelops, Tiresias 
muses: 
What is it to remember? Re-member. To put a body together again. 
But in the reconstruction what gets put in, or left out? An ivory 






It is all encrypted in the body. What is not recollected is ineluctably re-
enacted. (124) 
 
This refers to the piece of ivory used to replace the bite taken from Pelops’ 
shoulder by Demeter. Pelops is never complete and his dismembering 
begins his family’s curse. This discussion, which turns to Oedipus’s 
suppressed memory of his mother being demonstrated through paranoia, 
could be read too as a metaphor for rewriting. Rewriting is a never-
completed process of re-membering and reconstruction, with choices being 
made as to what gets put in or left out. It may be a process whereby writers 
replace fundamental stories, flesh and blood, with “ivory shoulders”, yet as 
Freud comments, what is left out becomes encrypted in the body and leads 
to ineluctable re-enactment.  
 Thus Where Three Roads Meet may be best understood as a re-
membering, a bringing to the surface of that which has been left out and 
become encrypted in the body feminine. The importance of that which is “left 
out” and its effect upon our unconscious and in turn our bodies, brings us 
back to the dominant silences within the text. By stressing Anna and 
Jocasta’s silence and inscrutability within this context, the reader is being 
made aware of the process by which feminine narratives become 
suppressed or repressed. When we hear about the myths of Jocasta, 
Philomela, Demeter and Persephone, we learn about the dangers of silence 
and repression. When we see Anna caring for her father or Jocasta 
occupying her dual mother-wife role, we see a re-enactment of prescribed 
femininity which seems inescapable. Yet, as Eliot proved in The Waste Land, 
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the breaking apart and reconstructing of myths has a power of its own and 
can speak to different moments and occasions. Where Three Roads Meet 
stands upon the ivory shoulders of Eliot’s Modernist poem and ultimately 






















 Some stories always need telling more than others. Right, Anthea? 
 Right, Grandad, I say.  
 (Girl meets boy 17)  
 
The conclusion of Diane Purkiss’s essay “Women’s Rewriting of Myth” 
emphasises that no approach to mythological revision is perfect. She does 
state, however 
This does not imply that judgement must be suspended; it’s more 
important to be wary and ironic about the strategies available when 
none are foolproof. A bit of political nous is useful too; it’s self-evident 
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that there are occasions when one story will be more helpful than 
another. Women must continue to struggle to tell the stories 
otherwise. The possibilities are endless (455).  
 
Anthea’s grandfather, having told the tale of political firebrand Burning Lil, 
reminds his granddaughter of the relative value of telling some stories. The 
stories told herein are all narratives which attempt to make and represent 
something true, without ignoring the inherent problems that arise when we 
speak of universal truth. They are also, in their varying ways, struggles – 
each wrestles with a different aspect of mythology, with different bodies of 
thought, and with different versions of femininity. What they share is the 
“political nous” Purkiss advocates, perhaps espoused by the nature of their 
commissioning, and the results have often been presented in equivocal, 
ironic ways whilst continuing to strive for those endless possibilities. 
 Whilst these possibilities may be limitless, the scope of this project is 
not. There is so much more to be said about this unique collection of texts, 
this singular and highly revealing project. I invite other critics to make a 
palimpsest of my work and to consider perhaps the female-authored texts 
beyond the Greco-Roman pantheon, or look at the ways in which masculinity 
has been constructed by authors such as Daniel Grossman, Philip Pullman 
and Alai. Broader work on how feminist rewriting of mythology may be 
conceived as a collaborative practice using texts beyond the Canongate 
project would also be a worthwhile area of study.  
 The limitations of this thesis are many. The sheer density of the four 
novellas and their constant capacity to provoke thought and evoke broader 
philosophies have necessitated a fairly broad survey. This may similarly be 
288 
 
seen as a strength and I also identify my role as a critic as partial, pragmatic 
and positional, adopting positions to help advance a larger argument which 
may have inadvertently left unexamined more detailed or closer 
considerations. Wherever possible I have tried to include a broad array of 
secondary sources and incorporate as many women and critics of colour as I 
can; this may not be a perfect example of such a practice but it was a sincere 
attempt and part of my praxis which is always in development. Whilst class, 
as an intersectional concern, was touched upon briefly, it has not been 
considered in as much detail as I might have liked and it must be 
acknowledged that  this thesis, its authors and seemingly its characters, are 
overwhelmingly white. These must be taken as lessons for the future. Yet it 
is hoped that despite these acknowledged restrictions, this thesis has 
affirmatively answered its primary research question: is a feminist rewriting of 
mythology possible? 
  I contend that all of the texts discussed in detail within this thesis 
represent examples of rewritings of mythology which can indeed be 
understood as feminist. This is not to assert categorically that their authors 
are necessarily themselves feminists; as discussed earlier, there are 
complexities in such characterisations, particularly regarding Atwood and 
Winterson. But the texts themselves approach mythology in a way which 
must be identified as feminist. They have all used the Canongate brief to 
explore, through various measures, the way myth has depicted and often 
maligned femininity. From this, they have generated four novellas which, in 
complicated ways, operate according to the ten theses I presented in the 
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introductory chapter, which I will repeat here as a departure point for the final 
evaluation of this thesis: 
 
1. Feminist rewriters of myth are critical readers of myth 
2. Myth engages with its personal and public significances 
Consideration is paid to both the personal and public significances of the 
rewritten myth in particular and the concept of myth in general, as pertains to 
representations of women and gender. 
3. Rewritten myths engage in ‘metamythmaking’  
In this way, they take part in the mythologizing of female authorship. 
4. Mythmaking is a collaborative process 
It is recognised as cooperative and continuous, with no definitive end nor one 
definitive voice.  
5. Individual myths are time-and-context bound  
Each myth becomes situated within the ongoing process of mythmaking 
whilst aware of its own moment.  
6. Individual female subjectivities are presented within broader female 
communities 
Myth is used to interrogate the relationship between the individual and her 
community, with the community’s advancement of paramount importance. 
7. Myths expand their own ‘halo of virtualities’. 
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Myths do not accept their earlier editions wholly, nor respond purely with 
hostility, but use the narrative and textual methods within that narrative to 
expand the ‘halo of virtualities’ around each myth. This may be through direct 
or indirect means. 
8. Myth is self-consciously literary 
The literariness of myth is apprehended through a self-conscious 
consideration of the process of its construction, its transmission and place 
within a canon. This can also be demonstrated by a discernible awareness of 
myth’s palimpsestic nature and considerations of ‘truth’ and ‘authenticity’. 
9. Myth uses both high and low culture 
This elides the boundaries between the privileged domain of the classically 
educated and popular literature, so as to better represent varying female 
experiences and languages. 
10.  Myth engages with contemporary critical discussions  
A consideration of contemporary discourse is not only ensures that myth is 
time-and-context bound, but it allows myth to be used to promote the female 
writer within her own critical landscape. 
Every one of the four Canongate Myths selected for this study represents an 
author who is responding to their source myth in a critical way. Whether it is 
an outward dismissal of the singular truth of the Odyssey in The Penelopiad, 
where Atwood’s foreword accuses Homer of “too many inconsistencies” and 
the Maids suggest multiple interpretations through their interludes, or 
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Tiresias illuminating Freud’s reading of the Oedipus myth by suggesting he 
was the only man to not suffer from his eponymous complex, these texts 
have all problematised their sources in considerable ways. Heracles is 
removed from his heroic pedestal and Iphis does not become a boy, with 
Ovid’s obsession with what people had under their togas humorously 
identifying us to that critical engagement with the source. These are 
considerable shifts, not merely in terms of narrative, but in terms of approach 
to established story.  
 Relevant too for each author are the questions of the personal and 
public significances of mythology, first identified by Ostriker and then 
expanded herein. The Canongate project engrained in the authors an 
awareness from the outset of the public significance of myth. At its most 
basic, it is significant within this context as a marketing ploy. This public 
significance was reasserted with every published addition to the corpus, with 
the Canongate thesis statement pasted atop each and every new rewritten 
myth emphasising this very facet. But none of these texts were content to 
simply use a recognisable ancient narrative to create something directly for 
the market; indeed, at times the recognised public significance of the 
rewritings flew in the face of expectation, as evidenced by the more critical 
reviews. This public significance is present in Penelope’s self-
characterisation as a “stick used to beat other women with”; Atwood’s 
establishment of this accepted ideal of wifely loyalty then ironically subverted 
by her Penelope functioning more as an unhappy and troublesome individual 
than as a paragon of feminine perfection. In this way, The Penelopiad 
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indicates an awareness of Penelope’s public reception and simultaneously 
expands her significance beyond those parameters.  
 The public significance of the Oedipus myth is unavoidable in Where 
Three Roads Meet. As Tiresias tells Freud, the story has never been the 
same since he told it, and we are reminded consistently of the effect one 
retelling of a myth has had upon the public psyche, and, indeed, upon our 
understanding of how that psyche works. Questions of the public significance 
of the Oedipal myth regarding gender are confronted too; through silence 
and a state of lack the reader is forced to acknowledge how the process of 
mythological transmission of this story failed to consider the motivation of its 
primary female character, Jocasta, and how Freud’s inability to apprehend 
this informed, in part, his inability to adequately theorise the feminine, thus 
leading to the profound and symbolic female silencing within the text. 
 Smith’s rewrite is also aware of the public significance, not just of 
Ovid’s myth of Iphis and Ianthe but of all myths. The marketing myths of the 
Pure corporation and myths about lesbian sexuality perpetuated in the 
Inverness pub sit alongside an interrogation of the myths we construct about 
gender. Myths about our relationship to the natural world are similarly 
explored through a loving rejuvenation of the nonhuman landscape and an 
eroticization of natural language. Smith’s connection of those myths to her 
source myth establishes all of these mythologies as significant within the 
public realm and something which, according to “the message boys” (Anthea 
and Robin) “MUST CHANGE” (133). 
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 It’s present too in Weight, felt in Winterson’s considerations of 
authenticity and the ‘real’, opposing her “authentic” revision against “reality 
TV or the kind of plodding fiction that only works as low-grade documentary” 
(xix). An interesting dimension in Winterson’s myth is that in addressing so 
particularly the personal significance of the myth of Atlas for her as a writer, 
she is in turn addressing the public myth of herself as writer, sharing with her 
public readership different versions of the events of her life presented in 
Oranges are Not the Only Fruit which had been assumed to be purely 
autobiographical since. But for Weight the primary consideration is the 
private significance of the myth; Winterson’s exploration of the myth of Atlas 
clearly resonated with her in a deep, and I suggest, Jungian way, providing 
her with the language to articulate what had been previously repressed and 
paving the way to her writing Why Be Happy When You Could Be Normal? 
 Where Three Roads Meet should also surely be seen as an 
engagement with the private significance of myth, given Vickers’s profession 
as a psychoanalyst. Approaching the Oedipus myth, the narrative which lent 
itself to Freud’s most famous theory and the “shibboleth” of all subsequent 
psychoanalytic enquiry, afforded an opportunity to reconsider the lynchpin of 
this most complex of complexes. For Atwood, The Penelopiad provided the 
opportunity to re-engage with themes and characters first explored in her 
poetry. For Smith, we can infer the personal significance of the embodiment 
and eroticization of her native landscape, the city of Inverness. Beyond these 
identified significances there are, of course, the personal significances that 
cannot be adequately mapped: the alterations on an unconscious level which 
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occur as a result of rewriting for both writers and readers. The expansion of 
myth’s halo of virtualities, reiterated throughout, renders possible new 
mythological configurations within our personal unconscious which may in 
time become consciously felt. 
 Feminist metamythmaking, identified earlier in this study as the 
process of self-consciously identifying the process of mythmaking so that it in 
turn becomes a myth and thus simultaneously expands the myth’s 
significance and draws attention to its nature as a constructed narrative, is 
present throughout all of these texts. From Winterson’s mythologising of the 
phone call she received from Canongate, to the establishment of Anthea and 
Robin as mutual mythmakers and to Atwood’s informative introduction where 
she details the research she conducted into the mythmaking process which 
supported her own mythmaking process, the novellas all betray a self-
conscious awareness of the experience of creating and recreating myth and 
their authorial presence within that experience. Vickers is possibly the least 
present authorial voice in her novella, but even she cannot resist contributing 
an author’s note which details her research and justifies her choices, 
detailing that like Atwood, she also attempted to draw on “other, more 
fragmentary, sources” whilst constructing her rewrite. These stories become 
enquiries as much as narratives and throughout, the female rewriter makes 
herself felt as she writes. The myth of the female mythmaker is thus 
expanded when we read these stories. 
 Another quality I identified earlier as positive within a feminist rewriting 
is the text’s refusal to privilege absolute versions and the recognition of 
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mythmaking as an ongoing process in which not only one voice is heard. All 
four novellas draw upon many sources: fragmentary tales, oral traditions, 
personal experience, through epigraphs the works of E.M. Forster, Joseph 
Roth, Kathy Acker, John Lyly and Robert Graves, and of course modernist 
authors such as Eliot and Joyce. In this way, they are intertextual 
negotiations between stories, using other versions and other voices to 
influence their own voice. All four texts are themselves clearly polyphonic; in 
The Penelopiad we have Penelope and her chorus of maids; in Weight we 
have the voice of Atlas through indirect discourse and the voice of Winterson 
through direct confession; in Girl meets boy the me, you, them, us, all 
together now complement and the layering of storytelling that occurs 
between Anthea and her lover and in Where Three Roads Meet we have the 
voice of Freud himself from Interpreting Dreams, Vickers’s own biographical 
account of Freud’s later life and then the imagined Freud and Tiresias in 
constant dialogue. In all four texts, therefore, a plurality of perspectives is 
created by varying and often conflicting voices. This in turn forms these 
myths’ prioritisation of connection and community, from the justice-seeking 
chorus of the maids to the elucidation of Atlas’s lonely isolation as he holds 
up the Kosmos. Together, Anthea, Midge and Robin are able to create 
political messages, where before their connection there was unhappiness 
and misunderstanding. Vickers’s establishment of the two key voices of 
Freud and Tiresias in turn draws attention to the voices still left unheard, 
Anna and Jocasta, appearing at the door with the tea tray but never admitted 
to the inner sanctum.  
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Without one single voice, the texts also do not offer definitive ends. 
The Penelopiad ends with the maids flying away as birds (196), Weight with 
“Atlas and Laika walking away” (151), Girl meets boy with the assurance that 
“death meets life meets end meets beginning all over again, the story of 
nature itself, ever-inventive, making one thing out of another” (160), and 
Where Three Roads Meet with the as-yet unknown experience awaiting 
Freud after his death, as he asks Tiresias what comes next (194), a question 
we do not learn the answer to. In this way, these texts betray that endless 
self-generating power discussed earlier, an awareness of the unfinished 
nature of story that is not purely postmodern in its desire for equivocality but 
instead acknowledges spaces to be filled by others; indeed there is the 
promise of ‘life after death’ in both Girl meets boy and Where Three Roads 
Meet, signalling the strive towards perfection that Ricoeur acknowledges as 
part of myth yet the texts understand can never be achieved. Instead, these 
are additions to an ongoing process, palimpsests which already predict the 
next layer of interpretation to be written on top of them. 
This in turn informs their constructions as contemporary, time-and-
context bound creations. Whilst Weight tends at times towards the ahistorical 
and the supposedly universal, it still acknowledges that it is a text produced 
in its moment and that the desire to “tell the story again”, repeated numerous 
times throughout, will continue to reassert itself in other contemporary 
moments. Furthermore, Winterson’s discussion of the need for authenticity in 
the time of reality TV indicates that it is, in part, a response to its own time of 
creation. Her satirical deployment of the modern men’s rights activists’ 
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language to describe women similarly establishes it as a myth aware of its 
own contemporaneity. The modern diction of both the Atwood and the Smith 
rewrites place them entirely in their early twentieth-century moment, with 
Penelope in purgatory commenting on contemporary phenomena like the 
internet and people visiting museums and her descriptions of “Odysseus and 
Telemachus snuff[ing] the Maids” suggesting a shift away from more earnest, 
weightier mythological diction. Only Where Three Roads Meet does not 
forthrightly present its identity as a myth of its moment, but it is a myth about 
another, historical moment – the death of Sigmund Freud and a 
consideration of what informed the constructions of his time-and-context 
bound mythologies. We feel this acknowledgement of the contemporaneity of 
these rewritings also through their consideration of high and low culture; 
Weight and Where Three Roads Meet are less invested in their mythification 
of low culture but in Smith we see the mythological figure of Cilla Black loom 
large and at Anthea and Robin’s wedding the Inverness Police Force band 
sing an arrangement not only of the songs of Gilbert and Sullivan but “an 
equally beautiful choral arrangement of Don’t Cha (Wish Your Girlfriend Was 
Hot Like Me)” (152). These novellas, produced by authors of literary fiction 
for a mainstream, middle-brow publishing project, perfectly represent a 
blending of cultures which help to disconnect Greco-Roman myth from its 
previously rarefied and privileged domain of the educated classes. 
Storytelling may be, as Penelope claims, a “low art”, but myth has long been 
considered to be the purview of the privileged (1). In these texts we find 
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instead an interesting navigation of associations and registers which helps to 
erode this distinction. 
 Ultimately, without exception, each of the rewritten myths in my 
selected pantheon contains within its being a mediation on where we are 
now in terms of literary culture. These myths are all trying to make sense of 
this time past postmodernism. We see Atwood’s indication of the ebbing of 
the postmodern and how it has been at times limiting in terms of its 
engagement with questions of gender. Winterson shows us clearly in Weight 
that she yearns for authenticity and boundaries, for things which can be felt 
to be real, all concepts which postmodernism taught us to be sceptical of and 
yet which we are now, in the twenty-first century, reconsidering. Girl meets 
boy seems to predict what would shortly after its publication more formally 
theorised as metamodernism; its use of literary modernism as an archive, its 
oscillations between the modern and the postmodern, and its knowingly 
flawed re-enchantment of the happy ending through a performatist approach 
are all indicative of a moving through and beyond postmodernism and 
suggestive of the shape of things to come. Where Three Roads Meet seems 
to re-deploy Eliot’s mythic method, what J.S Brooker calls “the tendency to 
move forward by spiralling back and refiguring the past” (1-2).  
 In all of these novels, this movement beyond and through considering 
what has come before is done with some form of ethical purpose and most 
particularly, a feminist purpose which redresses the asymmetries of gender 
Purkiss attributes to classical mythology. Atwood seeks justice for the 
hanged Maids; Winterson makes Hippolyte a flesh-and-blood victim whilst 
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her characterisation of Heracles holds him accountable for his crimes; Smith 
uses myth to explore the brutal commodification of our shared landscape 
whilst considering how women have similarly been misrepresented and 
Vickers offers a new consideration of a mythical interpretation which has at 
times led to misogyny and essentialism. These frank reconsiderations of how 
women have been depicted, these interrogations – of Penelope, the Maids, 
Hippolyte, Hera, Iphis, Ianthe, Jocasta, Anna – show that these rewritings 
have at their heart a feminist impulse to challenge misogynistic constructions 
of femininity. These women are all distinct individuals within their novellas 
but considered en masse they perform multiple and varying feminine 
identities operating as a collective within the project, a super-chorus 
speaking to broader questions about how we conceive and perpetuate our 
stories about women. 
 As Purkiss warns, there is no perfect revision. At times, the texts 
reveal the ongoing prevalence of the gender binary. There are questions too 
about the implications of this new literary context which may be called post-
postmodern, metamodern, hypermodern or many of the other terms male 
theorists have been keen to coin. Does this identified yearning for the real, 
the renewed interest in that which might be considered to be authentic, and 
this reconsideration of modernism lead us perilously close to the 
reinstatement of old boundaries we thought had disappeared? It is certainly a 
worthwhile consideration. Regarding this interest in modernism, it is curious 
to note that all four authors are all graduates of English Literature, with Smith 
even beginning (but abandoning) a PhD in American and Irish modernism 
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(Germana and Horton 3). Thus all four authors have had, it is presumed, an 
education in modernism and its mythical method. Given the privilege of this 
education, could it be that modernist myth becomes, rather than a liberating 
discourse for the female writer, just another body of mythological literature 
held in reserve for those lucky enough to receive a university education? 
This is clearly a danger.  
 Yet there is something both rejuvenating and reassuring in texts which 
are so clearly in favour of the power of storytelling to achieve something. I 
earlier detailed Kostkowska’s characterisation of Smith’s “essentially 
modernist confidence in the redemptive, transformative value of art” and this 
is something I feel we could apply to all of these authors. There is confidence 
enough here to aspire towards the transcendental, and if tempered, it can 
allow the political and the ethical the space for expression they have 
struggled to find in the strongest days of postmodern disintegration and 
paranoia. Sometimes it is important to adopt a position; it is also important 
for that position to be shifting and responsive. This reconsideration of the 
power of art to shape and console exists simultaneously with the 
aforementioned revitalisation of the feminist movement post-2008; we find a 
kind of hope in all of these texts, the expectation of more to come. In 2019, 
the landscape has changed even more. In the post-truth era of fake news, 
the desire for that which can be understood as true, given the damaging 




 I suggest that what becomes necessary, therefore, is the adoption of, 
as detailed previously, a rewriting that is at once earnest in its philosophies 
but ironic in its practices. These philosophies must be continually reassessed 
but this paradoxical use of irony to promote sincerity may allow for ethical 
statements to emerge from transformative works of art. Susan Sellers writes 
hopefully in her conclusion that:  
The increasing introduction of mechanical body parts will have a 
dramatic impact on the way we perceive gender, and the easy 
circulation made possible by computers will have equally radical 
implications for our myth-making. At best, the speed and facilitated 
interactivity of such communications will promote the collective and 
continual recreation exhibited as the way forward […] Whether this will 
prevent the ensuing consensus from forming itself into a new 
authoritarianism is something only the future will reveal. (139).  
 
Eighteen years after the publication of Sellers’s monograph, we do see the 
development of new authoritarianisms; as I write these very words the world 
is reeling from a terrorist attack in Christ Church, New Zealand, which 
appears to have been informed by the mythologies of alt-right discourse. Yet 
if everything can become, as Barthes believes, a myth, then to avoid myth 
altogether leaves its creation to those who would continue to perpetuate 
asymmetries in gender, class, race and ability. 
 The strategies outlined within this thesis are offered as a 
recommendation for the pragmatic tempering of absolutism; a continued 
endorsement of myth’s ongoing, palimpsestic and collaborative nature ought 
to help avoid the worst of its extremities. The female-authored Greco-Roman 
texts of the Canongate Myths series serve as four examples of how women 
writers can engage with the fraught, both true and untrue, slippery yet 
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seductive, power of myth as a creative force whilst simultaneously advancing 
a feminist position. Having thus satisfied the demands of this project, it is 
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